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ABSTRACT 
This Article has a dual focus: the use of patent portfolios for 
maximal near-term commercialization in nanobiotechnology, synthetic 
biology, and interference RNA, and the creation of commons for 
maximal long-term medical gain in these technologies.  These three 
technologies show great promise for clinical medicine, but only in the 
long-term.  At least twenty years of R&D will be required to overcome 
scientific and technological barriers to a revolutionary medical 
breakthrough.  For near-term R&D, different routes to patent portfolio-
enabled commercialization are described and prescribed.  A patent 
portfolio theory is presented which views the portfolio as the principal 
unit of intellectual property value because many firms maximize scale 
and diversity of intellectual property protection through a careful 
drafting of many distinct, but related, patents.  The theory is qualified 
by the extraordinarily valuable outlier patent that to some extent is 
“decontextualized,” i.e., its market value is partly independent from that 
of its portfolio.  Patent thickets and low quality patents, as well as recent 
doctrinal and likely forthcoming statutory changes that should reduce 
these problems, are addressed.  Multidimensional, modifiable roadmaps 
to commercialization are prescribed to meet near-term challenges.  
Research-based alliances (e.g., cross-university alliances), as well as 
exclusive licenses with start-ups, should often be considered.  Plans for 
acquiring venture capital and developing patent portfolios that attract 
good acquisition offers from pharmaceutical or biotechnology 
companies often must also be made.  Patent portfolio-enabled 
commercialization should be complemented by foundational commons 
that solidify the upstream basic science and technology building blocks 
for the technologies.  Commons are also needed for high risk, but also 
potentially very high medical return, multidisciplinary and long-term 
R&D in these three technologies. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an attempt to hit moving targets that, if captured as freeze-
frames, would defy ready characterization.  I predict probable 
developmental paths and consider feasible, though less probable, 
alternative developmental paths for three polymorphic nascent 
technologies in the life sciences: nanobiotechnology (NB/BN),1 synthetic 
 
1. A coherent distinction between “nanobiotechnology” (NB) and 
“bionanotechnology” (BN) appears exceedingly difficult.  “Nanobiotechnology” may often 
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biology, and interference RNA (RNAi).2  These three nascent 
technologies have enough similarities and differences in terms of patent 
portfolio issues, probable paths to commercial development, and 
promises for future medical advances to be fruitfully compared and 
contrasted in this Article.3  Developmental paths will evolve as 
congressional statutes, federal court doctrine, and U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) procedure also evolve over the coming years 
and decades, in part as both causes and effects of how the technologies 
evolve.4  Because of the great uncertainties involved in these evolutions, 
part of this Article thus focuses on a key to commercializing particular 
nascent life science technologies—building effective patent portfolios—
under conditions of high scientific, technological, and legal uncertainty, 
where decision-making itself is poorly understood.5   
The technological and scientific landscapes are even more complex 
than they are uncertain, although the uncertainty is a large part of the 
multilayered complexities in the pertinent sciences and technologies.6  
The breadth and overlap—and potentially overwhelmingly large 
number—of NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi patent portfolios, 
complex as they are, are exceeded in complexity by the broad and 
overlapping technologies that these portfolios could potentially cover.7  
This second, greater complexity is exceeded still by a third: multilayered 
and overlapping intracellular human genetic mechanisms and epigenetic 
systems.8  The fact that our pertinent human biology is even more 
complex than the extremely multifarious and challenging technologies 
should give us some pause when we hear of potential major medical 
 
include technology that would also be considered “bionanotechnology,” and vice versa.  
Because of this taxonomical difficulty and the related breadth of technology in a set that 
would include NB, BN, and technology in the intersection of NB and BN, 
“nanobiotechnology” will be defined broadly as NB and/or BN, or “NB/BN.”  See infra Part 
II and note 22.       
2. See infra Parts I, III–V. 
3. See infra Parts I–V. 
4. See infra Parts I–V. 
5. Cf. Interview by Sean Silverthorne with Gary P. Pisano, Harry E. Figgie, Jr. 
Professor of Business Administration, Harvard Business School, in Science Business:  What 
Happened to Biotech?, HARV. BUS. WK. (Nov. 13, 2006), available at 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/5503.html  (statement of Gary P. Pisano) (“[T]he business side of 
the [biotechnology] industry [has been] continually challenged by . . . profound and persistent 
uncertainty, [a] complex and heterogeneous . . . scientific knowledge base, and . . . rapid . . . 
scientific progress.”). 
6. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, IV–V. 
7. See infra Parts I–II, IV–V. 
8. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, V.B.1. 
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breakthroughs, such as prophylactics or cures for cancers, coming from 
the technologies anytime soon.9   
Although possible, it is not likely that such prophylactics or cures 
could come without a much more complete picture of the pertinent 
chemistry (e.g., cellular and systemic structures) and physics (e.g., 
pertinent quantum mechanical and classical forces and their influences 
on normal and pathological conditions).10  We need a deeper and more 
precise understanding of various cellular mechanisms and epigenetic 
systems (in the case of cancer, this would require, inter alia, a much 
better comprehension of the forces that promote and prevent 
carcinogenesis and metastasis).11   
In Part I, I briefly survey each of the three nascent technologies, 
creating overviews of likely near-term and long-term future 
developments.  In Part II, I look at efficacious patent portfolio 
construction and management primarily from the standpoint of how a 
patent practitioner could assist a government agency, university, or 
start-up that is looking to develop and commercialize an NB/BN, 
synthetic biology, or RNAi invention.  In Part III, I further examine 
how a practitioner could use patent portfolios to help his or her client 
via exclusive licensing, getting and maintaining venture capital, and 
becoming an attractive target for acquisition by a large pharmaceutical 
or biotechnology company.  Intellectual property (IP) is typically one of 
the most valuable assets of a government agency, university, or start-up 
seeking to commercialize innovation in cutting edge applications in the 
life sciences.12  An effective IP portfolio and a carefully planned and 
executed exclusive license between a government agency or university 
and a start-up are often crucial to receive venture capital, which has thus 
far been the lifeblood of most start-ups with very high input costs.13  
New complicated technologies almost invariably involve high input 
costs, thus creating incentives to maximize IP protection early, broadly, 
and often.14  In NB/BN, synthetic biology, and, to a lesser extent, RNAi, 
patents that were too broad in scope were pursued and granted too 
early and too often to too many inventors.15   
 
9. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, IV, V.B. 
10. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, IV, V.B. 
11. See infra Parts I, II.C.2, IV, V.B. 
12. See infra Part III. 
13. See infra Parts III.C–III.E. 
14. See infra Part II.B. 
15. See infra Part II.B in regards to nanomedicine patent applications.  Cf. Raj Bawa, 
Editorial Commentary, Will the Nanomedicine “Patent Land Grab” Thwart 
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Many patent thickets and invalid patents either loom or already 
exist, creating barriers to commercialization in sectors in all three 
nascent industries.16  Patents that become entangled in thickets probably 
face formidable validity and infringement challenges if and when the 
pertinent technology becomes commercially viable.17  The thickets thus 
create barriers to gaining that commercialization in the first place, partly 
because venture capitalists are understandably wary of investing in a 
company that is likely to face patent litigation.18  Fortunately, the federal 
courts, Congress, and the PTO are in the process of creating changes in 
the law which will help weed out the thickets and increase patent 
quality,19 although they have not gone far enough.  In Part V.A, I 
advocate further legal changes that could effect additional patent 
thicket weeding and increases in patent quality.  Finally, in Part V.B, I 
recommend an increase in the ratio of long-term rigorous, ambitious, 
and publicly funded research and development (R&D) to patent 
portfolio-driven near-term commercial R&D in these technologies.  The 
prescription is based mainly on projections that increasing this ratio 
would probably direct and expedite progress towards removing or 
circumventing scientific and technological obstacles to revolutionary 
medical applications of the technologies.20  The greatest long-term 
prospects—in terms of public good payoffs—are the improvements in 
health and increases in longevity that these still largely undeveloped life 
science technologies could provide via high-tech and highly personalized 
medicine.21 
 
Commercialization?, 1 NANOMEDICINE:  NANOTECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGY & MED. 346, 347 
(2006) [hereinafter Bawa Commentary] (stating that “[f]or more than a decade all of the 
world’s major patent offices have faced an onslaught of nanomedicine-related patent 
applications. . . . [R]esearchers, executives, and patent lawyers are making an effort to obtain 
broad protection for new nanoscale polymers and materials that have applications in 
nanomedicine.”) (citations omitted).  Such problems may not be particular to these nascent 
technologies or even to nascent technologies in general.  In the United States at least, too 
many low quality patents may be the general patent office norm, not the exception.  See Cecil 
D. Quillen, Jr., Innovation and the U.S. Patent System, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 207, 210 (2006) 
(arguing that “[t]he patent proliferation that results from the U.S. patent system’s current low 
standards for patentability and the necessity for would-be innovators to engage in defensive 
patenting is felt forcefully throughout the business community and among innovators.  More 
patents mean more patent obstacles and higher costs for would-be innovators.”).   
16. See infra Part II.B. 
17. See infra Part II.B.   
18. See infra Parts II.B, III.E. 
19. See infra Part II.C.1. 
20. See infra Part V.B.2. 
21. See infra Parts IV, V.B.2. 
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I. PRESENT AND PROBABLE FUTURE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPACITIES 
NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi are life science technologies 
that, just in the last few years, have attained a large amount of public 
and private funding—and much patenting as well—largely because of 
their perceived commercial potential in many areas, most notably, 
pharmaceuticals.  Ironically, however, there is much uncertainty—
especially in medicine—as to whether any of the technologies will make 
any truly major advances.  More fundamentally, precisely what each of 
these technologies is, how it will develop, and how to differentiate it 
from the others is also not certain.  I will not attempt to differentiate 
“nanobiotechnology” from “bionanotechnology.”22  I will instead define 
nanotechnological biotechnology/biotechnological nanotechnology 
(NB/BN) as the interface of nanotechnology with biotechnology.23  
Nanotechnology includes nanomaterials, nanointermediates, nano-
enabled products, and nanotools.24  Biotechnology includes gene 
cloning, as well as genetic, cell, and tissue engineering.25  NB/BN 
includes many technologies that are pertinent to either NB or BN, or 
 
22. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
23. Nanotechnology’s polymorphisms, combined with its poorly established scale 
definitions, create a degree of nebulousness which may be troubling for both the technology 
and patents related to it.  See Nicholas J. Uhlir, Note Throwing a Wrench In the System:  Size-
Dependent Properties, Inherency, and Nanotech Patent Applications, 16 FED. CIR. B. J. 327, 
338 (2006) (“Because nanotechnology is a rapidly evolving science, measurement standards 
often do not exist for the properties the technology exhibits.”).  Many of these 
polymorphisms exist within NB/BN.  Although nanobiotechnology and bionanotechnology 
are often used interchangeably, providing further taxonomical confusion, there also appears 
to be little discussion and no existing consensus on whether the terms are truly synonymous, 
whether it matters, and why one term is used as opposed to the other.  See Nature 
Nanotechnology, Nature Publishing Group, Editorial, Live Wires, 1 NATURE 
NANOTECHNOLOGY 79, 79 (2006) (“[S]hould the field be called nanobiotechnology or 
bionanotechnology?  Nature Nanotechnology prefers the former, and a quick search on 
Google confirms this by more than three-to-one.  But which is correct?  Are there subtle 
differences between the two?”).  Any distinction between a nanotechnological biotechnology 
(NB) subset and a biotechnological nanotechnology (BN) subset may inevitably be nebulous, 
given the evolving states of both nanotechnology and biotechnology.  Moreover, there may 
be many types of technology that could be classified as both NB and BN.   
24. See LUX RESEARCH, THE LUX NANOTECH INDEX (2007), available at 
http://www.luxresearchinc.com/pxn.php [hereinafter LUX NANOTECH INDEX] (referring to 
nanomaterials, nanointermediates, nano-enabled products, and nanotools as four stages of a 
nanotechnology value chain).     
25. See generally HARVEY LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL BIOLOGY (Sara 
Tenney ed., 6th ed. 2008) (1986).  As with the list of types of nanotechnology just given, see 
LUX NANOTECH INDEX, supra note 24, this list of types of biotechnology represents the 
technology accurately, but not comprehensively. 
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both.26  RNAi—i.e., microRNA (miRNA) or short interfering RNA 
(siRNA)—is a fairly recently discovered means of gene silencing.27  
 
26. For example,  biomolecular and biomimetic devices; biosensors; molecular motors; 
biomolecular fabrics; bioseparations via nanofiltration; subsets of engineered enzymes and 
proteins created by metabolic engineering; nanoparticle-enabled drug discovery and delivery; 
other nanotherapeutics and nanodiagnostics; optical semiconductors; catalysts for organic 
reaction; use of nanobiomimetics in nonbiological systems; and use of actin filaments in 
electronic circuitry.  This representative list of technologies in the interface of 
nanotechnology and biotechnology, though longer than the representative list for either 
technology alone, see supra notes 24–25, is still far from comprehensive. 
27. See A DICTIONARY OF BIOLOGY 42, 568-72 (Robert S. Hine ed., Oxford 
University Press 6th ed. 2008) (describing succinctly how RNAi evolved from antisense DNA 
technology and how double-stranded RNA (dsRNA) is superior to antisense single-stranded 
DNA (ssDNA) as a silencing tool in that dsRNA is not susceptible to degradation via 
DNAases).  There are two RNAi sequential pathways:  (1) a miRNA pathway; (i) a Dicer 
protein cuts precursor fragments of miRNA into shorter fragments, typically twenty-one-to-
twenty-two nucleotides, (ii) a gene strand associates with an assembly of proteins, the RNA-
induced silencing complex (RISC), (iii) “miRNA binds imperfectly to target . . . [the 
complementary messenger RNA (mRNA) base sequence,] causing suppression of translation 
. . . but not degradation of the mRNA”; and (2) a siRNA pathway.  Id. at 570–71.  (emphasis 
added).  The siRNA pathway also uses a Dicer cut and RISC assembly, although, unlike with 
miRNA, the siRNA-RISC complex “binds to [the] target mRNA [base] sequence completely, 
triggering cleavage and degradation of the mRNA.”  Id. at 571 (emphasis added).  RNAi is 
described as having much promise to knockout specific genes to understand their function 
and for new forms of targeted gene therapy, especially in oncology.  See id at 571.  Precursors 
to siRNA “originate from various sources, including virus infection, introduced transgenes, 
and transposons,” so it helps protect cells by targeting viral RNA for destruction and by 
silencing transposons.  Id. at 571.  Transposons, or transposable elements (Tn elements), are 
“jumping” DNA sequences that can transpose across the genome via the enzyme transposase, 
thus mutating genes and damaging chromosomes.  The siRNA-guided silencing mechanism 
prevents the “jump” by destroying the complementary mRNA for transposable elements and 
thereby precluding the production of transposase.  See Philip D. Zamore, Genomic Defence 
with a Slice of Pi, 446 NATURE 864, 864 (2007); GEORGE M. MALACINSKI & DAVID 
FREIFELDER, ESSENTIALS OF MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 364–65 (3rd ed. 1998).  See also 
Gilbert Chin & Jake Yeston, Editors’ Choice:  Promoting Silence, 317 SCIENCE 427, 427, 429 
(2007) (discussing Jiang Han et al., Promoter-associated RNA is Required for RNA-directed 
Transcriptional Gene Silencing in Human Cells, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 12422 (2007)) 
(providing a very brief review of the capacity of RNAi to modulate gene expression by either 
degrading mRNA or blocking translation and reporting that siRNAs in yeast act by 
degrading “low-abundance nascent transcripts, rather than on the DNA.”).  Chin & Yeston, 
supra.  “In human cells, siRNAs directed against promoter sequences can block gene 
transcription.  Do these siRNAs act on the promoter DNA or, as in yeast, an RNA species?”  
Id. at 429.  Research also suggests that suppressing a variant of a human EF1a mRNA 
promoter approximately 230 base pairs upstream from this promoter reduces the ability of 
siRNA to induce transcriptional silencing.  Id.  When miRNA, but not siRNA, act on mRNA 
such that translational blocking occurs sans mRNA degradation, the degree of translational 
blocking may need to be proportionate to the amount of mRNA.  This would be true if 
pertinent bacterial findings can be extrapolated to yeast (and possibly to humans), because 
bacterial research has found the ratio of mRNA/protein production to be constant.  See 
Narendra Maheshri & Erin K. O’Shea, Living with Noisy Genes:  How Cells Function 
Reliably with Inherent Variability in Gene Expression, 36 ANN. REV. BIOPHYSICS 
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Similarly, synthetic biology is a fairly new area of bioengineering with 
ambitions such as the artificial synthesis of macro-level biological 
systems using programmable parts or “gene switches” connected via a 
modular interface.28  There are many technologies that intersect two of 
the three nascent technologies of NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi, 
and some in the interface of all three.  Some of these intersecting 
technologies are potentially highly salutary.29  However, the three 
technologies are often discussed separately in both scientific literature 
and legal literature.  These considerations support the mutual coverage 
and the separate categorization of the three technologies in this Article.   
 
BIOMOLECULAR STRUCTURE 413, 418 (2006) (reviewing experiments that utilized 
“stochastic [in vivo] models of gene expression to infer . . . mRNA[] and protein dynamics . . . 
[from] static snapshots of protein distribution . . . [which created] steady-state protein levels . . 
. [that confirmed] the validity of the common assumption that protein production is 
proportional to mRNA levels”). 
28. See, e.g., Sapna Kumar & Arti Rai, Synthetic Biology:  The Intellectual Property 
Puzzle, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1745, 1746 (2007).   
Synthetic biology’s long-term goals encompass such far-reaching possibilities as 
constructing an entirely artificial programmable genome from standard parts. . . . 
More immediately, synthetic biology “systems”—that is, organisms engineered with 
artificial metabolic pathways composed of a number of different standard parts—
have produced important concrete results, including the possibility of unlimited 
supplies of previously expensive drugs for malaria. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
29. In the interface of NB/BN’s potential cellular applications and synthetic biology’s 
engineering ambitions, see, for example, Richard Jones, Thesis, What Can Biology Teach 
Us?, 1 NATURE NANOTECHNOLOGY 85, 86 (2006) (conjecturing that some physicists might 
want to take synthetic biology’s engineering ambition of reintroducing systemic functionality 
to a stripped-down host organism further by using nature’s design of the cell as a roadmap for 
synthesizing all of the synthetic components of the cell).  See also Mitchel J. Doktycz & 
Michael L. Simpson, Perspective, Nano-Enabled Synthetic Biology, 3:125 MOLECULAR 
SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 1, 1–7 (2007) (arguing that the use of unique physical properties of 
nanoscale materials, guided by systems biology principles, permit the construction of 
synthetic structures with cell-like characteristics).  The authors outline the research needed 
for the creation of nano-enabled synthetic biology.  Nano-enabled synthetic biology will 
ultimately include hybrid systems that expand the synthetic biology toolbox, with the possible 
eventual realization of “synthetic systems of high functional density and cell-like complexity.”  
Id. at 7.  In the interface of NB/BN and RNAi, see, for example, Robert Berry, Dendritic 
Nanotechnologies, Inc.:  The Keys to Nanotechnology—Precision, Scalability, and 
Reproducibility, 2 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 175, 179–80 (2005) (arguing that dendritic 
polymer nanostructures would be excellent reagents for the delivery of siRNA in vivo and in 
vitro).  In the interface of RNA generally (and thus not just RNAi) and synthetic biology, see 
Farren J. Isaacs et al., Review, RNA Synthetic Biology, 24 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 545, 
545–53 (2006), for a discussion of various computational and directed-evolution ambitions for 
engineering both more complex RNA systems and novel, diverse RNA molecules that could 
sense, probe, and control a variety of cellular, molecular, and large-scale systemic 
components, and the obstacles to realizing these ambitions. 
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A.  The Present and Near Future: Incremental Progress 
Pharmaceuticals are perhaps the most promising area for all three 
fields.  However, a distinction must be made between that which has 
been patented and that which has actually convinced the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) that it is safe and effective for medical use.  
There are frequent reports of nanotechnology drug delivery tools and 
nano-reformulated drugs in “existing use.”30  However, in its most recent 
consumer update, dated July 25, 2007, the FDA states: 
 
Some day, you may see nanotechnology used . . . to provide new 
drugs that are able to reach sites in the body more effectively and 
at safer doses[,] create tiny sensors that detect diseases in the 
body far earlier than existing diagnostic tools[,] [and] 
manufacture incredibly small pumps that can be implanted to 
deliver lifesaving medications precisely to the cells and tissues 
that need them.31 
 
In contrast, the FDA’s list of current medical uses includes only the 
most mundane and apparently least risky applications, such as 
sunscreens and protective and glare-reducing coatings for eyeglasses.32  
The FDA indirectly addresses this discrepancy, but does not clearly 
 
30. E.g., Peter Coffee, Fads and Hype in Technology:  The Sargasso Sea of “Some Day 
Soon,” in LYNN E. FOSTER, NANOTECHNOLOGY:  SCIENCE, INNOVATION, AND 
OPPORTUNITY 19, 28 (2006) (arguing that nanotechnology is not a fad, but a trend, as 
indicated by “existing uses, such as . . . drug-delivery tools”); Paul J.A. Borrn & David 
Berube, A Tale of Opportunities, Uncertainties, and Risks, 3 NANOTODAY 56, 57–58 (2008) 
(reporting both that a rapidly increasing nano-based market includes medical products such 
as heart valves, drug delivery systems, and imaging techniques and that nanosilver coatings 
are also increasingly used in products such as wound dressings and urinary catheters). 
31. Press Release, U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Consumer Update, FDA 
Readies for More ‘Nanoscale’ Challenges (July 25, 2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/consumer/updates/nanotech072507.html [hereinafter FDA Readies for 
More Nanoscale Challenges] (emphasis added). 
32.   [A] few cosmetic products claim to contain nanoparticles to increase the 
stability or modify [the] release of ingredients.  Similarly[, the] FDA is aware 
of nanotechnology-related claims made for certain sunscreens.  We are 
currently not aware of any safety concerns[,] but [the] FDA is planning 
additional studies to examine the effects of select nanoparticles on skin 
penetration. 
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA AND NANOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS:  
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, http://www.fda.gov/nanotechnology/faqs.html (last visited 
Nov. 07, 2008) [hereinafter FDA Statement on Whether There are Regulated Nanotech 
Products] (answering the question “[a]re there any FDA-regulated products currently on the 
market that employ nanotechnology?”). 
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state whether non-sunscreen or non-cosmetic uses (e.g., prescription 
drugs or medical devices used for medical prevention or treatment) of 
nanotechnology are currently marketed.33  The contrast between 
apparent overstatements of the extent of present pharmaceutical 
applications from enthusiastic private sources and the FDA’s apparent 
excess caution in focusing mostly on cosmetics and sunscreens may 
reflect source-driven agendas that lead to questions of bias.  That said, 
most likely even very enthusiastic industry representatives would admit 
that technological barriers to the use of NB/BN in pharmaceuticals, at 
least for now, preclude revolutionary advances in treatment for often-
lethal diseases.  Similarly, even the FDA admits that NB/BN has an 
impressive future pharmaceutical potential,34 although, of course, safety, 
efficacy, and environmental effects will have to be adequately 
addressed.  Certainly, though a few may be on the market, FDA-
approved NB/BN drug tools and nano-enabled drugs are not 
revolutionizing medical treatment at this time.   
It is highly probable that scientific and technological barriers will 
also keep NB/BN from revolutionizing medical treatment in the near 
future.  For instance, in nanoparticle-enabled gene therapy or drug 
delivery, pertinent science and engineering investigations tell us that we 
are just starting to understand the formidable limitations to precisely 
targeted delivery such as demonstrated size and charge-determined 
disruptions of polycationic organic nanoparticles on living cell 
membranes.35  Because uses of synthetic biology and RNAi also involve 
 
33. Cf. id. (“[S]everal FDA regulated products . . . employ nanotechnology.  However, 
to date, few manufacturers of regulated products have claimed the use of nanotechnology in 
the manufacture of their products or made any nanotechnology claims for the finished 
product.”). 
34. See FDA Readies for More Nanoscale Challenges, supra note 31. 
35. Pascale R. Leroueil et al., Nanoparticle Interaction with Biological Membranes:  
Does Nanotechnology Present a Janus Face?, 40 ACCTS. OF CHEMICAL RES. 335, 336–37 
(2007) (investigating how polycationic organic nanoparticles might cross a mammalian cell 
membrane).  The authors conducted experiments that selected dimyristoylphosphatidyl 
choline (DMPC) as a supported lipid bilayer in a crystalline phase to see if and, if so, how this 
mimic of a mammalian plasma membrane might be disrupted by polycationic organic 
nanoparticles.  Id.  The authors were able to image “hole” or “pore” formation directly in the 
lipid bilayer of DMPC, generally associated with exposure to various polycationic polymer 
species.  Id. at 337, 339.  The nanoparticles were hypothesized to enter cells not via 
endocytosis or phagocytosis mechanisms, but by an adhesive or diffusive mechanism.  The 
authors, however, concluded that “[c]learly, more studies [were] needed to fully understand 
the process by which nanoparticles cross the cell plasma membrane. . . . Gaining a better 
understanding of this mechanism has important implications for design of drug delivery, cell 
transfection, and gene therapy agents.”  Id. at 341. 
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intricate cellular and extracellular processes, they will likely face similar 
formidable, though often not insurmountable, obstacles to successful 
implementation.36 
B. In 20-to-40 Years: Revolutionary Progress, Effecting Leaps Forward 
in Medicine 
1. Interim Work Towards the Probable Revolutionary Advances: 
 
36. Cellular and extracellular obstacles to the implementation of RNAi include the 
limit that yet-to-be-determined standards for screening and phenotype ontology create for 
the use of RNAi to identify loss-of-function or gene silencing phenotypes.  See Thomas Horn 
et al., GenomeRNAi:  A Database for Cell-Based RNAi Phenotypes, 35 NUCLEIC ACIDS RES. 
D492 (DATABASE ISSUE) D496 (2007), available at 
http://nar.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/35/suppl_1/D492 (arguing that major unsolved 
challenges “in representing RNAi phenotypes . . . [include] a lack of standards on [the] 
minimal information . . . need[ed] . . . for small and large-scale screening approaches” and a 
proper descriptive ontology for cellular phenotypes).  As for cellular and extracellular 
obstacles to the implementation of synthetic biology, see Keith E. Tyo et al., Expanding the 
Metabolic Engineering Toolbox:  More Options to Engineer Cells, 25 TRENDS IN 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 132, 132 (2007).  The artificiality of synthetic cellular solutions to many 
problems, including pathological cellular conditions, poses the challenge of discovering “ways 
to remodel highly interconnected cellular networks to add properties that are often 
orthogonal to . . . [their evolved] design . . . .”  Id.  See also Philippe Marguet et al., Biology by 
Design:  Reduction and Synthesis of Cellular Components and Behaviour, 4 J. ROYAL SOC’Y 
INTERFACE 607, 619 (2007) (arguing that it is critical for synthetic biology to address this 
question:  “given the amount of cell physiology (even for highly characterized organisms such 
as E. coli) that is still poorly understood, to what extent can we standardize parts or systems 
with confidence?”); Ernesto Andrianantoandro et al., Review, Synthetic Biology:  New 
Engineering Rules for an Emerging Discipline, 2 MOLECULAR SYSTEMS BIOLOGY 1, 1–2 
(2006), available at http://www.nature.com/msb/journal/v2/n1/pdf/msb4100073.pdf (comparing 
the prospective development of synthetic biology to the actual development of computer 
engineering).  The authors argue that, to construct biological systems, synthetic biology will 
have to extend engineering principles to accommodate the unique set of design problems and 
solutions across populations of cells.  Id.  But see J. Christopher Anderson et al., 
Environmental Signal Integration by a Modular AND Gate, 3:133 MOLECULAR SYSTEMS 
BIOLOGY 1, 5-6 (2007) for a report of a successful construction of a modular synthetic biology 
interface that integrates environmental signals.  Input promoters are cleverly constructed as 
independent sensors of when different, often non-integrated, environmental signals (e.g., 
oxygen, pH, cell density, lactate, and glucose) acquire the integration necessary for specificity.  
Only then are the two input promoters—inputs to an AND gate—activated and swapped with 
outputs using the AND gate.  Id. at 5.  This swapping of inputs and outputs (the inputs and 
outputs being easily replaceable transcriptional signals), while preserving the AND gate 
behavior, is reported to demonstrate the modularity of the AND gate.  Id. at 6.  The model is 
also reported to require the use of a particular plasmid and fluorescent reporter system that 
facilitates the eventual standardization of genetic circuits connected in a series which the 
authors report to be “a critical approach in the design of large integrated systems consisting 
of multiple genetic circuits.”  Id.  See also Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, for some assertions of 
synthetic biology’s future powers if obstacles to these powers could be removed or 
circumvented.   
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Identification and Removal, or Circumvention, of Scientific and 
Technological Obstacles 
If these three technologies, considered alone or as a group, were 
graded on what they will most probably deliver in the near future to 
patients with often-lethal diseases, such as various forms of cancer, they 
would receive a B-.  However, if they were graded, either separately or 
as a totality, twenty years hence—assuming scientific, technological, 
legal, and funding conditions facilitate the proper research and 
development paths—they would receive an A+.37  This is a potential 
 
37. However, the combination of these conditions needed to foster near-optimal 
development is presently not in place.  See recommendations for fostering near-optimal long-
term development, infra Parts IV, V.B.  If these conditions remain as they are now, my best 
guesstimate of the time to A+ level development in terms of medical delivery would be about 
forty years, or roughly double the time it would take if near-optimal conditions are put in 
place in the near future.  Although my “twenty-to-forty-year guesstimate” for achieving 
revolutionary medical gain is admittedly only that, this guesstimate is preferable to stating 
“near-to-remote future to remote future” both because of the nebulousness of this qualitative 
projected range and because, considering all of the variables, I maintain that the twenty-to-
forty-year time frame is still a fair guesstimate.  See infra note 52 and accompanying text.  The 
Ontario Medical Advisory Secretariat’s assessment of nanotechnology specialists’ projections 
of expected timeframes for the use of nanotechnologies in clinical patient care also may 
provide some credence to my guesstimate as it pertains to NB/BN.  THE MEDICAL 
ADVISORY SECRETARIAT, ONTARIO MINISTRY OF HEALTH AND LONG-TERM CARE, 
NANOTECHNOLOGY:  HORIZON SCANNING APPRAISAL 30 (Nov. 2006) [hereinafter 
ONTARIO MEDICAL NANOTECH HORIZON] (stating the following:  (1) although over half “of 
the specialists . . . [predicted] that nano-based therapies will lead to major changes in 
medicine over the next [twenty] years,” “potential beneficial effects are not expected on a 
relatively large scale until after 2020”; (2) yet specialists were split about the extent to which 
unexpected obstacles might lengthen the time to viable clinical delivery; and (3) moreover, 
“[t]he time span between the first successes in the laboratory and general everyday 
application is underestimated.  Potential problems include the lack of long-term stability of 
nanostructures and the manufacture of sufficiently large commercially viable quantities of 
nanotechnology products (in particular, [three]-dimensional nanostructures).”).  Note as well 
that if the nanotechnology specialists would like to receive grants for research having 
potential clinical medical applications, they have a conflict of interest that may lead to 
negatively skewed time-frame estimates.  Such considerations make a National 
Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI) representative’s rather broad projections of radical 
transformative change by 2020, unsupported by extensive factual investigation, appear 
particularly questionable.  Cf. Mihail C. Roco, National Nanotechnology Initiative—Past, 
Present, Future, in HANDBOOK OF NANOSCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND TECHNOLOGY 3–4 
(William A. Goddard III et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (providing a sigmoid curve—with time (in 
years) as the x axis, nanotechnology outcomes as the y axis, and the years 2000–2020 as 
horizontal asymptotes—to represent his prediction of growth in nanotechnology outcomes 
until we approximate a “nano-world” in 2020).  If Roco is correct and his sigmoid curve fairly 
accurately depicts the nanotechnology growth that will occur over the next eleven years, 
exponential growth should be just around the corner, especially in NB/BN because “the most 
dynamic component driving an accelerating path of change is the convergence of 
nanotechnology, modern biology, and digital revolution.”  M.C. Roco, National 
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problem with “just around the corner” hype: it hides the obstacles to 
maximizing the development of highly promising technologies in the 
remote future, because it fears that revealing these obstacles will 
prevent near-term commercialization.  Unfortunately, the near-term 
ventures can only hope for a succession of incremental gains along a 
modest, low-risk-for-investors R&D path.38  Long-term development 
must be based on solid, publicly funded research that broadly looks at 
the potential scientific and technological uses of these technologies, 
obstacles to realizing these potential uses, and ways to eliminate or 
circumvent the obstacles.39 
Some high quality academic research on these very issues is already 
being done.  For instance, Jacob Klein, a physical chemist at Oxford 
University, in commenting on his own and other “novel and important” 
concurrent research,40 highlights potential clinical delivery problems in 
NB/BN which are associated with interactions between nanoparticle-
protein corona coating and the patient’s cell.  He also recommends that 
researchers use more sophisticated methods to measure pertinent 
forces.41  Several rigorous analyses highlighting barriers to 
 
Nanotechnology Initiative—Past, Present, Future 7–8, preprint available at 
http://www.nano.gov/NNI_Past_Present_Future.pdf.  But considering not only the 
nanotechnology specialist projections and the Ontario Secretariat’s description of possible 
problems that could delay commercial translations of lab successes reported above, but also 
the many studies revealing formidable obstacles to the realization of radical growth in 
NB/BN, discussed in this part of the Article as well as in Parts I, II.C.2, IV, and V.B, 
exponential growth in the near future appears overly optimistic, even under the best 
scientific, technological, and legal conditions.    
38. See infra Part V.B.1. 
39. See infra Part V.B. 
40. Most notably the research of Tommy Cedervall et al. published in Understanding 
the Nanoparticle—Protein Corona Using Methods to Quantify Exchange Rates and Affinities 
of Proteins for Nanoparticles, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2050 (2007).   
41. Jacob Klein, Probing the Interactions of Proteins and Nanoparticles, 104 PROC. 
NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 2029, 2029–30 (2007) (arguing that nanoparticle-protein interactions that 
effect corona coating show great potential in nanomedicine, especially nanotoxicology).  
Klein also suggests that advances towards realizing this potential in nanomedicine will require 
more quantitative and systematic research into the corona, as well as research into how the 
“corona actually interacts with and affects the well-being of living cells, using, among other 
approaches, the highly sophisticated methodologies that have been developed to measure 
surface and intermolecular forces directly.”  Id.  Klein is also very complimentary of the 
aforementioned concurrent research by Cedervall et al.  Klein interprets Cedervall’s research 
as showing that which proteins “win the competition” to adsorb on the nanoparticle surface 
depend on these parameters:  interactions of their affinities to the corona, time length of the 
experiment, and whether available nanoparticle surface area is in excess to the protein 
mixture or vice versa.  Klein, supra at 2029.  Klein argues that the protein mixture should be 
in excess and, ideally, reflect what would occur in a “true biological situation” (e.g., mimic a 
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implementation have also been conducted on NB/BN, synthetic biology, 
and RNAi mechanisms related to targeted drug delivery and other 
medical interventions.42 
RNAi biomedical technologies could include molecular 
modifications that enhance compound efficacy and gene-specific RNAi 
targets, among other possibilities.43  However, as with nanoparticle-
assisted drug delivery, the use of RNAi in drug delivery faces the 
anticipated barrier of mistargeting.44  Although formidable obstacles for 
both targeted siRNA drug delivery and gene therapy remain,45 many 
 
typical therapeutic or imaging concentration).  Id. at 2029–30.  Greater nanoparticle size also 
unexpectedly enhanced the degree of adsorption.  Id. at 2030.    
42. Regarding NB/BN, see, for example, Patrick Couvreur & Christine Vauthier, 
Expert Review, Nanotechnology:  Intelligent Design to Treat Complex Disease, 23 
PHARMACEUTICAL RES. 1417, 1419 (2006), for a list of many different possible NB/BN 
solutions to current therapeutic challenges for diseases and medical conditions including 
cancer, infections, metabolic diseases, autoimmune diseases, prevention of graft rejection, 
pain treatment, and outstanding problems in gene therapy.  The authors also suggest that an 
inadequate understanding of how the immune system functions as a whole and the need to 
identify specific cell targets for more selected performance are two of the research problems 
that must first be solved before the NB/BN clinical solutions can be realized.  Id. at 1440.  Cf. 
James L. McGrath, How Nanotechnology Will Revolutionize Bioseparations, 30 BIOMEDICAL 
ENGINEERING SOC’Y BULL. 10, 10–11 (2006) (arguing that the use of nanofiltration to 
facilitate reliable bioseparations of “[beta-2 microglobulin] from albumin at [the] flow rates 
and protein levels used in blood dialysis[,]” thus reducing the need for more frequent dialysis 
to combat the unacceptable loss of albumin, shows great potential, while also stating “that 
nanofabricated membranes will eventually have the [necessary] strength and architecture” to 
realize this potential) (emphasis added). 
43. Cf. Helmuth H.G. van Es & Gert-Jan Arts, Review, Biology Calls the Targets:  
Combining RNAi and Disease Biology, 10 DRUG DISCOVERY TODAY 1385 (2005) (arguing 
that RNAi biology can help identify disease-relevant genes and construct in vitro models, and 
that “adenoviral siRNA libraries and disease-based cellular models [can be] used [to] 
generate high-quality and functionally validated targets” for drug discovery). 
44. See Sabrina Oliveira et al., Review, Targeted Delivery of siRNA, 2006:63675 J. 
BIOMEDICINE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1 (2006), available at 
http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/JBB/2006/63675 (Because the 
functional mediators of RNAi are small interfering RNAs (siRNA), “siRNA should 
therefore be targeted to three levels:  to the target tissue, the target cell type, and the 
subcellular compartment.  Primary obstacles for achieving this . . . include competitive uptake 
by nontarget cells, excretion in urine, degradation by nucleases, and endosomal trapping.’’).  
However, the authors describe three categories of approaches to overcoming these barriers:  
chemical modifications of siRNA, viral nucleic acid delivery systems, and nonviral nucleic 
acid delivery systems.  Id. at 2–6.   
45. E.g., id. at 1, 6–7; Jens Kurreck, Review Article, 2006:83757 siRNA Efficiency:  
Structure or Sequence—That is the Question, J. BIOMEDICINE  BIOTECHNOLOGY 1, 1–6 
(2006) available at http://www.hindawi.com/GetArticle.aspx?doi=10.1155/JBB/2006/83757; N. 
Aronin, Target Selectivity in mRNA Silencing, 13 GENE THERAPY 509, 513 (2006) (discussing 
possible toxic clinical off-target side effects of RNAi in gene therapy, such as changes in the 
expression profiles of the non-targeted, but hit, mRNA, effecting RNAi-induced off-target 
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strategies have been proposed to surmount these obstacles.46 
2. Medical Leaps in 20-to-40 Years: Vastly Improved Risk 
Identification, Prevention, Diagnosis, and Treatment for Common and 
Commonly Lethal Chronic Diseases 
All three technologies have implications for various areas of 
medicine, most notably oncology.47  However, for reasons that will be 
explained below, truly revolutionary gains in premorbid risk 
identification, individually tailored prophylactics, earlier and more 
accurate diagnoses, and more efficacious and safer treatments will be 
possible only after various scientific and technological barriers to 
implementation are eliminated or circumvented.  Arguably the most 
promising of the three technologies from the medical perspective is 
RNAi, especially for cancer,48 with particular promise noted for the 
 
mRNA translational repression).   
46. E.g., Oliveira et al., supra note 44, at 1–7; Kurreck, supra note 45, at 5–6. 
47. See, e.g., Andrei Gartel & Eugene S. Kandel, RNA Interference in Cancer, 23 
BIOMOLECULAR ENGINEERING 17, 17 (2006) (reporting that RNAi has become a potent tool 
for effecting changes in gene expression via siRNA to determine cellular factors in 
oncogenesis and tumor suppression and that RNAi aimed at oncogenes, both in vitro and in 
vivo, has successfully inhibited tumor cell growth); Marta Izquierdo, Review, Short Interfering 
RNAs as a Tool for Cancer Gene Therapy, 12 CANCER GENE THERAPY 217, 217 (2005) 
(discussing the following promising RNAi methods for fighting cancer:  inhibiting 
overexpression of cancer genes, blocking cell division via interference with cyclin E and 
related genes, suppressing anti-apoptosis genes and thus facilitating cancer cell death, and 
reducing the side effects of chemotherapy by interfering with multidrug resistance genes or 
chemoresistance targets); Marguet et al., supra note 36, at 615 (describing the use of synthetic 
biology for cell-based cancer therapeutics made by engineering mammalian cells, including a 
description of one study in which melanoma patients received engineered cells by adoptive 
cell transfer).  The authors contend that “[e]ven though only [two] out of the [fifteen] patients 
showed sustained regression, the work demonstrates the potential applicability of targeted 
therapy using engineered cells.”  Id.   
48. See Chia-ying Chu & Tariq M. Rana, Translation Repression in Human Cells by 
MicroRNA-Induced Gene Silencing Requires RCK/p54, 4 PLOS BIOLOGY 1122, 1133 (2006) 
(reporting different effects of deleting helicase RCK/p54, a component of RISC, depending 
on whether the RISC was miRISC or siRISC).  Deleting RCK/p54 releases translational 
repression via an imperfect complementary miRNA that acts through miRISC, but this 
deletion does not influence the gene silencing effects of the perfect complementary siRNA 
that acts through siRISC.  Id.  The authors argue that this finding provides mechanistic 
insight, although they conclude that additional related research is needed on carcinogenesis 
because “most targets of miRNA have not yet been identified.”  Id.  Relatively low miRNA-
induced upregulation of the RAS protein has been associated with tumorigenesis in lung 
cancer, altered RCK/p54 expression has been associated with the development of both 
colorectal tumors and chronic hepatitis C, and “perturbations of either miRNA or RCK/p54 
expression levels can have deleterious consequences for the cell.”  Id.  See, e.g., Gartel & 
Kandel, supra note 47; Izquierdo, supra note 47, at 221–24.  See also A DICTIONARY OF 
BIOLOGY, supra note 27, at 570–72 (discussing the role of RISC assembly in miRNA and 
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treatment of pancreatic cancer49 and breast cancer.50  However, overlap 
among these technologies should foster synergistic collaborations.51   
Although the maturation of NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi 
may well lead to revolutionary gains in clinical medical intervention at 
some point in the next twenty-to-forty years,52 a comparably pertinent 
history of unmet promises leaves me skeptical that such gains will occur 
anytime sooner.  Over ten years ago, telomerase inhibitors were 
predicted to offer great advances in cancer treatment via suppression of 
telomeres.53  Telomeres are TTAGGG nucleotides repeated hundreds 
of times on the tips of linear chromosomes.54  Each time that they divide, 
normal somatic cells lose telomeric DNA as a function of age both in 
vivo and in vitro.55  In contrast, many cancer cells and cell lines 
established from cancer maintain their telomere length by telomerase, 
which synthesizes telomeric repeats.56  Telomerases are special reverse 
transcriptases, which are enzymes that transcribe DNA from an RNA 
template.57  In 1996, Michael Fossel was one of the enthusiasts of the 
potential of not only telomerase inhibitors to cure cancer, but also of 
telomerase enhancers to cure aging, in the then near future: 
 
siRNA). 
49. See, e.g., Hong Chang, Review, RNAi-Mediated Knockdown of Target Genes:  A 
Promising Strategy for Pancreatic Cancer Research, 14 CANCER GENE THERAPY 677, 677 
(2007). 
50. See, e.g., Ramesh Subramanian et al., siRNA-Mediated Simultaneous 
Downregulation of uPA and Its Receptor Inhibits Angiogenesis and Invasiveness Triggering 
Apoptosis in Breast Cancer Cells, 28 INT’L J. ONCOLOGY 831, 831, 836  (2006) (reporting that 
the simultaneous transcriptional silencing of the “genes” that code for the UPA and UPAR 
proteins can indirectly trigger apoptosis in breast cancer cells). 
51. See, e.g., supra note 27. 
52. The wide time interval required for stating a projection as a more-likely-than-not 
probability, rather than just a possibility, reflects uncertainty about whether very good 
allocations of resources, facilitative IP, and regulatory regimes will be in place.  In Parts IV 
and V, infra, I argue that the present heavy emphasis on the fast commercial development of 
applications of academic research—in the United States, at least—will create path 
dependencies in R&D leading to more modest gains and thus perhaps decades of unnecessary 
delays in achieving truly revolutionary health-related benefits from these technologies.  In 
NB/BN, some experts predict that second generation nanodevices will be ready for clinical 
use as early as 2009.  See ONTARIO MEDICAL NANOTECH HORIZON, supra note 37, at 9 tbl.1.  
But even if this should occur, it will likely be many years, if not decades, later that these 
nanodevices will approximate their optimal clinical efficacy.      
53. See infra text accompanying note 58. 
54. See J.W. Shay & W.E. Wright, Review, Hallmarks of Telomeres in Ageing 
Research, 211 J. PATHOLOGY, 114, 116 (2007). 
55. See id. at 114, 116. 
56. See id. at 117–19; MICHAEL FOSSEL, REVERSING HUMAN AGING 70 (1996). 
57. See Shay & Wright, supra note 54, at 114. 
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 The work on telomerase inhibitors is more advanced than the 
work on inducers; cancer therapy will precede therapy for aging.  
Two families of telomerase inhibitors are currently undergoing 
trials in animals.  The first human trials cannot be far off: The 
best estimates from those working with these compounds is 
before 2000.  A reasonable estimate is that if the rate of 
development continues, we will have a clinically available cure 
for most cancers by the year 2005 or soon thereafter. . . . 
. . . . 
 Treating aging with telomerase inducers would slightly 
increase our chances of acquiring cancer[,] but we would also 
treat ourselves with a telomerase inhibitor to kill cancers before 
commencing telomerase therapy [for aging].58 
 
It is now shortly after Fossel’s predicted year for the “cure for most 
cancers,” but there still is no cure for any cancer, via a telomerase 
inhibitor or any other method (nor is there a cure for aging).59  These 
additional historical reminders should help suppress excess hype about 
translating the great promise that RNAi transcriptional and 
translational silencing mechanisms have displayed in the lab to great 
successes with either miRNA or siRNA in treating cancer patients in 
the near future: 
 
 RNA interference has joined the family of gene-regulation 
tools that already includes anti-sense RNA, ribozymes, and 
triplex-forming oligos.  Each of these [new] methods at the time 
of its emergence was viewed as a near-universal solution to gene 
inactivation problems.  However, the discrepancy between 
“promise and reality,” as well as the “growing pains” of 
empirically discovered limitations and artifacts inspired a much 
more balanced view of these techniques.  In the face of the 
growing popularity of experimental RNAi, one cannot help but 
wonder what its limitations will be.  So far, the issue of target-
 
58. FOSSEL, supra note 56, at 162–63. 
59. Nonetheless, regarding malignant cancer at least, Fossel certainly appears to have 
been on the right track.  See Shay & Wright, supra note 54, at 118 tbl.1, 119 (reporting 
aggregate ratios of (tested positive for telomerase activity)/(total tested) from hundreds of 
studies over a recent five year period which examined the presence of telomerase activity in 
different tissues—(1) normal tissue (367/2350); (2) preinvasive cancer (410/1391); and (3) 
malignant cancer (3615/4304)—and arguing that “[s]ince telomerase activity is detected in 
almost all advanced tumours [sic], the use of telomerase inhibitors may provide an effective 
and novel approach to cancer therapy”).       
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specific versus off-target effects is the most commonly 
recognized problem of this approach. . . . 
. . . . 
 Importantly, “the nonspecific effects on gene expression are 
dependent upon siRNA concentration in a gene-specific 
manner.”  Therefore, it is possible that the non-specific effects of 
a studied siRNA and a randomly chosen “control” duplex could 
differ substantially only because the two were delivered to the 
target cells with different efficiencies, have different intracellular 
stability, etc. 
. . . . 
 Unfortunately, the use of a single specific siRNA and a single 
“targetless” control siRNA predominates in the literature. . . . 
[W]e expect that more stringent controls . . . will become the 
accepted norm. . . . 
. . . .  
 . . . While the general significance of microRNAs in oncology 
has been recognized,60 a tremendous amount of work is still 
required to produce a complete list of these molecules encoded 
in [the] human genome, as well as to determine the biological 
functions of each one of them. . . . 
. . . . 
 We expect that miRNA implicated as oncogenes will become 
targets of therapeutic intervention. . . . Also, we will certainly see 
gene therapy attempts aimed at restoring the tumor suppressive 
miRNAs that are lost in cancer. . . . 
. . . . 
 . . . The attempts of siRNA-based therapy are certainly not 
far away, [sic] however, they would face the same problem as the 
preceding technologies: how to efficiently deliver the active 
sequence to a specific target in a body without side effects.61, 62 
 
60. One example of the specific oncological significance of miRNA is the 
aforementioned association between miRNA-induced upregulation of the RAS protein and 
lung cancer.  See Chu & Rana, supra note 48.    
61. Ironically, one possible side effect is facilitating carcinogenesis:  “Viral or nonviral 
vectors transfect cells, allowing researchers to bypass systemic delivery challenges.  Integrated 
expression systems run the risk of producing cancer, however, and so are highly 
experimental.”  Charlie Schmidt, News Feature, Negotiating the RNAi Patent Thicket, 25 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 273, 275 (2007).    
62. Gartel & Kandel, supra note 47, at 28–30 (citations omitted).  There are many 
anticipated barriers to efficacy, such as the mistargeting reported by Gartel & Kandel.  
Another researcher also reports the irony that first generation RNAi drugs, based on 
promising preclinical data, may be efficacious, but for “the wrong reasons”—i.e., reasons 
unrelated to gene silencing—thus potentially retarding further RNAi development: 
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In addition to reminding ourselves that predicted timelines for 
medical applications of biotechnology have frequently gone unmet, we 
should also find sobering recent research at the ENCyclopedia Of DNA 
Elements (ENCODE) consortium and elsewhere which calls into 
question many basic assumptions about DNA, RNA, and protein 
regulation, creating a regulatory picture that is far more intricate and 
multilayered than was long-assumed.63  One possible consequence of the 
 
This is because of the potential for nucleic acids to stimulate innate immune 
responses, which are known to be capable of antiviral, antiangiogenic, and 
anticancer activities. . . . [T]he concept of therapeutic “isiRNAs,” that is, siRNAs 
combining potentially synergistic gene silencing and immune-stimulatory activities, 
has been discussed.  It would certainly not be the first time, or even surprising, to 
find drugs to be safe and efficacious, but working through an unanticipated 
mechanism of action.  Yet the realization that early RNAi drugs may have been 
clinically successful because of these nonspecific effects rather than gene silencing 
may negatively impact the perceived value of the RNAi platform, both because 
these responses increase development risk and because there would be no need to 
buy expensive RNAi IP when access to immune-stimulatory nucleic acids may be 
obtained for much less. 
Dirk Haussecker, Review, The Business of RNAi Therapeutics, 19 HUMAN GENE THERAPY 
451, 459–60 (2008) (citations omitted).      
63. See The ENCODE Project Consortium, Identification and Analysis of Functional 
Elements in 1% of the Human Genome by the ENCODE Pilot Project, 447 NATURE 799, 799–
80 (2007) [hereinafter ENCODE PILOT PROJECT] (reporting the following among many 
unanticipated findings of research on 1% of the human genome:  (1) pervasive transcription, 
with many transcripts linking distal regions with known protein coding sequences; (2) newly 
identified non-coding transcripts, some of which overlap with chromatin structure and 
protein-coding transcripts while others are in regions previously thought to be 
transcriptionally silent; (3) chromatin structure predicting the timing of DNA replication, 
while chromatin accessibility and histone modification patterns predict the presence and 
activity of transcription start sites; (4) the identification of several new transcription start sites 
that were surrounded by regulatory sequences with no upstream locational bias; (5) much 
variation itself in the sequence variability of both the functional elements and the likelihood 
that these elements were located in a structurally variable genomic region; and (6) lack of 
constraint of many functional elements across evolution, suggesting that there is a large pool 
of biochemically active, but neutral elements that provide no benefit to the organism).  
Elizabeth Pennisi summarizes some of the most surprising results of this and related research.  
Elizabeth Pennisi, News of the Week, Genomics:  DNA Study Forces Rethink of What It 
Means to Be a Gene, 316 SCIENCE 1556, 1556–57 (2007) (stating that the research reveals an 
extremely different picture of DNA, RNA, protein, and their interactions than the one that 
scientists have assumed for decades).  All of the following long-held assumptions appear to be 
wrong:  (1) DNA is compact.  No, human genes can be sprawling. (2) Much of the transcribed 
DNA is translated.  Again, no, because although protein-coding DNA comprises 2% of the 
genome, 80% of the bases are being expressed.  (3) Not much untranslated DNA turns up as 
transcribed-only regulatory RNA.  On the contrary, this is the fate of a huge amount of 
untranslated DNA.  Ms. Pennisi reports that these findings, combined with unexpected 
distributions of exons and promoters, suggest that “a multidimensional network regulates 
gene expression . . . [and] that because of this complexity, [some] researchers . . . [believe 
that] RNA transcripts[, not DNA transcripts, should be viewed] as the fundamental 
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unanticipated huge amount of expressed, non-coding DNA transcribed 
as regulatory non-coding RNA (ncRNA) is creating a multi-
transcriptional knockout from a single RNAi sequence.64  ENCODE 
and related recent research reveal enormously complex specific and 
global interconnectivities between metabolism, mRNA abundance, 
transcription, translation, protein production, and static architecture,65 
 
functional units of genomes.”  Id.  See Thomas R. Gingeras, Perspective, Origin of 
Phenotypes:  Genes and Transcripts, 17 GENOME RES. 682, 683 (2007) (arguing that “a by-
product of these [recent] studies [is] the unanticipated, but unanimous conclusion” that there 
is a huge amount of expressed DNA that never turns up in proteins).  Gingeras states that it 
has been suggested that we temporarily refer to the large collection of newly identified 
putative non-protein coding transcripts as “transcripts of unknown function” (TUFs) until 
they are better understood.  Id.  See also Mark B. Gerstein et al., Perspective, What is a Gene, 
Post-ENCODE?  History and Updated Definition, 17 GENOME RES. 669, 676 (2007) 
(proposing, in light of the diverse regulation and pervasive transcription highlighted by 
ENCODE, this newer, more inclusive definition of a gene which expands on the idea that 
genotypes make phenotypes:  “A [gene is a] genomic sequence ([either] DNA or RNA) 
directly encoding functional product molecules. . . .”).  This assumes, at the molecular level, 
that phenotype relates to biochemical function, because this assumption comports with 
earlier concepts of a gene.  Id. at 679.  If several functional products share overlapping 
regions, a gene is then the distinct union of all overlapping genome sequences coding for final 
RNA or protein products.  Id. at 676–77.  Nonetheless, Gerstein et al. suggest that defining 
“function” within their “gene” definition could be at best challenging and at worst impossible:  
“High-throughput biochemical and mutational assays will be needed to define function on a 
large scale. . . . However, we probably will not be able to ever know the function of all 
molecules in the genome.”  Id. at 679.      
64. See, e.g., Alex Gaither & Vadim Iourgenko, RNA Interference Technologies and 
Their Use in Cancer Research, 19 CURRENT OPINION ONCOLOGY 50, 50–53 (2006) 
(discussing the use of RNAi to knockout genes associated with neoplastic growth). 
65. See, e.g., Yohann Grondin et al., The Correlation Between Architecture and mRNA 
Abundance in the Genetic Regulatory Network of Escherichia Coli, 1:30 BMC SYSTEMS 
BIOLOGY 1, 5 (2007) (agreeing with ENCODE, the authors found that “[m]any factors 
intervene in the dynamics of gene regulation,” including both “local factors such as the 
sequence specificity of the transcription factor DNA binding site and global ones such as the 
structural organization [sic] of the chromosomes”).  Grondin et al. also found “a significant 
correlation between architecture and mRNA” which they speculated to be due to selective 
pressure to produce both enough regulator for phenotype production, but not too much 
regulator because that would require “more regulator to be eliminated in order to generate 
another phenotype.” Id.  (citations omitted).  The regulation is effected by DNA-binding 
transcription factor proteins encoded by certain mRNA.  Grondin et al.’s findings also 
suggest a “significant correlation between the number of genes regulated by a transcription 
factor and the abundance of mRNA that encode for this transcription factor.” Id.  See also 
Daniel H. Lackner et al., A Network of Multiple Regulatory Layers Shapes Gene Expression 
in Fission Yeast, 26 MOLECULAR CELL 145, 145–54 (2007) (conducting a translational profile 
of S. pombe cells which found multiple complex and unexpected genome-wide relationships 
between transcription and translation, as well as between translation and mRNA 
polyadenylation).  Specific findings included these:  (1) a positive correlation between mRNA 
length and translational efficiency which puzzled the authors because mRNA is inversely 
correlated with several other independent measures of translational efficiency; (2) 
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with newly discovered ncRNA playing key regulatory roles under both 
normal and pathological conditions.66  Answering such a dauntingly 
large and diverse range of complex, but important questions about the 
human genome will also require improved methodologies.67  Thus, 
despite some patenting and some substantial technological 
developments, the mechanisms of RNAi cannot be truly understood at 
present because RNAi has to fit within this multilayered “portfolio of 
biology puzzles” which will require much additional investigation.68 
  
 
deadenylation dynamics could explain “potentiation,” that is, “[i]ncreased transcription 
would temporarily increase the proportion of long-tailed mRNAs, which in turn would lead 
to increased translation,” which would provide an elegant global link between transcriptional 
and translational change; (3) the strong possibility that intracellular mechanisms and 
extracellular systems are congruent, if not coordinated, multilayered means of regulating 
protein production; and (4) transcriptional and translational efficiencies may be correlated, 
though not causally linked, due to “independent evolutionary selection at different levels of 
regulation.”  Id. 
66. Cf. Aldo Pagano et al., New Small Nuclear RNA Gene-Like Transcriptional Units 
as Sources of Regulatory Transcripts, 3 PLOS GENETICS 0174, 0175 (2007) (studying the 
particular ncRNAs synthesized by RNA polymerase III which the authors hypothesize play 
key roles in regulating protein-coding genes synthesized by RNA polymerase II). 
67. Cf. Bradley E. Bernstein et al., Review, The Mammalian Epigenome, 128 CELL 
669, 677–78 (2007) (reviewing the pertinent literature, emphasis is placed on methodological 
advances needed to answer many diverse and immensely complex epigenomic questions, with 
the conclusion that the enormity of the challenge should nonetheless not deter research 
because “a concerted effort toward understanding the [human] genome would ultimately be 
rewarded with a far richer understanding of how the genetic code is made manifest across an 
incredibly varied background of developmental stages, tissue types, and disease states”). 
68. Cf. Chu & Rana, supra note 48, at 1133–34 (Cautioning that while their findings, 
combined with the results of previous research, “suggest an intriguing role for miRNA 
function in development and carcinogenesis[,] . . . most targets of miRNA have not yet been 
identified. . . . What determines the balance between active translation and repression of 
mRNAs targeted by miRISC, and how cells control the specificity of this repression, are key 
directions for future investigation.”); Zain Paroo et al., Review, Biochemical Mechanisms of 
the RNA-Induced Silencing Complex, 17 CELL RES. 187, 189, 192 (2007) (After listing and 
analyzing numerous broad unanswered questions regarding biochemical mechanisms of 
RNAi—e.g., “[w]hat are the biochemical functions of genetically identified RNAi 
components,” “[h]ow is RISC activity regulated”—the authors conclude that uncovering the 
“influence of cellular signaling pathways on RISC activity and the contribution of RNAi to 
physiological processes are [sic] critical in understanding the importance of small regulatory 
RNAs in biology and disease.”). 
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II. THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PATENT PORTFOLIOS69 TO NAVIGATE 
THROUGH COMPLICATED AND UNCERTAIN LEGAL, SCIENTIFIC, AND 
TECHNOLOGICAL TERRITORIES 
A. The Patent Portfolio: The Main Unit of IP Value in All Three 
Technologies 
Universities and government agencies with innovations in nascent 
life science technologies, such as NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi, 
which have near-term applications, often build and maintain patent 
portfolios to help them get good exclusive licensing deals with start-ups 
that show promise for commercial development.  The 
university/government agency-start-up alliance can then further develop 
the portfolio to get and keep venture capital, with the hope that the 
start-up or the portfolio itself will mature into a lucrative acquisition 
target for a large pharmaceutical or biotechnology company.  Patent 
portfolio theory provides considerable explanatory power for how 
patenting fits into commercial decision-making in all three 
technologies.70  The theory explains, at least in part, each of the 
following: (1) the prevalence of heavy, early, and broad patenting; (2) 
why government agencies, universities, and start-ups that obtain 
 
69. I say “patent,” not “IP” portfolios, because virtually all NB/BN and RNAi 
inventions will be patented.  Although it is possible that some synthetic biology inventions 
will be governed by copyright law, Kumar and Rai, in examining the constraints of statutory 
construction, current practice in synthetic biology, and policy concerns, are skeptical that this 
will be the case.  See Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1763–64. 
Synthetic biologists might argue that strings of DNA bases are comparable to source 
code and that DNA strings could therefore also be covered by copyright.   
Unlike software, however, the products of synthetic biology are not discussed . . . in 
the [copyright] statute.  Thus, a court that . . . wished to find that material 
copyrightable would have to do so by analogy.  Additionally, even if courts were 
willing to make such an analogy, [17 U.S.C. § 101, the statute defining what is 
copyrightable] . . . requires expressive choices. . . . 
The construction of DNA sequences using base pairs that do not exist in nature 
might allow significant room for expressive choice. . . . However, most synthetic 
biologists working today, including those at MIT, are working within the confines of 
the existing genetic code.  This code constrains the expressive choices that they 
make, making copyright protection less likely.   
Beyond formal legal doctrine lies a set of policy concerns [given that patent rights 
are available, adding an entirely new type of right might hurt innovation]. 
Id. (citations omitted).   
70. See generally Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (making a somewhat similar, though more thorough and generally 
applicable argument than the one I am presenting only for three technologies, that is, that the 
patent portfolio represents the “true value of patents”). 
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attractive exclusive licensing agreements typically have patent portfolios 
with many diverse, but distinct, patents—the collective power of the 
patents in the portfolio gives the portfolio leveraging might that is 
largely independent of the value of any patent; (3) the diversity of 
claims patented by a university or start-up company—the diversity 
maximizes the range of related activity on which the university 
investigators or start-up company can construct and develop research; 
(4) both the high diversity and high quantity of patents in successful 
portfolios give the patentee an insurance that is especially valuable 
where, as in all three of these technologies, the pertinent science, 
technology, and law are all highly uncertain and quickly evolving, that 
is, an insurance against determinations of individual patent invalidity, 
infringement, or lack of commercial value;71 and (5) the incentives for 
patent thicket formation, as well as the associated increased risks of 
holdup and bargaining failure, validate the concerns of some IP scholars 
that the worsening patent thicket problem has increased the costs of 
innovation. 
Nonetheless, Robert Merges, a skeptic of the idea that software 
patent portfolios are produced primarily for “defensive purposes” with 
insufficient care given to individual patents, conducted an empirical 
study in the software industry which reported high correlations between 
at least some proxies of correlates of prosecution effort and firm 
success.72  Although my Article is interested in natural science patents, 
not software patents, Merges’ critique, though industry-specific, could 
perhaps be generalized as an argument for the perceived greater 
relevance of individual patents vis-à-vis patent portfolios. 
I will first explain why I do not find Merges’ empirical critique of 
portfolio theory compelling, then distinguish my portfolio theory 
 
71. Regarding the potential litigation protection of nanotechnology patent portfolios, 
compare R. Douglass Moffat, Public Markets and Nanotechnology Companies, in LYNN E. 
FOSTER, NANOTECHNOLOGY:  SCIENCE, INNOVATION, AND OPPORTUNITY 61, 61–62 
(2006). 
At this stage of nanotechnology development . . . intellectual property platforms 
based on broad patents (often coming from academia) are the main assets behind 
many companies.  The applicability of this . . . [technology] could cut across many 
markets and applications.  Some firms have amassed broad IP by taking a portfolio 
approach to early-stage commercialization. . . . Such diversification . . . makes sense 
not only from a scientific point of view but also to lessen risks associated with 
potential patent litigation.  The patent landscape in nanotech might be likened to 
the gold rush days, with [many] overlapping claims. 
72. Robert P. Merges, Patents, Entry and Growth in the Software Industry 1, 23 (Aug. 
1, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=926204).   
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somewhat from that of Gideon Parchomovsky and R. Polk Wagner.  
Even assuming, arguendo, that the serious methodological and 
analytical problems in Merges’ study73 could be remedied in either a 
revision of his manuscript or a subsequent study such that better 
support is provided for his hypothesis that prosecutorial effort on 
individual patents fosters firm success, aggregate effort applied to patent 
portfolios could foster even greater firm success.  In fact, Merges admits 
that his study is consistent with this hypothesis: 
 
[T]he results for the total number of patents held by the firm . . . 
are somewhat puzzling.  Only the square of this number is 
significant.  This latter result suggests that the size of a firm’s 
patent portfolio does have an effect on the firm’s success, one 
that increases in magnitude nonlinearly with the size of the 
portfolio.74 
 
Merges’ study at most implies that the value of individual patents is 
not negligible, which does not preclude the possibility that their value is 
often far exceeded by that of the portfolios that they comprise.  The 
nonlinear relationship that Merges found (again, assuming arguendo 
that this relationship would persist after the methodological and 
analytical problems were remedied) could be due to the presence of 
 
73. Id. at 16–37.  The study has at least two analytical flaws:  (1) causal inferences are at 
least implied from individual correlates between proxies of prosecutorial effort and firm 
growth for firms of various sizes, without any indication that ceteris paribus conditions have 
been met; and (2) no rationale for choosing various proxies of prosecutorial effort is given.  
The study also has at least three methodological flaws:  (1) correlational coefficients and T 
values are provided without indicating precisely which tests are used;  (2) If the Pearson r and 
a one-way T test were used, there is no indication that Kolmogorov-Smirnov or other tests for 
normal distribution were used, which is particularly problematic given that, 
patent counts exhibit relatively large means and heavy upper tails[, which] . . . 
usually indicates the presence of overdispersion that is consistent with the presence 
of both observed and unobserved heterogeneity.  It may also reflect the presence of 
outliers that cannot be easily modeled by assuming smoothly distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity.  The consequences of these features of data for alternative modeling 
strategies deserves further investigation because the regression models based on 
several popular discrete distributions are unsuitable. 
Jie Q. Guo & Pravin K. Trivedi, Flexible Parametric Models for Long-Tailed Patent Count 
Distributions, 64 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 63, 63 (2002); and (3) data from several 
privately held firms was not used because “erroneously identical numbers [were] reported for 
revenues and employees from year to year.  In such instances where firm data appeared 
suspect, a new company was randomly selected to sample.”  Merges, supra note 72, at 18.   
These several replacements could have introduced selection bias. 
74. Merges, supra note 72, at 21. 
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outliers, which would be consistent with my qualified portfolio theory 
that I will now describe. 
There are different versions of patent portfolio theory.  My version 
is that the value of a large and distinct, but related, group of patents 
often functions as something of a super-patent, high in scale, 75 
diversity,76 and quantity,77 as previously described by Parchomovsky and 
Wagner.  However, I also find Parchomovsky and Wagner’s description 
of an inverse relationship between individual patent value and the 
number of patents in a portfolio78 imprecise.  Parchomovsky and 
Wagner view quantity of patents in a portfolio as a mitigation of the 
tradeoff between diversity and scale, as well as an explanation of the 
apparent paradox that firms acquire individual patents at costs that 
exceed their individual values.79   
I mostly agree that the pertinent firm benefit in a cost-benefit 
comparison is the marginal value that the additional patent is expected 
to add to the portfolio compared to the marginal cost of acquiring the 
patent, but, unlike Parchomovsky and Wagner,80 I do not infer virtual 
irrelevance of individual patent value in patenting decisions from this 
portfolio-level cost-benefit assessment.  Parchomovsky and Wagner 
state that “[t]he overwhelming majority of patents have no value 
whatsoever, and of those that have value, it is nearly impossible to 
determine ex ante,”81 although they do not provide a very compelling 
argument to support this assertion.  Certainly, a major innovative 
breakthrough with clearly foreseeable substantial clinical medical 
applications would have a high probable value ex ante.  Parchomovsky 
and Wagner also do not adequately address the possibility of an 
individual prospective or actual patent or claim of such high value that 
to some extent it “transcends the portfolio” as measured by the 
disproportionate attention the patent or claim receives from the patent 
applicant or patentee and his or her competitors.  Their statement that 
although “individual patents may be of great independent value to their 
inventors[,] . . . [i]nventors can increase the value of such patents by 
 
75. Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70, at 31–37. 
76. Id. at 37–41. 
77. Id. at 42–43. 
78. See id. at 42. 
79. Id. 
80. See id. at 42–43 (asserting that under patent portfolio theory, patenting decisions 
are made with virtually no consideration of the value of individual patents). 
81. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
REVISED 3-13-09 MACKEY FINAL FORMATTED 3/16/2009  9:52 AM 
150 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1 
 
constructing a portfolio around them”82 implicitly dismisses this 
transcendent possibility, even though the distribution of the value of 
patents is apparently quite skewed.83 
Perhaps an analogy between coaching a successful professional 
football team and obtaining and maintaining a successful patent 
portfolio is apt.84  Although the ultimate value of the 2007 New England 
Patriots was their collective and coordinated breadth and depth of skills, 
coaching attention paid to individual players was proportionate to 
overall pertinent coordinated skill breadth and depth.85  Thus, to extend 
the analogy, perhaps in an NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi 
portfolio, there is a key Tom Brady quarterback patent within which 
there is also a key throwing method claim.  Much attention will be paid 
to prosecuting that patent, with special care given to the written 
description, enablement, and claim drafting for the throwing method.  
That does not mean that the portfolio of coordinated skills taken as a 
totality is not the best predictor of team success.  The value of the 
throwing method claim should thus be viewed primarily, though not 
 
82. Id. at 9. 
83. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 
80 (2005) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents] (reporting that “the top [one] 
percent of patents [are] more than [one] thousand times as valuable as the median patent.”). 
84. This analogy is used partly because pertinent natural science firms do not put their 
patent portfolio evolutions on display with explanatory footnotes.  Moreover, because of the 
nascent nature of NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi, firms have not yet gone through their 
patent life cycles to allow for retrospective analysis.  In addition, professional athletics teams 
are well-known, allowing for rather transparent analogies.  Although there are obvious 
pertinent differences between professional athletics teams and life science firms, there are 
many pertinent similarities as well, such as possible high commercial value that depends at 
least partly on prudent planning to maximize the probability of success. 
85. Note that I said 2007 New England Patriots, not 2007–2008 New England Patriots; 
the Patriots certainly appeared invincible in 2007, but the New York Giants victory over the 
Patriots in the 2008 Super Bowl proved that the Patriots could be beaten.  The lesson for 
near-term patent portfolio enabled commercialization may be that even the most promising 
commercial ventures can backfire.  Cf. Ann Thayer, Latest News, Harvard Licenses Nanotech 
Patents:  Nano-Terra Gets Whitesides Nanofabrication Portfolio, 85 CHEMICAL & 
ENGINEERING NEWS, June 11, 2007, at 14, [hereinafter Thayer, Harvard Licenses Nanotech 
Patents] (arguing that Nano-Terra, a start-up that licensed an extremely promising patent 
portfolio from Harvard in 2007, may be analogous to Nanosys, another nanotechnology start-
up founded in 2001 by Harvard chemistry professors Charles M. Lieber and Hongkun Park, 
among others).  Nanosys is reported to have had a similar approach to Nano-Terra for 
commercializing nanotechnology and to have about 500 patents and patent applications, 
many licensed from Harvard, Columbia University, MIT, and the University of California.  
Like Nano-Terra, Nanosys’ scientific connections and IP attracted investors, only to 
disappoint them when it called off a $100 million stock offering in 2004.  Id. 
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entirely, within the context of the Tom Brady quarterback patent.  The 
patent in turn should be viewed primarily, though not entirely, within 
the context of the New England Patriots firm capital.  I say not entirely, 
because this particular throwing method claim and this particular Tom 
Brady quarterback patent alone would have a high market value for 
many teams, and thus neither has a negligible value divorced from the 
Patriot portfolio. 
Moreover, such particularly important individual patents and claims 
can play distinct decontextualized roles, especially when they are even 
more exceptionally valuable vis-à-vis the team.  Team size, like quantity 
of patents in the portfolio, does have the effect of greatly reducing this 
possibility of the extraordinarily valuable outlier dwarfing the portfolio 
such that the value of the portfolio could be viewed as more dependent 
on it than vice versa.  Thus, in a sport such a football, where team size is 
large, player value is more contextualized.  In a sport such as basketball, 
with a maximum team size of twelve, the exceptional outlier like 
Michael Jordan of the 1995 Chicago Bulls can have a value that exceeds 
that of the remainder of the team.  The team’s greater dependence on 
him than vice versa could be calculated by the probable difference that 
he alone made to the team’s exceptional performance.86  Thus, ceteris 
paribus, the probability of an extremely valuable outlier patent or claim 
may vary inversely with the respective number of patents or claims in 
the portfolio.  Extremely valuable outlier patents or claims are probably 
rare in start-up firms with large patent portfolios, but there certainly are 
dominant patents and claims with effects that exceed, if not dwarf, the 
composite effects of patents and claims in the remainder of their 
portfolios. 
The very small percentage of utility patents that are litigated—or 
even enforced throughout their potential twenty-year term87—suggests 
that the “extraordinary outlier” is rare indeed.  Thus, my view is that 
 
86. For example, but for Michael Jordan, it is very unlikely both that the team would 
have won a record seventy-two games in the regular season and that the team would have 
dominated the competition in the postseason. 
87. See John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L. J. 435, 437 (2004); Lemley 
& Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, supra note 83, at 75 (2005) (stating that the empirical 
evidence indicates that of the 200,000 patents issued each year, 1.5 percent are litigated and 
0.1 percent are litigated to trial); SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 
202–03 (2004) (discussing two studies of biotechnology patent litigation rates, one finding six 
per 100 biotech patents litigated, the other finding 1.9 per 100 biotech patents litigated).  The 
study reporting a 1.9/100 biotech patent litigation rate also reported that the litigation was 
concentrated in “high-value patents,” which is consistent with the extraordinarily valuable 
outlier that qualifies my patent portfolio theory.   
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there are a few individual patents and claims of a distinct, high worth 
that to some extent transcends the worth of the portfolios that contain 
them.  This qualified portfolio theory appears more credible than 
Parchomovsky and Wagner’s categorical portfolio theory that makes 
individual patent irrelevance the predominant effect of maximizing 
portfolio diversity and scale via within-portfolio high quantity patenting 
that mitigates the scale-diversity tradeoff.  The relatively few utility 
patents that are either litigated or enforced throughout the maximum 
twenty-year patent term is consistent with my qualified portfolio theory 
because, while my theory makes the portfolio the primary unit of value, 
the theory also allows for extraordinarily valuable individual patents to 
be carefully and vigorously protected via litigation and maximum term 
enforcement.  While no doubt there are many other considerations, 
these considerations nonetheless appear to make a qualified portfolio 
theory more credible than an absolute portfolio theory.   
The rarity of litigation and full-term enforcement also create 
additional problems for Merges’ prosecution effort-based critique of 
portfolio theory.  The most notable problem is the strong possibility that 
this effort reflects ex ante ignorance about portfolio value more than it 
does the pursuit of individualized, rather than portfolio-based, 
approaches to commercialization.  Once proportionate patent and claim 
value in the portfolio as it pertains to more global commercialization, 
research, and development prospects become clear, low attention to the 
vast majority of individual patents is correctly predicted by my qualified 
patent portfolio theory.   
There are scholars who do not attempt to refute the apparent 
paradox that firms acquire individual patents at costs that exceed their 
individual values, although unlike Parchomovsky, Wagner, and myself, 
they also do not use patent portfolio theory to explain the apparent 
paradox.  The following are among the theoretical alternatives to patent 
portfolio theory presented as explanations: patents as signals, patents as 
internal metrics, the lottery theory of patents, and defensive patenting.  
However, Parchomovsky and Wagner effectively critique each of these 
alternatives to patent portfolio theory.88   
 
88. See generally Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70.  Most persuasive among 
their critiques are the following.  First, signaling theory—patents signal to third parties 
information about the patented invention and patenting firm—fails to explain the patent 
paradox, because if the expected value of individual inventions is low, “it is not clear how 
information about individual . . . [patents] is valuable to third parties.”  Id. at 21–22.  Second, 
internal metrics theory—patents serve an intra-firm purpose, that is, measuring employee 
productivity—also fails to explain the patent paradox.  “Given the low private value of 
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Moreover, the key value of patent portfolios is emphasized not only 
by scholars such as Parchomovsky and Wagner, but also by 
practitioners.89  Looking at the three technologies under discussion, I 
will now show how portfolio-driven over-patenting contributes to both 
thickets and low quality patents.  Later, I will show the extensive 
exclusive licensing predicted by patent portfolio theory. 
B.  Patent Thickets and Low Quality Patents: Consequences of Patenting 
Too Early, Too Many, and Too Broadly in NB/BN, Synthetic Biology, 
and RNAi 
In various technology sectors in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and, to a 
lesser extent, RNAi, patents that were too broad in scope were pursued 
and granted too early and too often to too many inventors.  In various 
sectors in all three technologies, universities have been frequent 
participants in this rush to patent many broad patents early.  Several 
factors foster thickets and low quality patents in these technologies: (1) 
the complexities of the technologies; (2) insufficient attention to 
 
patents, it seems problematic to equate patent filings with successful job performance.”  Id. at 
22–23.  Third, defensive patenting theory—patents are “bargaining chips to negotiate with 
competitors and to secure certain niches in the marketplace”—is only partly correct, because 
the portfolio can act not only as shield, but also as sword, that is, defensive patenting theory 
ignores “offensive uses conferred with patent rights.”  Id. at 26–27.  Fourth, lottery theory—
patents are generally of very low value, but “a few are of such great financial consequence 
that they provide a sufficient incentive to inventors to obtain patents, based on the 
infinitesimal hope of receiving an extremely high payoff”—assumes that inventors are “so 
risk-seeking that they are willing to engage in an activity with a negative expected value.  
However, the standard assumption in the patent literature . . . is that investors are actually 
risk-averse.”  Id. at 24–25.  I would add the following critique of lottery theory:  although my 
qualified portfolio theory allows for the exceptionally valuable outlier claim or patent as an 
exception to the generality that patents are purchased at costs that exceed their projected and 
actual worth, I reason that this allows for fairly rare, intense, individualized protection via 
careful prosecution, litigation, and full-patent term enforcement.  This protection is due to 
probable exceptional ex ante worth, probable or known exceptional ex post worth, or both.  
The protection is not lottery-like gambling, either ex ante or ex post, on the very improbable 
existence of an outlier claim or patent of exceptional worth.    
89. In NB/BN, see, for example, Chinh H. Pham & Charles Berman, Intellectual 
Property Policy and Impact, in LYNN E. FOSTER, NANOTECHNOLOGY:  SCIENCE, 
INNOVATION, AND OPPORTUNITY 105, 106 (2006) (Lawyers Pham and Berman argue that a 
patent portfolio should “minimize the gaps that competitors can design around” and that the 
“challenge of creating a strong and solid portfolio is equally applicable to the field of 
nanotechnology.”).  See also Bruce S. Itchkawitz, Developing an Effective Patent Portfolio, 3 
NSTI-NANOTECH 344 (2006); Albert P. Halluin & Lorelei P. Westin, Nanotechnology:  The 
Importance of Intellectual Property Rights in an Emerging Technology, 86 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 220, 226 (2004) (contending that “the key to the success of many 
emerging technology companies will be how well-managed their intellectual property 
portfolio is”). 
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individual patents by some patent practitioners; (3) the perceived need 
to claim as much new turf as soon as possible to defend against others 
rushing in to patent portions of the nascent field which could possibly be 
viewed as within the scope of one’s specification;90 and (4) the burden on 
overworked and undertrained patent examiners. 
A thicket is not equivalent to a group of invalid patents, infringing 
patents, or both.  In a thicket, numerous inventors can hold valid 
patents that nonetheless create a high density of patent protection for 
potential commercial products or services.91  However, this distinction 
between thicketing as a barrier to commercialization and other legal and 
technological barriers to commercialization does not mean that the two 
are mutually exclusive.  Some patents in a portfolio may add to thicket 
density, while others in the portfolio may be infringing overlaps or be 
invalid because of lack of utility, an inadequate written description or 
enablement in the specification, or claim indefiniteness.  Obviousness, 
post-KSR,92 is another major hurdle to their validity.  Patent thickets 
could thus lead to various transaction costs that stymie innovation and 
development.93   
Nonetheless, some commentators paint a picture of an uncluttered 
biotechnology patent landscape.  This view has been based on the 
commonsensical argument that anticommons thicketing should be 
viewed as the ratio of the number of patents in the field to the breadth 
 
90. See Halluin & Westin, supra note 89 at 226–27.  See also Bawa Commentary, supra 
note 15, at 346–49.  Cf. Raj Bawa et al., Protecting New Ideas and Inventions in Nanomedicine 
with Patents, 1 NANOMEDICINE:  NANOTECHNOLOGY, BIOLOGY, AND MED. 150, 155 (2005) 
[hereinafter Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine] (expressing concern that the proliferation 
of broad patents in nanotechnology could ultimately require litigation to untangle, “especially 
if sectors of nanomedicine become financially lucrative,” and reporting a classic patent 
thicket already “developing in the area of single-walled carbon nanotubes”). 
91. See Gavin D. George, Note, What is Hiding in the Bushes?  eBay’s Effect on 
Holdout Behavior in Patent Thickets, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 557, 557 (2007) 
(defining a patent thicket as existing “where there are numerous different firms holding 
patents that are legally and technologically distinct, but overlap to cover a much smaller 
number of actual or potential commercial products”). 
92. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007). 
93. See Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science and Law 
of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REV. 871, 902 (2006) 
(arguing that the problems with biotechnology patents of broad scope are clear, namely, 
difficulties in negotiating thickets of rights which effect inefficient exploration of some areas 
of research, while also precluding the encouragement needed to solicit second-comers to find 
new uses that build on patents in the thickets); Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra 
note 90 (contending that the end result of the proliferation of nanotechnology patents that 
lead to thickets is “a drag on the innovation process itself”). 
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of the field.94  A thicket of course does denote high population density, 
not just high population or high population growth.  Thus, given the 
breadth of all three fields, reports of industry-wide heavy patenting in 
NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi do not cause as much concern as do 
reports of the issuance of many patents in fairly narrow sectors within 
the fields.  Unfortunately, however, there have been reports of thickets 
in fairly narrow sectors in all three fields: for example, in NB/BN, single-
walled carbon nanotubes;95 in synthetic biology, DNA-binding proteins;96 
and in RNAi, clinical medical therapeutics.97  Reportedly more cautious 
PTO examinations of RNAi patent applications may make thicketing 
less of a problem in RNAi.98  Yet the issuance of the first RNAi target-
specific patent to Sirna Therapeutics—covering any chemically modified 
siRNA that targets the KK-gamma gene (implicated in several diseases 
including asthma, arthritis, and cancer)99—is viewed by one industry 
insider as overly broad.100 
The problem of many overbroad patents is of particular concern—
especially in NB/BN—among foundational patents.  One worry is that 
such patents could stymie development by reducing access to 
foundational building blocks.101  Even in synthetic biology where 
 
94. E.g., David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics:  The Mismeasure 
of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1682 (2007) (arguing that an 
anticommons cannot be inferred only from a high number of patents in an industry, because 
one must also consider the breadth of the industry). 
95. E.g., Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90.  Cf. Pham & Berman, 
supra note 89, at 113. 
If the USPTO were to allow broad patent claims it would restrict innovation by 
allowing a few major players to control a large share of the field and crowd out 
small, innovative players[;] . . . in some areas a restriction on innovation may soon 
be created.  This [may] be especially true for inventions involving carbon nanotubes.  
There are currently an abundance of issued patents, many of which may be 
overlapping in scope.  
96. E.g., Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1758–60. 
97. E.g., Schmidt, supra note 61, at 273–75. 
98. See id. at 273. 
99. Id. at 275.  See also U.S. Patent No. 7,022,828 (filed May 28, 2002) (issued April 4, 
2006). 
100. Schmidt, supra note 61, at 275 (quoting an anonymous industry insider:  “[w]e’re 
sure the siRNA community will address these kinds of patents and unite to stop them”).  This 
insider also predicted “fierce fighting among companies when it comes to these [target-
specific] patents; this will be a future battlefield.”  Id. (alteration in original).   
101. Cf. Ted Sabety, Nanotech Innovation and the Patent Thicket:  Which IP Policies 
Promote Growth?, 1 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 262, 275–76, 278–79 (2004) (arguing that 
because the cluttered patent landscape of nanotechnology resembles that of the radio 
industry and that the government-compelled creation of RCA to pool radio patents may have 
prevented thicket-induced slowed production, the government should proactively intervene 
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commons of standard building blocks have been created,102 at least one 
broad foundational synthetic biology patent has been issued.103  One 
scholar contends that “even assuming appropriate enforcement of 
foundational patents, a proliferation of patents on basic parts and 
devices could create transaction-cost-heavy thickets or 
‘anticommons.’”104 
Prior to PTO’s creation of a nanotechnology art division,105 
nanotechnology patent practitioners often claimed that allegedly nano-
ignorant patent examiners were entirely responsible for the issuance of 
invalid nanotech patents, although the practitioners also commended 
PTO attempts to remedy the alleged ignorance.106  In contrast, some 
academics alleged that practitioners pursued the maximal value of 
patent portfolios—or simply patented early, broadly, and often—with 
each new patent reducing the risk of a later validity or infringement 
challenge.107 
The likely truth is that both examiner nano-ignorance and 
practitioner pursuit of maximum patent portfolio value effected less-
thorough-than-needed drafting of many individual claims and the 
written description or the enablement parts of the specifications.  The 
lack of thoroughness caused the issuance of many overbroad and/or 
overlapping NB/BN patents, many of which were foundational.  
However, it is also probably true that neither the examiners nor the 
practitioners deserve blame.  The examiners were extremely 
overworked and not specifically trained in NB/BN, which may excuse 
 
in nanotechnology by creating publicly funded foundational patents). 
102. See, e.g., Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1763–65 (discussing synthetic biology 
commons, including one at MIT, and one at Biological Innovation for Open Society (BIOS), 
the latter being a patent-based commons).  The MIT Registry contains more than two 
thousand standardized parts; “[t]he MIT scientists involved with the Registry . . . are 
sufficiently concerned that they have created a ‘BioBricks Foundation’ that might serve to 
coordinate a synthetic biology commons.”  Id. 
103. See U.S. Patent No. 6,774,222 (filed Dec. 15, 2000) (covering molecular computing 
elements, gates, and flip-flops). 
104. See Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1747. 
105. See PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
CLASSIFICATION ORDER 1850 (2005), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/documents/1850.pdf. 
106. E.g., MORRISON AND FOERSTER, LEGAL UPDATES AND NEWS, 
COMMERCIALIZING NANOBIO PRODUCTS:  AN OVERVIEW OF LEGAL ISSUES AND 
REGULATIONS (2004), http://www.mofo.com/news/updates/files/update1366.html (last visited 
Nov.  8, 2008). 
107. See, e.g., Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70, at 33–36. 
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them of some nano-ignorance.108  The practitioners were also obligated 
to both their firms and their clients to provide the greatest overall value 
to their clients in a highly competitive new technology where patent 
portfolio value was the best approximation of that value.  The 
responsibility to fix the system needed to come from outside observers, 
such as academics who can afford to be disinterested, as well as 
Congress and the federal courts.  It is thus most heartening that 
academics, legislators, and judges have worked towards ways to reduce 
patent thickets and increase patent quality.  I will now describe how 
particular doctrinal, statutory, and PTO rule changes may help reduce 
the patent thickets and increase patent quality, as part of an assessment 
of the changing legal, scientific, and technological landscapes.  I will also 
describe challenges that these landscapes create for practitioners 
seeking to maximize patent portfolio value. 
C. Prosecuting to Maximize Patent Portfolio Value When the Pertinent 
Patent Law, Science, and Technology are All Uncertain and Quickly 
Changing 
 
In this section, I will address patent prosecution challenges in all 
three fields that are experiencing rapid and uncertain legal, scientific, 
and technological changes.  I will focus first on how the higher 
obviousness bar effected by KSR and its Federal Circuit progeny,109 as 
 
108. See Uhlir, supra note 23, at 341.  The multidisciplinary nature of the field also 
appears to have made adequate examiner training in nanotechnology an arduous task.  
Because the novelty of many nanotechnology inventions inheres in their unusual and/or size-
dependent properties, the applicant’s capacity to be his or her own lexicographer encourages 
one to define the inventions by property limitations over the prior art oneself.  The 
definiteness requirement for validity thus puts the examiner in the position of evaluating the 
metes and bounds of nanoproperties that complicate the claim’s relationship to the prior art.  
See id. at 345.  Moreover, “in any given nanotech case, the chance that an examiner will 
possess practical knowledge of the relevant technology is small.  Thus, examiners will more 
likely fail either to appreciate the significance of the properties exhibited by nanotechnology, 
or to recognize these properties or their equivalents in the prior art.”  Id. at 341. 
109. Prior to KSR, there was a growing concern that both rejection rates during 
prosecution and invalidity determinations during litigation were too low, largely because the 
obviousness bar had become too low.  Regarding invalidity determinations during litigation, 
see, for example, Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (stating that “[i]n biotechnology cases, the Federal 
Circuit has bent over backwards to find biotechnolog[y] inventions nonobvious, even if the 
prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the invention”).  But see generally 
Christopher A. Cotropia, Nonobviousness and the Federal Circuit:  An Empirical Analysis of 
Recent Case Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (2007) (reporting, while the KSR decision 
was pending, various results from his statistical study of Federal Circuit obviousness 
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well as likely components of the Patent Reform Act, will make some 
pertinent patent prosecutions less certain and some pertinent patent 
validity challenges less risky. 
 
determinations from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2005 from which he inferred both that 
it is likely that the Federal Circuit has no bias towards nonobviousness and that, overall, the 
“suggestion test,” or the TSM test, plays a small role in its obviousness determinations).  
However, his statistical analysis has the following limitations which preclude support for 
either inference.  First, by temporally truncating the population parameter to four years, 
Cotropia obtained a total population of 102 patents.  Cotropia contends “while information 
from the 1980s and 1990s is nice, the focus of the current debate is on the Federal Circuit’s 
recent jurisprudence.  It matters little what the court’s take on nonobviousness was twenty 
years ago.”  Id. at 927.  But on the previous page he seems to contradict this blithe 
justification for his temporal truncation—”the population of this study can be used to predict 
the ‘population of all past and future . . . decisions[,]’”—implying that the validity of the 
study’s findings could be checked by how they predict populations from the 1980s and 1990s.  
Id. at 926 (alteration in original).  Moreover, including the earlier patents would have allowed 
for trend analyses.  Most importantly, the earlier patents would have increased the 
subpopulation sizes, thus increasing a type of statistical power, that is, the improbability of 
committing a ß error in subpopulation comparisons.  Consider the 0.1668 p-value for the 
Fisher’s Exact Test which Cotropia obtained by comparing the Federal Circuit’s obviousness 
determinations of appeals from lower court infringement cases with the determinations in the 
lower courts.  Id. at 933.  If he had included the early patents to increase the N, the 
differences most likely would have resulted in a p-value of less than 0.05.  Second, Cotropia 
contends that, because nonobviousness is a fact-intensive inquiry, it is difficult to determine 
whether a decision is incorrect.  Id. at 929.  Although Cotropia states that such fact-intensive 
inquiry does not appear possible on a large scale, by reducing his population parameters to 
obtain only 102 patents, his own inquiry is medium-scale at best.  Despite lack of knowledge 
of the underlying facts, he tacitly assumes throughout the study, by testing repeatedly for 
deviations from a 50% obviousness determination rate, that this rate indicates lack of bias 
regarding obviousness.  See, e.g., id. at 931–33.  An analysis of the underlying facts and 
pertinent statutory and case law could have indicated a point much higher or lower than this 
for any subpopulation comparison.  Thus, because Cotropia fails to place the data in its 
proper underlying factual context, his inferences about the statistical significance of his data 
are invalid.  The absence of facts, combined with this assumed null hypothesis (i.e., judge 
tacitly assumed unbiased if obviousness determinations are 50%), also creates a lack of 
internal validity because the facts are confounders and hence his statement that “[s]tatistical 
testing supports this causal observation” is false.  Id. at 948.  Third, Cotropia’s differential 
treatment of decisions where all claims in a patent were determined valid or invalid (he 
operationally defined the totality of the claims as one “patent”) vis-à-vis decisions where 
some of a patent’s claims were determined valid and others determined invalid (he 
operationally defined the valid and invalid ones as two distinct “patents”) introduced at least 
some systematic bias.  See id. at 925.  Perhaps if he had supplemented this approach with 
analyses of claims only, he could have compared resulting differences in ways that would have 
detected the extent to which this bias alone invalidated the study, notwithstanding all of its 
other aforementioned limitations.  These limitations are stated in detail not only to support 
the proposition that Cotropia’s data does not afford him the inferences that he draws from it, 
but also to highlight just some of the many methodological problems that can occur in patent 
metrics.  In addition, a second proposition is supported, that is, that patent metrics studies 
should be designed, conducted, and analyzed with extreme care.            
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1. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. and Pertinent Likely Provisions of the 
Patent Reform Act: Effects on Patent Prosecution 
a. The Heightened Obviousness Bar for Post-KSR NB/BN, Synthetic 
Biology, and RNAi Claims to Combinations   
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. heightened the obviousness bar with a 
unanimous Supreme Court opinion110 that serves as both an ex ante (i.e., 
pre-issuance) prosecutorial bar on obvious patent application claims and 
an ex post (i.e., post-issuance) weeder of obvious patent claims.  
According to the Federal Circuit’s teaching, suggestion, or motivation 
(TSM) test for obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, an invention is 
obvious if a hypothetical “person having ordinary skill in the art” 
(PHOSITA) would have found a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to 
combine prior art references to make the invention.  However, in April 
2007, the Supreme Court held in KSR that the Federal Circuit’s use of 
the TSM test was too rigid because it required that the prior art address 
the particular problem that the patentee sought to solve.111  KSR held 
that the obviousness PHOSITA would not be confined to consider only 
the elements designed to solve the problem because “[c]ommon sense 
teaches . . . that familiar items may have obvious uses beyond their 
primary purposes. . . .”112  KSR thus raised the obviousness bar to patent 
validity.   
However, KSR also held that intensive, explicit analysis is often 
required to determine if there is an apparent reason to combine known 
elements as manifested in a combination.113  Obviousness is not proven 
merely by identifying in the prior art all of the elements of an 
invention.114  Nonetheless, the Court maintained that teachings 
themselves need not be explicit and that a court should account for the 
inferences and creative steps that the obviousness PHOSITA would 
make.115   
Cautioning against “overemphasis on . . . published articles [or] the 
explicit content of issued patents,” the Court opined that when there is 
little discussion of obvious combinations, “it often may be the case that 
market demand, rather than scientific literature, will drive design 
 
110. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1733 (2007). 
111. Id. at 1741–42. 
112. Id. at 1742. 
113. Id. at 1740–41. 
114. Id. at 1741. 
115. Id. 
REVISED 3-13-09 MACKEY FINAL FORMATTED 3/16/2009  9:52 AM 
160 MARQUETTE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:1 
 
trends.”116  Design incentives and other market forces could be available 
in a different field or endeavor.117  Likewise, if a technique used to 
improve one device would be recognized by the obviousness PHOSITA 
as likely to improve similar devices in the same way, this recognition 
would make the technique obvious unless the actual application of the 
technique would be beyond the obviousness PHOSITA’s skill.118  
However, this prescription for inquiries into sources other than 
published articles and issued patents was counterbalanced with an 
emphasis on multiple patent review: “Often, it will be necessary for a 
court to look at the interrelated teachings of multiple patents. . . .”119  
Thus, the Court emphasized the need for an expanded obviousness 
analysis based on more patent and publication-related information, as 
well as more non-patent and non-publication-related information.  This 
emphasis on an expansive inquiry came with a related warning not to 
transform the general principle underlying the TSM test and Graham 
into a rigid rule that limits obviousness inquiry, although, if such rigidity 
was eschewed, both the TSM test and Graham could still be useful in an 
obviousness analysis otherwise correctly applied.120  The Court argued 
that Graham itself prescribed a broad obviousness inquiry,121 and that 
the material issue is “the objective reach of the claim.”122   
Stating bluntly that “[a] person of ordinary skill is also a person of 
ordinary creativity, not an automaton,”123 the Court, contrary to the 
Federal Circuit, opined that proof that a combination was “obvious to 
try” could make a claim for the combination obvious.124  “Obvious to 
try” can be shown by design need or market pressure to solve a problem 
for which there are finite, predictable solutions that the obviousness 
PHOSITA would have reason to pursue and could anticipate a 
successful pursuit.125 
 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1740. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 1741.  See also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
121. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1739. 
122. Id. at 1742. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id.  Recall also that KSR stated that market and design forces can come from a 
different field altogether and can involve a claimed technique for a device that is different, 
though similar, if the obviousness PHOSITA would have recognized using that technique to 
make the similar device, and it was within his or her technical skill to make it.  See id. at 1740.  
Considered with statements made in KSR linking design and market forces to making 
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The plethora of polymorphisms and multidisciplinary nature of 
NB/BN and, to a lesser extent, synthetic biology and RNAi, will make 
defining the obviousness PHOSITA for many inventions in these fields 
difficult.126  Subsequent to KSR, the Federal Circuit in Daiichi Sankyo v. 
Apotex, Inc. defined PHOSITA for an obviousness determination 
narrowly as one of two types of specialists, rather than the general 
practitioner used by the district court.127  The narrow definition caused 
the Federal Circuit to overrule the district court on the question of 
obviousness.128  The Daiichi Sankyo court’s obviousness determination 
 
something “obvious to try,” if there are a finite number of predictable solutions and the 
obviousness PHOSITA would have anticipated a successful pursuit, these other statements 
suggest that the finite, predictable solutions need not have been for the device claimed or 
even in the same technical field.    
126. Note that the PHOSITA legal construct is the hypothetical objective reference 
person for not just obviousness analysis, but also utility, written description, enablement, and 
claim definiteness analysis (thus making PHOSITA definitions essential to many 
determinations of claim validity), as well as claim construction in infringement cases.  
Although this is not the prevailing current doctrine, the range of obviousness PHOSITA 
candidates should be commensurate with the best estimate for the variance from the level of 
ordinary skill among practitioners in the art.  For instance, if there is an extremely wide range 
of skill in a well-defined art, then there are many candidates who would fit within the “normal 
range of skill” and thus could be said to possess “ordinary skill.”  The converse logic applies 
when the range of skill is much narrower, leading to a much greater constriction of who 
should count as possessing “ordinary skill.”  Note, however, that there is more than one 
PHOSITA per claim and that this logic as it pertains to innovative skill would not apply to 
the written description or enablement PHOSITA.  Burk & Lemley, supra note 109, at 1185–
90.  The Federal Circuit has varied its PHOSITA constructions depending on the analytic 
task required; for example, the PHOSITA for obviousness purposes has been constructed to 
be, 
not an especially inspired problem solver, as she is imagined to remain stuck in the 
rut of conventional thinking.  But the obviousness PHOSITA is still someone who is 
trying to solve new problems.  By contrast, the PHOSITA of the first paragraph of 
section 112 shows no such innovative tendency, but is simply a user of the 
technology.   
Id. at 1190 (citations omitted).  Thus, the level of “ordinary innovative skill within an art” 
and, if I am correct, variance from this level of ordinary innovative skill, should be highly 
pertinent in determining PHOSITA for obviousness analysis, but impertinent for written 
description or enablement analysis. 
127. Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256–59 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(considering that the inventors of a compound to treat ear infections were specialists in drug 
development and ear treatments, not general practitioners or pediatricians, and that the 
specification was directed to the same sort of expert, the Federal Circuit determined that the 
district court erred in accepting a general practitioner or pediatrician as the PHOSITA for an 
obviousness analysis, for the appropriate PHOSITA was either a scientist engaged in 
developing pharmaceutical formulations and treatment methods for the ear, or a medical 
professional who treats ear infections and is trained in pertinent pharmaceutical formulations 
for the ear).    
128. Given its narrowing of the obviousness PHOSITA to one of two types of 
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was thus ultimately driven by its narrow PHOSITA definition. 
The patent prosecutor in a highly complex technology like any of the 
three fields here may thus be caught in something of a bind.  On the one 
hand, he or she must attempt to avoid a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 written 
description rejection by making the written description precise enough 
for this PHOSITA to know that the inventor was in possession of the 
claimed invention at the time of the application.  On the other hand, he 
or she must also try to avoid a 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection by keeping 
the written description from being so precise that it leads to a very 
narrow obviousness PHOSITA and a holding that the invention is 
obvious.  There will often be yet another major consideration—
enablement under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1—that tips the scales towards 
precision.  For the enablement PHOSITA to be able to make the 
invention, enablement must include precise language, ideally with clear 
links to both the written description and the claims, thus implying that 
all three should be written precisely.  This may create an additional risk 
of an obviousness determination, post-KSR and post-Daiichi Sankyo, 
but it will not necessarily create a much greater risk.  On the other hand, 
considering the complexity of the three fields, deliberate vagueness 
could greatly risk an enablement rejection.  Thus, as usual, it is better to 
err on the side of being too precise than not precise enough.   
Precision and thoroughness are key for prosecutors, examiners, and 
judges alike.  Implicit in KSR’s emphasis on secondary characteristics is 
the need to apply the TSM test, if at all, in an expansive and flexible 
manner.  The Court’s construction of an obviousness PHOSITA with 
not just ordinary skill, but common sense and ordinary creativity, 
prescribes thorough fact-based investigation.  Although ultimately a 
legal determination, obviousness, of course, often also requires a very 
fact-intensive inquiry.  When the Court opines that an obviousness 
determination often necessitates examining multiple patents, not just 
the most clearly relevant patents and printed publications,129 as well as 
market forces and design trends,130 the Court is basically saying, do not 
truncate the factual inquiry because many facts aside from what may 
appear at first review to be the most pertinent prior art and printed 
publications may be relevant.  Note that the many polymorphisms in 
 
specialists, the Federal Circuit determined that a reasonable jury could only find that either 
specialist would have seen the invention as obvious and thus it was obvious as a matter of law.  
Id. at 1257, 1259.     
129. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. 
130. Id. at 1740. 
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NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi, even if they are not combinations, 
may still be products of interdisciplinary research and thus, in patent 
prosecution and patent validity litigation, be especially likely to require 
a thorough examination of information culled from various sources.131   
Although it may be troubling for the patent prosecutor with a 
debatably non-obvious invention in any of the three fields, from a policy 
perspective, Daiichi Sankyo is another helpful weeder of invalid claims.  
The narrowness of the obviousness PHOSITA in Daiichi Sankyo would 
appear to require, for instance, that the obviousness PHOSITA 
pertaining to virtually all NB/BN be a person of ordinary skill in the 
pertinent interdisciplinary niche within nanotechnology and 
biotechnology.  Such a person in one’s exact subdiscipline is, inter alia, 
far more likely to find one’s claim obvious than is a “general 
nanotechnologist” of ordinary skill.132  Returning to the perspective of 
patent prosecution, Daiichi Sankyo appears to make O’Neill et al.’s 
encouragement of nanotechnology inventors and researchers to work 
closely with their patent agents and attorneys to provide “thorough 
specification[s] that disclose[] all reasonable variations of their 
nanotech[nology] inventions”133 even more compelling by mitigating the 
obviousness concerns associated with my precision prescription above.  
In doing so, the applicant fosters a broad construction of the 
obviousness PHOSITA.  Thus, patent prosecutors are best served by 
making the enablement, claim(s), and written description precise, while 
also emphasizing in the written description the breadth of the pertinent 
arts. 
The high level of ordinary skill in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and 
RNAi could, following KSR and Daiichi Sankyo, make the invention 
 
131. Cf. Stephen J. MacKenzie, Supreme Court’s KSR v. Teleflex Decision (2007), 
http://www.wcsr.com/default.asp?id=118&objID=241&print=1 (last visited Oct. 11, 2008) 
(arguing, in the context of KSR’s effects on litigation, “[i]n chemical, electrical, and 
biotechnology cases, a more in depth obviousness analysis may be needed since predictability 
of results may not be easily apparent, the function of known prior art elements usually 
changes when chemically combined, and the background knowledge of a person of ordinary 
skill in the art may span several disciplines”).    
132. Daiichi Sankyo may outdate some previous commentary on the enablement 
challenge that assumed that the PHOSITA would be broadly defined as a nanotechnologist 
of ordinary skill.  Leonard P. Diana, et al., Untangling the Nanothreads Between the 
Enablement and Written Description Requirements, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 41, 47 
(2007) (contending that despite very high knowledge and expertise in nanotechnology, a 
PHOSITA would have, paradoxically, relatively low knowledge and expertise because of 
nanotechnology’s highly interdisciplinary nature). 
133. Sean O’Neill et al., Broad Claiming in Nanotechnology Patents:  Is Litigation 
Inevitable?, 4 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 29, 39 (2007).   
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appear more predictable and technologically feasible compared to what 
was known at the time of the invention.  Prior to KSR, in the 1990s at 
least, the probability that federal district courts would find a claim 
obvious appears to have varied inversely with the complexity of the 
art.134  Because of their generally greater complexity, biotechnology 
claims may have been less likely to be held obvious in this decade, even 
when the inventions involved relatively minor additions to the prior art.  
However, KSR’s holding that if an invention is “obvious to try,” it is 
obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103, even absent identification of the 
problem or any written prior art, will probably make similar, relatively 
minor additions to the prior art in NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi 
claims more likely to be held obvious. 
In regards to the three fields addressed in this Article, there have 
been several cases in biotechnology that are related to synthetic biology 
and RNAi, and a few cases related to some form of NB/BN as well.  
However, thus far, there has been only one case that specifically 
addressed a nanotechnology patent and no cases that have specifically 
addressed a synthetic biology or RNAi patent.  In the sole 
nanotechnology case, In re Kumar, the Federal Circuit vacated and 
remanded the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences’ (BPAI) 
determination that several claims in a patent application for aluminum 
oxide particles of submicron size were obvious.135  The Federal Circuit 
rejected the BPAI’s own identification for the first time of underlying 
particle size values (i.e., the size values had been previously identified 
by no one, including no party during prosecution or the BPAI appeal) 
to make an obviousness determination.  The court stated that if an 
obviousness rejection “is based on overlapping values in the prior art, 
identification of the values deemed to overlap is material to the 
rejection.  In this case[,] the overlapping values were identified for the 
first time in the decision of the Board, and are not themselves set forth 
in  . . . any . . . reference.”136  The Federal Circuit remanded the case for 
 
134. Cf. Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the “Death” of Obviousness:  An 
Empirical Study of District Court Obviousness Opinions, STAN. TECH. L. REV., July 2006, ¶¶ 
22, 41, available at http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/McEldowney-Obviousness.pdf (reporting from 
his empirical study of 321 published federal district court opinions (the study is limited in that 
it did not look at Federal Circuit opinions) that reached the question of obviousness on 407 
utility patents).  Although complexity of the art was not associated with an obviousness 
holding in the 1970s, it was in the 1990s; “simple patents [were] more likely than complex 
patents to be invalidated as obvious in the 1990s.”  Id. 
135. In re Kumar, 418 F.3d 1361, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
136. Id. at 1367. 
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the declarants to provide additional information, armed this time with 
the BPAI’s identification of overlapping numerical values.137 
However, KSR, with its emphasis on the problem not having to be 
spelled out for the obviousness PHOSITA, may at least partly eclipse 
Kumar.  KSR emphasized that this PHOSITA has not only ordinary 
skill in the art, but also ordinary creativity138 and common sense.139  An 
issue post-KSR, for a case such as Kumar, would thus seem to be not 
whether the numerical values generated by the examiner, the BPAI, or 
federal judge were ever before the applicant, but rather, whether the 
obviousness PHOSITA would have used ordinary skill, common sense, 
and ordinary creativity to derive the same finite overlapping range.  
KSR would not appear to require this PHOSITA to have been 
presented with the numerical values. 
Kumar also criticized the BPAI for mishandling the declarative 
evidence and applying the incorrect enablement test for obviousness.140  
Kumar stated that the correct test is whether the prior art enabled the 
obviousness PHOSITA to make and use the invention.  That is, would a 
patent reference have enabled this PHOSITA to produce particles of 
the size and distribution claimed by Kumar?141  Although if the prior art 
is enabling, it “teaches,” making the invention obvious, if the prior art is 
not enabling, it may or may not “teach away.”  “Teaching away” is a 
form of secondary evidence involving unexpected results that KSR 
discussed as being valuable in establishing non-obviousness.142  Thus, in 
nanotechnology patent applications, prosecutors should emphasize 
unexpected results, especially size-dependent unexpected results due to 
quantum effects and the absence of an enabling method of producing 
nanoscale materials with certain properties.  Demonstrating such 
unexpected results would still show non-obviousness post-KSR.  
Prosecutors should also emphasize the value of declarative teaching 
away evidence of uncited art post-KSR. 
Regarding post-KSR obviousness issues with chemical and 
biotechnology claims that may be pertinent to synthetic biology and 
RNAi inventions, the following statement and prediction are probably 
correct: “A virtually per se rule of patentability for new biotechnology 
 
137. Id. at 1369. 
138. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007). 
139. See id. 
140. See In re Kumar, 418 F.3d at 1368–69. 
141. Id. at 1369. 
142. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1740. 
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entities is set in the 1995 Deuel case.  Deuel has been the subject of 
heavy criticism [in] the scholarly community. . . . It may be expected that 
in the wake of KSR there will be a renewed challenge to the viability of 
Deuel.”143  Just weeks after KSR, in Ex Parte Kubin, relying on KSR’s 
“obvious to try” reasoning, the BPAI took a direct shot at Deuel.144 
Deuel had held that prior art DNA cloning methods and a partial amino 
acid sequence for a protein encoded by the disputed patented DNA did 
not suffice to make that DNA obvious.145  But then, just weeks after 
Kubin, in another case, Takeda Chemical Industries,146 the Federal 
Circuit rejected an argument analogizing “obvious to try” to KSR.  
However, Takeda Chemical Industries should not be misinterpreted as 
either an implicit rejection of Kubin or an implicit reaffirmation of 
Deuel; it was neither, fitting in nicely with not only Kubin, but also 
Pfizer147 and KSR.  Unlike in Kubin, Pfizer, and KSR, the invention in 
Takeda Chemical Industries was one of “millions of possibilities” among 
the pertinent options.148  Clearly, when KSR said that there should be 
 
143. Harold C. Wegner,  
KSR-Induced PTO Obviousness Practice Changes, 20-21 (2007), available at 
http://www.patenthawk.com/blog_docs/070529_KSR_PTO_Obviousness_Practice_(Wegner).
pdf (discussing In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
144. Ex parte Kubin, Application No. 09/667,859, 8–9 (B.P.A.I. 2007) (precedential 
opinion). 
145. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d. at 1558–59. 
146. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. 
Cir. 2007). 
147. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
148. Ex Parte Kubin held that a rejected claim to a nucleic acid sequence encoding a 
cell surface marker protein was obvious because there was a limited number of ways to 
isolate the protein that the obviousness PHOSITA would have had reason to try, expecting at 
least one to be a success.  Ex parte Kubin, Application No. 09/667,859 at 9.  In Takeda 
Chemical Industries, the Federal Circuit held that “in cases involving new chemical 
compounds, it remains necessary to identify some reason that would have led a chemist to 
modify a known compound in a particular manner to establish prima facie obviousness of a 
new claimed compound.”  Takeda Chem. Indust., 492 F.3d at 1357 (emphasis added).  The 
Federal Circuit therefore rejected the appellant’s “obvious to try” argument because it failed 
to show how the obviousness PHOSITA would have chosen the prior art compound to 
modify the compound from the “hundreds of millions of possibilities.”  Id.  In addition to 
these two post-KSR cases, in Pfizer, decided shortly before KSR, the prior art also gave the 
obviousness PHOSITA far-fewer-than-astronomical options in a genus—fifty-three 
acceptable anions—from which to select a few, including the claimed anion.  Pfizer, 480 F.3d 
at 1363.  The question of “limited options” often appears as a decisive motif running through 
what may otherwise be seen as disparate opinions.  Prosecutors may often wish to preempt an 
“obvious to try” rejection by emphasizing in the written description the uncertain feasibility, 
multitude, and diversity of options that existed at the time of the invention, using the prior 
art, declarations, and valid and reliable evidence of design needs or market pressures.  The 
prevalence and prominence of “limited options” motifs in all of these opinions on 
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limited options, the Court did not intend the finite limit to be so 
astronomical.  In Kubin, Pfizer, and KSR, in contrast, there were truly 
limited options.149 
Given the potential of all three nascent technologies to enable more 
precise drug delivery, one wonders if KSR will have a warming or 
chilling effect on large pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies 
that have been somewhat risk-averse regarding these technologies.  
These companies have preferred not to develop the technologies 
internally, but instead acquire the start-ups with the most promising or 
“disruptive” patent portfolios.150  This question may be commercially 
critical for particular government agencies and university inventors, as 
well as their start-up exclusive licensees, because pharmaceutical patent 
expirations will also cause the drug market to open considerably in the 
near future.151   
Many pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies look to make 
what they can of combinations, new uses, or new methodologies related 
 
obviousness make such work important as part of a thorough and careful written description.   
149. Some commentators have nonetheless misinterpreted KSR in criticizing Kubin.  
See, e.g., Eric K. Steffe & Elizabeth J. Haanes, Patent Board Challenges Federal Circuit to a 
Deuel, IP LAW 360, July 27, 2007, at 3, http://64.237.99.107/media/pnc/4/media.354.pdf. 
(criticizing Kubin for not providing “any identified predictable solutions, let alone a finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions to the problem.  Where KSR may have opened 
the door, nothing in the KSR opinion mandated dispensing with the need for at least some 
structural similarity in the prior art.”) (emphasis added).  But Kubin argues compellingly that 
because combining the prior art references would have led to a limited number of 
conventional methods for isolating the claimed cDNA for producing a protein implicated in 
the human immune system and various human diseases, the obviousness PHOSITA would 
have a motive to try these methods with the reasonable expectation that at least one method 
would be a success.  Kubin effectively relies on KSR’s statement that where there are a finite 
number of identified, predictable solutions within the obviousness PHOSITA’s technical grasp 
and he or she has a motive to solve the problem and reason to anticipate success, the success 
was due to common sense and ordinary skill and thus obvious to try.  See Ex parte Kubin, 
Application 09/667,859, at 8-9; KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742 (2007).  
Ordinary common sense, ordinary creativity, and flexible and expansive obviousness inquiries 
were strong motifs running through KSR.  Requiring identification of a particular similar 
structure in the prior art—when the obviousness PHOSITA could use ordinary common 
sense and ordinary creativity to combine the prior art references that included limited 
conventional methods one of which would most likely solve the problem—imposes precisely 
the sort of narrowness and rigidity that KSR rejected for obviousness determinations. 
150. See MICHAELA PLATZER, NATIONAL VENTURE CAPITAL ASSOCIATION, 
PATIENT CAPITAL:  HOW VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DRIVES REVOLUTIONARY 
MEDICAL INNOVATION 9 (2006) (reporting that “many large pharmaceutical and life science 
corporations consider young, venture backed companies to be their de facto R&D pipelines.  
For this reason, venture-backed companies often are acquired for their disruptive 
technologies by these larger organizations”). 
151. See Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 154. 
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to known drugs, however, pursuing  “extended patent coverage for their 
key commercial products” as part of their “Patent Life Cycle 
Management[] [strategy to] maximize[] [the] profitability of drugs.”152  
KSR could certainly be applied to challenge such extensions as obvious, 
particularly by combining its “obvious to try” analysis153 with the 
reasonable probability of success analysis in not only KSR,154 but also 
Pfizer.155  However, the chilling effect of such prospective challenges on 
these companies is unlikely to be very big precisely because the 
companies are already risk-averse.  These companies often acquire 
start-ups with portfolios that include highly valuable patents and claims 
on somewhat “disruptive technology” where “unexpected results” and 
other “secondary indicia of non-obviousness” can be convincingly 
shown.156  Thus, if NB/BN, synthetic biology, or RNAi offers a 
combination, new use, or new method for a drug with an expiring 
patent, and the risk-averse drug company is willing to acquire the patent 
portfolio containing the combination, use, or method allowing for an 
extension of patent coverage, the extension would probably withstand 
an obviousness challenge. 
b. Possible Forthcoming Statutory and PTO Rule Changes That Would 
Help Further Weed Out Patent Thickets and Increase Patent Validity: 
Creating a One-Year Post-Grant Opposition Period, Reducing the 
Litigation Estoppel Effect of Inter Partes Reexaminations, and 
Empowering the PTO to Make Rules That Limit Continuations 
In addition to the case law discussed in the previous section, at least 
two components of the House version of the Patent Reform Act, the 
Senate version of this act, or both,157 and a third reform proposed by the 
PTO,158 are likely to be effective ex post patent thicket weeders and 
 
152. See Steven R. Ludwig & Matthew E. Kelley, Pharmaceutical Patent Life Cycle 
Management After KSR International v. Teleflex, VENABLE LLP, May 2007, at 1, available at 
http://www.venable.com/docs/pubs/1684.pdf. 
153. See KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1742. 
154. See id. 
155. See Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
156. Cf. PLATZER, supra note 150. 
157. The House version has passed.  See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th 
Cong. (as passed by House, Sept. 7, 2007).  The Senate is still debating its version.  Compare 
Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 110th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
Jan. 24, 2008), with Patent Reform Act of 2008, S. 3600, 110th Cong (as referred to S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, Sept. 25, 2008). 
158. Changes to Practice for Continuing Applications, Requests for Continued 
Examination Practice, and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, 71 Fed. 
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patent quality enhancers: (1) creating a one-year post-issuance period 
when validity challenges can be made without incurring the expense 
associated with reexamination or litigation;159 (2) reducing the litigation 
estoppel effect of inter partes reexaminations;160 and (3) empowering the 
PTO to limit continuations.161  Allowing one year for post-issuance 
validity challenges at the PTO would spare potential challengers the 
monetary expenses, opportunity costs, and lengthy periods of 
uncertainty often associated with lawsuits and, to a lesser extent, 
reexaminations.162  Striking the estoppel language “could have raised” 
from “raised or could have raised” in 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) could also make 
inter partes reexamination a more frequent choice for a validity 
challenger who also wants to preserve litigation options.163  The first two 
 
Reg. 48 (proposed Jan. 3, 2006) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter PTO Proposed 
Limit to Continuations as a Matter of Right].   
159. See H.R. 1908, sec. 6(f)(1), §§ 321–22; S. 1145, sec. 6(e)(1) §§ 321–22.  But see S. 
3600, sec. 5(c).  The more recent Senate Bill creates a more complicated two-period post-
grant challenge system.  During the first nine-month post-grant period, petitions to cancel 
claims as unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) or (3) may be made.  S. 3600, sec. 5(c), § 
321(b).  During a second post-grant period, commencing the later of nine months after 
issuance (or reissuance) or the termination of a first-period proceeding, petitions may be 
made based on prior art in patents or printed publications to cancel claims as unpatentable 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. S. 3600, sec. 5(c), § 321(c). 
160. See H.R. 1908, sec. 6(d).  But see S. 1145, sec. 6(a); S. 3600, sec. 5(b)(1).  In 
contrast to the House version, both Senate versions would eliminate inter partes 
reexaminations, leaving in their stead only the post-grant review procedures referenced in the 
previous footnote.  See S. 1145, sec. 6(e); S. 3600(c), sec. 5(c). 
161.  See PTO Proposed Limit to Continuations as a Matter of Right, supra note 158, 
at 48–49.  But see Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652 (E.D. Va. 2007) (presenting a successful 
challenge of the PTO’s proposal which effected a preliminary injunction on implementing the 
proposal).  However, the PTO’s appeal of Tafas is currently pending at the Federal Circuit.  
Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Identifies New Applicability Date 
of Certain Provisions in “Claims and Continuations” Final Rule (Aug. 4, 2008), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/08-33.htm. 
162. In addition to reducing the ex post expense of a validity challenge, the one-year 
period for post-issuance validity challenges at the PTO may also indirectly reduce hindsight 
bias if the obviousness issue is then taken to the Federal Circuit.  The Supreme Court, 2006 
Term—Leading Cases, 121 HARV. L. REV. 375, 383 (2007) (concurring with fellow scholars’ 
prescriptions for post-grant PTO review).  The law review editors argued that a more robust 
review would not only alleviate concerns about overissuance, but could also proactively 
combat judge hindsight bias by providing independent obviousness assessments by both the 
examiner and pertinent experts during the review.  Id.  If the obviousness issue remains 
unresolved, post-KSR, a judge employing common sense might be more likely to defer to the 
PTO’s robust review.  Id. 
163. Cf. JULIE A. HEDLUND, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION 
FOUNDATION, PATENTS PENDING:  PATENT REFORM FOR THE INNOVATION ECONOMY 11 
(2007), available at http://www.itif.org/files/PatentsPending.pdf (arguing that this estoppel 
language made third parties reluctant to use inter partes reexaminations even after Congress 
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changes listed above would also allow third parties to participate more 
in patent examination and review, which scholars providing in-depth 
analyses of possible reforms to the patent system have recommended.164   
The last change listed—empowering the PTO to limit 
continuations—would encourage the rigorous initial prosecution of 
claims, by discouraging the filing of what could be an endless series of 
continuation-in-part applications (CIPs).  Such CIPs can perpetually 
broaden claims so long as each new CIP’s claims are supported by the 
initial specification in a 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 sense and otherwise comply 
with pertinent provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 120 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.78.  
Having a CIP as a virtually certain prosecutorial option can thus add 
both sloppiness and perpetual uncertainty to ultimate claim scope.  
Allowing the PTO to restrict continuations may reduce a patentee’s 
ability to protect all variations of its combination product.  However, 
obviousness doctrine, rejuvenated by KSR and its Federal Circuit 
progeny, will protect against many attempts to design around initially 
claimed combinations with distinct, but obvious, derivatives.   
2. Just-Now-Learning that Human Genetic Regulation is Not What 
We Thought: Specific Consequences for Prosecuting NB/BN, Synthetic 
Biology, and RNAi Patents 
As noted in Section II.B.2, new research at ENCODE and elsewhere 
convincingly shows that much of what we have long thought was true 
about nucleic acid regulation of protein production and activity at the 
mammalian cellular and extracellular levels is incorrect.  ENCODE et 
al. could have effects on the written description, utility, enablement, and 
definiteness of nucleotide and amino acid sequence patents.  At first 
blush, most troubling for prospective patentees of sequences would 
appear to be continuing to establish utility under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  The 
 
had allowed for appeals to the Federal Circuit). 
164. E.g., Adam B. Jaffe & Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, 1 CAPITALISM 
& SOC’Y 17, 22-23 (2006) (arguing compellingly that because the presumption of patent 
validity is necessary to reduce start-up precariousness that can deter investment, this 
presumption must remain, but that this presumption must also be made reasonable by an 
increase in patent quality effected by a change in the rules associated with inter partes 
reexamination).  If all parties are given meaningful opportunity to request reexamination on 
the basis of any relevant facts they have—with an opportunity to appeal and make any 
argument later in court not specifically made in the reexamination—then this presumption 
might become reasonable, because the greater attractiveness of inter partes reexamination, 
backed up with meaningful possible appeal, means a patent must either withstand a rigorous 
post-issuance test, be of too trivial worth for its validity to matter, or be too clearly valid to 
elicit a third party challenge.  Id.   
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need for a specific, substantial, practical, and credible utility could 
certainly be difficult to meet if many of the most basic roles that the 
sequence was long thought to play are called into question.165  Moreover, 
calls from scientists for a highly accessible genetic commons that 
extends upon the genomic commons created by the Human Genome 
Project,166 combined with the Federal Circuit’s most likely no-longer-
tenable discrete definition of “a gene” as “a chemical compound, albeit 
a complex one,”167 makes one wonder if patent law regarding the 
regulation of nucleotide sequences needs a major overhaul.  In addition 
to concerns about whether the sequences as we now understand them 
meet the utility requirement of § 101, there are science policy issues,168 
as well as concerns about whether the definiteness requirement of § 112, 
¶ 2 is met, given the current uncertainty regarding just what a gene is.  
Until the mechanisms controlling human transcription and translation—
and their extracellular regulating links that allow for genome-wide and 
proteome-wide extraordinarily complex, seemingly multiple context 
dependent determinants of phenotypes which were found in the 
research at ENCODE et al.—are far better understood, this uncertainty 
will persist. 
Consider the possible definiteness problems associated with claim 
one of Verdezyne’s recent patent licensed to the University of 
California.  The claim is putatively for “[a] method of synthesizing a 
DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide” which involves iterative DNA 
deconstruction and reconstruction via globally optimized division, 
 
165. Cf. Posting of Kevin Noonan to Patent Docs, What’s ENCODE’d in Your 
Genome Isn’t a Collection of Genes, 
http://patentdocs.typepad.com/patent_docs/2007/06/whats_encoded_i_1.html (June 18, 2007, 
22:51 EST) (arguing that because ENCODE implies that the traditional definition of the 
mammalian gene as a discrete template for translation is wrong because transcription is more 
generalized, the utility of Express Sequence Tags (ESTs), which were thought to be 
differentially expressed in tissue, and thus, reflect an event specific to a cell, tissue, or organ, 
is, “at best, highly questionable”). 
166. Cf. Roger D. Klein, Editorial, Gene Patents and Personalized Medicine, 4(3) 
PERSONALIZED MED. 237, 239–40 (2007) [hereinafter Klein, Gene Patents] (Contending that 
“the heritable and somatically acquired genetic traits influencing most drugs’ physiologic 
effects are likely to be polygenic.  In the future, the inherent encumbrances that gene-related  
patents impose . . . [are likely to] be magnified, as advancing knowledge necessitates the 
acquisition and integration of information regarding possible variants in multiple genes that 
act in concert[,]” while implying that an expansion of patent-eligible subject matter to include 
medically related genotype-phenotype correlations would also deter this necessary 
acquisition and integration.). 
167. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1206 (Fed. Cir. 1991), cert. 
denied, 502 U.S. 856 (1991). 
168. See, e.g., Klein, Gene Patents, supra note 166, at 238–40. 
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thermodynamically controlled self-assembly, and reconstitution.169  First, 
forget ENCODE et al.’s research for a second.  The claim’s apparent 
excess breadth—exacerbated by the use of the open-ended word 
“comprising” in the first claim upon which the next forty claims 
depend170—could make it vulnerable to a written description challenge171 
and/or an infringement challenge.  Now recall that ENCODE et al.’s 
findings imply that nucleotide sequence expression culminating in 
particular amino acid sequences is highly variable.172  If this implication 
is correct, then claim one of Verdezyne’s patent could possibly be 
vulnerable to a definiteness challenge due to an inherent ambiguity in 
the phrase “encoding a polypeptide” because the method may not 
encode a polypeptide under all conditions.  On the other hand, because 
claims are given their broadest reasonable construction “in light of the 
specification as it would be interpreted” by the definiteness 
PHOSITA,173 courts could find this variability acceptable if the method 
encodes a polypeptide under at least one condition and, considering the 
specification, this PHOSITA would construe the method as encoding 
the polypeptide.   
3. General Strategies and Tactics in Patent Prosecution that Maximize 
Patent Portfolio Value in NB/BN, Synthetic Biology, and RNAi 
Given both the thickets looming in various sectors in all three 
technologies and the breadth of scientific and legal uncertainty,174 patent 
prosecutors in any of these technologies must do extensive and intensive 
searches of both the printed prior art and the evolving state of the art 
prior to actual prosecution.  Such thorough research is needed to ensure 
that the specification includes as broad and precise a written description 
of the art and as clear and thorough an enablement for the claims as 
possible.  KSR makes it imperative that claims be crafted to avoid 
excess breadth vis-à-vis both the prior art and all non-prior art 
 
169. U.S. Patent No. 7,262,031 (filed May 21, 2004). 
170.  “A method of synthesizing a DNA sequence encoding a polypeptide, comprising . 
. .”  ‘031 Patent claim 1. 
171. Unless the claim was accompanied by a highly pertinent and broad written 
description. 
172. See ENCODE PILOT PROJECT, supra note 63. 
173. In re Am. Acad. Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
174. Although legal uncertainty persists, it appears much more likely—given KSR, its 
BPAI and Federal Circuit progeny, and both the House and Senate versions of the Patent 
Reform Act—that the cumulative impact of legal changes affecting prosecution will lead to 
more, not fewer, hurdles to establishing and proving patent validity. 
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knowledge culled outside of printed publications and patents (especially 
information pertaining to market forces and design incentives).   
However, maximal valid breadth by definition is not excessive.  
Thus, the prosecutor should obtain the broadest claims—considered 
collectively as parts of a much greater whole that is one’s ultimate 
patent-related focus, i.e., the patent portfolio—that one’s other patents, 
the prior art, outside knowledge, and the specification will allow.175  
Maximal patent protection means careful portfolio building with many 
broad, non-overlapping patents that maximize diversity and magnitude 
of protection in (a) particular area(s) of the technology.  Although CIPs 
and other continuations may be limited by new PTO rules,176 neither 
these rules nor the House or Senate version of the Patent Reform Act 
does away with broadening reissues, which could be filed within two 
years of issuance177 to prevent potential competitors from designing 
around one’s inventions.  Claiming less than maximal valid specification 
breadth prevents optimal portfolio-level patent magnitude and diversity 
and inadvertently invites claims for designs around inventions protected 
by the portfolio.  Such inadvertent invitations will almost certainly be 
accepted in the three intensively and extensively patented technologies 
discussed here.  In addition, note that the Patent Reform Act may also 
eliminate “interferences.”178   
Regardless of the ultimate status of “interference” or “prior inventor 
challenges,” litigating challenges will continue to be expensive 
distractions from patent portfolio buildup in alliance with business and 
science development.179  Moreover, although this will be addressed more 
fully in the next part of this Article, the quality of further development 
and the value of an ultimate acquisition by a large pharmaceutical or 
 
175. Considering also that the claims must be given the broadest reasonable 
interpretation that the definiteness PHOSITA, after assessing the specification, would give 
them.  In re Am. Acad. Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d at 1364. 
176. See supra Part II.C.1.b. 
177. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
178. Both House and Senate versions replace “interference proceedings” with 
“derivation proceedings.”  H.R. 1908, sec. 3(j); S. 1145 sec. 3(j); S. 3600, sec. 2(j).  However, 
under all current versions of the Act, the PTO Director could nonetheless still institute a 
proceeding under 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) when a dispute arises between different individuals 
regarding the right to patent the invention under 35 U.S.C. § 101.  H.R. 908, sec. 3(i)(a)(C); S. 
1145, sec. 3(i)(a)(1); S. 3600, sec. 2(i)(a)(1).      
179. Cf. Roger C. Hahn, The Evolving Landscape of Patenting Biotech Inventions:  
Terra Firma or Terra Incognita?, 30 BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING SOC’Y BULL. 7, 9 (2006) 
(“A huge drain on resources is required to resolve patent disputes once they have initiated in 
comparison to the modest costs required in building an effective IP portfolio.”).   
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biotechnology company will be largely driven by real and perceived 
patent portfolio quality.  Validity and infringement battles can make a 
start-up appear unstable to licensees, venture capitalists, and potential 
exit companies that could acquire the portfolio, albeit in a much more 
developed form. 
III. DESIGNING AND EXECUTING ROADMAPS THAT MAXIMIZE 
COMMERCIAL VALUE: USE OF PATENT PORTFOLIOS, LICENSES, 
VENTURE CAPITAL, AND ACQUISITIONS 
A. Early Thorough Integrative Research Planning that Culminates in a 
Multi-Dimensional Modifiable Roadmap 
The composition of an effective roadmap for these three 
technologies should usually begin at the point that commercialization 
appears to be a realistic possibility.  At that point, business executives 
and consultants as well as IP and other legal advisors in a government 
agency, university (typically in or associated with the technology 
transfer office of the agency or university), or start-up company where 
these innovations will most likely occur should begin to collaborate on a 
route to commercial success.180   
Among the many considerations is whether a research-based 
alliance—e.g., a cross-government agency or cross-university alliance—
via the Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement 
(CREATE) Act should be formed.  The benefit of such an alliance is 
that it would reduce patent-related competition and the possibility of an 
obviousness rejection181 if two research teams in separate government 
agencies or universities are engaged in parallel research and care is 
taken to realize CREATE’s capacity to circumvent this rejection.182  
 
180. Cf. Posting of John D. Carroll to Fierce Biotech, Nanotech is Promising, but Faces 
Hurdles, http://www.fiercebiotech.com/node/8774/print (Sept. 21, 2007 6:59 EST) (reporting 
that although the efficient manufacture of nanotherapeutics will be difficult, small companies 
have the flexibility to produce innovations for new therapies).  Id.  Market demands, 
however, would require the involvement of large pharmaceutical companies.  This is 
consistent with a trend towards initial innovation occurring in small companies that are 
subsequently acquired by large ones.   
181. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(c) (2000). 
182. OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1403–04 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“[S]ubject matter derived from another not only is itself unpatentable to the party who 
derived it under § 102(f), but, when combined with other prior art, may make a resulting 
obvious invention unpatentable to that party under a combination of §§ 102(f) and 103.”).  
Compliance with this holding is essential.  Prior art only under § 102(f) that was not 
commonly owned by both research teams at the time of the invention is not disqualified as 
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Enhanced cross-fertilization, collaboration, and consolidation of 
scientific and technological forces are all likely benefits.  However, 
reduction of troll-like holdup by the other agency or university is an 
unlikely benefit. Although neither the agency nor the university may be 
a manufacturing entity in the traditional sense, it is also true that neither 
is the idle extractor of rent that makes for a troll.183 
Another major consideration is the probable market value of 
innovations given numerous factors that are to varying degrees 
technology-specific and even technology type-specific.184  The 
assessment of probable market value is necessarily speculative, but 
should nonetheless be pursued to generate best educated guesses for 
incipient roadmap construction.  It is essential to consider all reasonably 
possible roadblocks on various anticipated routes toward 
commercialization.  Foreseeable possible roadblocks include: (1) 
scientific ignorance (e.g., unsolved pertinent puzzles uncovered by 
ENCODE and other research); (2) failure of future research to 
surmount or circumvent anticipated185 and unanticipated186 technological 
barriers; (3) barriers created by technology-type concentrations of 
patent thickets;187 (4) pertinent known and unknown distributions of 
patent ownership which could stymie licensing negotiations and 
 
prior art under § 103(c) (and thus not under §§ 103(c)(2) and (c)(3)).  Id.  Thus, information 
not contained in printed publications and patents, yet available outside the university, 
government agency, or start-up prior to collaboration, would not be disqualified as prior art.  
Patent prosecutors must coordinate the full disclosure of information from both groups when 
forming a joint research agreement under CREATE. 
183. See Marc A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls? 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 611, 629–30 (2008). 
184. Cf., e.g., Bawa Commentary, supra note 15, at 346 (discussing factors specific to 
nanomedicine).    
Several variables will determine whether advances in the laboratory will  translate 
into multiple opportunities for the consumer.  Early-stage nanomedicine 
commercialization will be hampered by large-scale production challenges, high 
production costs, the public’s general reluctance to embrace innovative medical 
technology without real safety guidelines, a scarcity of venture funds, few near-term 
commercially viable products, a well-established micrometer-scale industry, the 
pharmaceutical industry’s reluctance to embrace nanomedicine, and the absence of 
clear regulatory guidelines. 
185. Just one of many expected barrier types:  barriers to effective nucleic acid 
sequence target delivery in RNAi. 
186. New pharmaceuticals and other new medical interventions both have long 
histories of unanticipated adverse clinical side effects, including, perhaps most notoriously, 
the lethal side effect of gene therapy for an eighteen-year-old man receiving the therapy in a 
clinical trial.  See Couzin & Kaiser, infra note 289. 
187. For example, in NB/BN, an apparent thicket in single-walled carbon nanotubes.  
See Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90. 
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discourage venture capital;188 (5) thickets effected by clusters of patent 
expirations;189 (6) environmental and safety concerns regarding 
biological pharmaceuticals;190 (7) the number of pending and issued 
patents on similar inventions as part of a review of competitors’ patent 
portfolios;191 and (8) repeated citation by others of potential unlicensed 
competitor patents as signs of their licensing potential.192   
Once these roadblocks are considered, additional pertinent prior art, 
market forces, and design incentives should be reviewed, and all 
possibly valid, non-infringing, and commercially valuable patents that 
could be obtained for one’s inventions should be identified.193  It may 
seem premature to begin working on a modifiable roadmap of such 
complexity based in no small part on estimated prospective patent 
values, based in turn on preliminary research only, with not a single 
actual provisional or national patent application yet filed.  However, 
envisioning the entire commercialization process extremely early gives 
the process some initial direction and identifies precisely what must be 
done when using deadlines that are as ambitious as current conditions 
allow.  Although these timeframes are modifiable, strong incentives 
should be built to meet them; speed of development is of course 
impressive to licensees and venture capitalists, as well as pharmaceutical 
 
188. Cf. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 
TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1992–93 (2007) [hereinafter Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup]. 
The threat that a patent holder will obtain an injunction that will force the 
downstream producer to pull its product from the market can be very powerful.  
These threats can greatly affect licensing negotiations, especially in cases where the 
injunction is based on a patent covering one small component of a complex, 
profitable, and popular product. 
189. Regarding expirations of pharmaceutical patents, compare Bawa et al., Protecting 
Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 154, for an argument that commercialization in 
nanomedicine will be driven partly by the expiration of drug patents.   
190. Cf. K. John Morrow Jr., Gauging Nanobiotech’s Promise Realistically:  Biotech 
and Pharma Firms are Taking a Wait-and-See Approach, 26 GENETIC ENGINEERING & 
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWS, Dec. 1, 2006, available at 
http://www.genengnews.com/articles/chitem_print.aspx?aid=1953&chidl=2 [hereinafter 
Morrow, Gauging Nanobiotech’s Promise] (reporting the concerns of representatives of 
industry and investment management firms that potential environmental and health hazards 
of nanotechnologies have not been adequately assessed). 
191. Cf. Pham & Berman, supra note 89, at 113 (stating that the patent system can be a 
marker of innovation, with numbers of issued patents and pending patent applications 
helping one ascertain potential competitors and “the relative positions of intellectual 
property”). 
192. Cf. id. at 114. 
193. Cf. Couvreur & Vauthier, supra note 42, at 1440 (arguing in the context of 
nanotechnology that successful collaboration requires managing IP very carefully at the 
beginning of the business relationship). 
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and biotechnology companies considering acquisition targets.   
The first very-near-future deadline should then be set for the 
formation of a multidimensional, modifiable roadmap for maximal 
commercial development.  Such a roadmap could include the following: 
(1) projected pertinent scientific developments, with evaluations of 
different developmental paths in turn linked to probability estimates of 
“conditions precedent,” that is, path-dependent necessary conditions for 
the developments to occur; (2) projected technological developmental 
trajectories as effects of the scientific developments in one above; (3) 
projected technological developmental trajectories that are not effects 
of the scientific developments in one above; (4) projected evolution of 
pertinent patent law; (5) projected evolution of pertinent food and drug 
law;194 (6) projected evolution of pertinent environmental law;195 (7) 
identification of IP issues generally, most notably any pertinent 
innovations in synthetic biology that should be subject to copyright law, 
not patent law;196 (8) projected patent portfolio formation and evolution 
as effects of attempts to maximize scale and diversity considering one 
through six above as well as the preliminary research on roadblocks 
discussed in Part II.C.3; (9) identification and evaluation of 
pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that may want to acquire 
a projected patent portfolio at some defined date (e.g., exactly five years 
hence); (10) identification and evaluation of current and future public 
funding as well as various possible future sources of venture capital; 
and, if this commercial roadmap should occur in a government agency 
or university, rather than a start-up, (11) identification and evaluation of 
possible start-ups for exclusive licensing negotiations (with a near-future 
deadline for determining how to proceed with a first choice potential 
licensee).   
Much, if not all, of this information will be difficult to quantify via 
 
194. Cf. PLATZER, supra note 150, at 5 (“Life science start[-]up companies face special 
challenges given the high degree of risk and the cost and time it takes to bring these 
innovative health care therapies and technologies to the marketplace.  An unpredictable 
regulatory environment weighs heavily in the calculation of investment risk in a new 
technology.”). 
195. Cf. Albert C. Lin, Size Matters:  Regulating Nanotechnology, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 349 (2007)  (recommending, because risks are uncertain yet potentially huge, 
notification and labeling for all nanomaterials and additional screening, bonding, and 
monitoring for free form nanomaterials).  Thus, the uncertainty of regulatory approval is 
compounded by the uncertainty as to what regulations will be in effect when particular 
nanomaterials are putatively ready to be commercialized.  Id. 
196. Although recall that it appears unlikely that synthetic biology will be subject to 
copyright.  See Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1763–64. 
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probability estimates, although best educated guesses should be 
provided with estimated confidence intervals.197  In addition, scientific, 
technological, and legal uncertainties that defy categorical probability 
analysis may be quantified via traditional analysis of set intersection, 
possibility analysis that allows for gradation of set membership, or 
both.198  The great degree of uncertainty regarding technological growth 
could also allow for contingency plans based on possible obsolescence.199  
 
197. For example, the probability that technological development x will occur by a 
future date could be presented as a probability, p(x), with a probability of the probability 
estimate being correct presented as its confidence interval.  This probability of a probability, 
p(p(x)), represents the likelihood that the probability measurement is correct and is thus a 
gauge of “certainty,” c(x), that is, “predictive power.”  Maximal predictive power would exist 
when c(x) = 1, that is, when p(x) = 0 or 1 and when p(p(x)) = 1, because complete certainty 
would exist when one both predicts that x will either happen (p(x) = 1) or not happen (p(x) = 
0) and one also has complete confidence in this prediction (p(p(x)) = 1, CI = 0).  On the other 
end of the continuum, absence of predictive power would exist when c(x) = 0, that is, when 
p(x) = 0.5 and p(p(x)) = 0, because maximal uncertainty would occur when one has no reason 
to believe that x will either happen or not happen (p(x) = 0.5), nor any reason to believe in 
any particular probability of x happening (p(p(x))=0, CI = 1).  Thus, under maximal certainty, 
p(x) = 0 (0, 0) or 1 (1,1); under maximal uncertainty, p(x) = 0.5 (0,1).  Put differently, one’s 
probability that a technological development will occur by a future date is a subjective 
assessment that reflects one’s perceived knowledge of what is likely to happen.  Thus, for 
instance, given all that one knows about the science, technology, and law that could affect 
R&D in synthetic biology, one might predict how likely it would be for a eukaryotic cell to be 
completely synthesized from scratch in twenty years.  In contrast, one’s probability of the 
probability that the eukaryotic cell will be synthesized then is one’s perceived knowledge of 
the degree to which one’s knowledge of pertinent science, technology, and law is complete.  
Thus, if the second-order probability is low, one lacks confidence, due to perceived ignorance, 
that the first-order probability is correct.  Thus, a second-order probability could be 
calculated to determine the extent of additional research one might need to do to minimize 
this ignorance. The many rapidly evolving dimensions on the roadmap require that it be 
designed so that it can be modified when one or more projected dimensions miss the mark.  
However, much effort may be required to minimize uncertainty at the start, because initial 
investments can be modified only to a point without uprooting technological developments.  
Initial investments may effect entire sequences of additional investments which anticipate 
that the technological developments will follow paths that approximate their initial projected 
trajectories.   Cf. SCOTCHMER, supra note 87, at 56–57. 
[N]ot all ideas for innovations are known when investment decisions must be taken, 
and thus there can be regret.  Any investment has the potential to set in motion a 
whole sequence of related investments that will entrench a technology. . . . The right 
interpretation of efficiency must account for options on expected future 
development.  Since the future path of development has a stochastic element, the 
decision maker must have a subjective view of what is likely to happen, and with 
what probabilities, and then calculate economic welfare as an expected value.  If this 
seems too demanding, try to formulate an alternative.  Compared to what? 
Id. 
198. For a seminal discussion of possibility analysis, see L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Sets, 8 
INFO. & CONTROL 338 (1965). 
199. Cf. JACK ULDRICH, INVESTING IN NANOTECHNOLOGY 251 (2006) (arguing that 
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Even when obsolescence appears improbable, if it also seems 
reasonably possible, given that utility patent protection begins with the 
date of issuance and ends twenty years from the date of application,200 
obsolescence should be addressed for the degree to which it is expected 
to reduce the patent portfolio’s exit value at acquisition. 
At first, the best plan is to increase patent portfolio magnitude and 
diversity in a specific market, with a large number of distinct, but related 
patents that mitigate the intra-market magnitude-diversity trade-off.  
The importance of market specialization at the incipient development 
phase in a start-up has been particularly noted in nanotechnology.201  
Premature cross-market development is generally cost-prohibitive.  The 
small size of most nanotechnology start-ups, despite the potential cross-
market applicability of their technology, makes incipient developmental 
efforts across markets overextensive.202  Even in nanomedicine, where 
companies are developing a wide range of apparatuses, manufactures, 
and methods,203 small start-up size necessitates development in one 
nanomedical market only.  As the nanomedical start-up matures, cross-
market diversification would become more feasible, allowing for 
additional mitigation of the risks created by long R&D timelines, 
FDA204 and EPA205 hurdles, and possibly unforeseeable hurdles.  The 
unforeseeable hurdles could include limited niche marketability due to 
unanticipated side effects with many patients as well as other limits to 
clinical use due to expense, causing third-party payer non-coverage 
 
various nanoscale products and devices such as carbon nanotubes, nanoparticles, and 
quantum dots could have very short commercial lives, because although they may fetch a 
premium price at first, prices may drop as production scale increases and more competitors 
get into the field, allowing for both upgrades and entirely new products and services). 
200. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
201. ULDRICH, supra note 199, at 21 (arguing that nanotechnology start-ups “should 
be able to subcategorize the specific market [that] they are about to enter (e.g., electronics, 
tools, biotechnology)”).   
202. Cf. id. at 21–22 (arguing that although a nanotechnology company often has 
potential applications in many markets, market realities dictate that it focus on one field first 
and develop a specific product for that market because nanotechnology companies, especially 
the small start-ups, need strategic focus to succeed). 
203. See Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 156. 
204. See, e.g., NANOTECHNOLOGY TASK FORCE, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION, NANOTECHNOLOGY 19–28 (2007), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/nanotechnology/taskforce/report2007.html. 
205. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA Invites 
Public Participation in Development of Nanotechnology Stewardship Program (Dec. 18, 
2006), available at 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/a883dc3da7094f97852572a00065d7d8/0edb5f39e2ed
3c428525720b00629872!OpenDocument. 
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because the nanomedical intervention is not substantially superior to 
much cheaper therapeutic options. 
B. Maintaining and Modifying the Roadmap to Maximize Commercial 
Value 
Once the roadmap is created—because it depends on the eleven 
dynamic variables in Part III.A206—it should be frequently viewed for 
adjustment in research, development, and business emphases, from the 
pre-exclusive licensing stage down the road to acquisition.  The 
roadmap—and the patent portfolio within it which will often be a 
dominant force in determining routes toward exclusive licensing, 
financing, and acquisition—must be viewed as dynamic entities.  
Virtually constant attention and frequent, though not major, changes in 
direction should be expected depending on existing and projected 
changes in these entities.  Although radical directional change could 
connote instability that would often reduce anticipated commercial 
gains, more modest fine-tuning projects an impressive degree of 
diligence that would bode well for commercialization. 
C. Using the Patent Portfolio to Facilitate Commercial Development 
Building and maintaining patent portfolios with many non-
overlapping patents which maximize both magnitude and diversity is but 
one part—albeit a crucial part—of the legal enablement of commercial 
development in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi.207  The patent 
portfolio must be part of an integrated legal and commercial strategy 
with well-defined developmental paths clearly plotted on the 
multidimensional roadmap.208  The leveraging power of the portfolio in 
 
206. See supra Part IV.A. 
207. Cf. Michelle Dipp et al., Keeping It Real With Investors, BIOENTREPRENEUR 
(2006), available at 
http://www.nature.com/bioent/building/financing/012006/pf/bioent899_pf.html (arguing that 
IP fosters start-up transition from birth to growth, seed money is needed for initial patent 
applications and licenses to ensure a strong IP position, small start-ups must have the tools to 
defend their IP from infringers of all sizes, and no industry depends on IP as much as the life 
sciences industry). 
208. Cf. Gabor Garai & Andrew S. Baluch, Integrated Legal Strategies for Combination 
Biomedical Products, THE PULSE, April 2007, at 3, available at 
http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload137/4046/ThePulse_April07.pdf.  
Just as a nanotechnology combination product unites these three physical components—drug, 
device, biologic—so too are the regulatory, intellectual property (IP), and business law issues 
increasingly related with regard to the legal aspects of these products.  To succeed in the 
marketplace, the innovators of combination products must be armed with an integrated legal 
strategy.  
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the context of the multidimensional roadmap to commercialization can 
be formidable.209  However, because patent clusters have already formed 
in sectors within all three technologies, navigating these clusters will 
often be crucial for exclusive licensing,210 financing,211 and commercial 
and technological maturation into an attractive acquisition target.212 
D. Exclusive Licensing 
Investor analysts have stressed the value of strategic partnerships in 
these emerging technologies.213  Although exclusive licensing (often 
between university innovators and start-ups that can build on the 
innovations) has become an increasingly attractive first step to 
commercialization, “holdups” that potentially stymie innovation can 
exact a considerable toll.214  Thus, it is imperative to try to foresee 
potential holdups and ascertain if an attempt at a non-obvious 
anticipatory design-around is needed.  A non-obvious design-around 
would effectively circumvent the claims in the potential holdup. 
Similar mitigation strategies are an important part of the bilateral 
bargaining between a university (or government agency) patentee and a 
start-up exclusive licensee.  If it has downstream rivals, “an early 
 
209. Cf. Schmidt, supra note 61, at 273. 
210. Presumptively valid and broad patent protection in any of these technologies can 
be the key ingredient to obtaining a good licensing deal.  For instance, Sirna’s broad patent 
portfolio in RNAi made it very attractive for Merck—which, like many pharmaceutical 
companies, has generally been very cautious about licensing or acquiring patent portfolios in 
these new technologies—to license the portfolio.  See id. 
211. Cf. Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 156 (Asserting that 
patents are critical for start-up financing:  “investors are unlikely to invest in a start-up that 
has failed to construct adequate defenses around its intellectual property.  In fact, patents 
generally precede funding from a venture capital firm.”). 
212. Cf. Bawa Commentary, supra note 15, at 346 (Arguing that investors in 
nanomedicine and pharmaceutical companies consider patent issues to be among the most 
important issues that they will consider in evaluating a prospective investment). 
213. Regarding nanotechnology for instance, see ULDRICH, supra note 199, at 27:  
“[b]ecause many nanotechnology start-ups are small, they will need assistance in getting their 
product to market.  For this they will often need partners.” 
214. Cf. Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1758 (“[A] crowded patent landscape creates 
the possibility of ‘holdup’ by a previously unknown patent holder who emerges only after 
others have invested large sums of money . . . to the extent that patent rights holders rely 
upon reach-through royalties to secure revenue, standard economic theory predicts that 
product output by the improver will be suboptimal.”) (citations omitted).  However, trolls do 
not just holdup big companies with deep pockets:  “Start-up companies are easy targets for 
holders of weak patents of ambiguous scope because of the fragility of their funding and the 
time-sensitivity of their business plan.”  Peter S. Menell, A Method for Reforming the Patent 
System, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 487, 507 (2007). 
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licensee will actually benefit from agreeing to conditions that will 
preserve the patent holder’s position in subsequent negotiations with 
other downstream firms, since the early licensee benefits if subsequent 
licensees (its rivals) must pay higher royalties.”215  Several high profile 
exclusive licensing deals between universities and start-ups in all three 
technologies imply that these deals are one of the preferred first 
commercial moves for many universities with promising near-term 
innovations.216 
E. Maximizing Patent Portfolio Value to Obtain and Maintain Venture 
Capital 
Virtually all start-ups in these three research-intensive fields will 
need venture capital, and the number of patents, combined with the 
magnitude and diversity of patent protection, are key to getting that 
venture capital.  Though widely recognized as critically important, 
getting venture capital is by no means easy to get, and even if a start-up 
receives venture capital, success is not guaranteed.  A large percentage 
of biotechnology start-ups have not had a successful exit either as an 
 
215. Lemley & Shapiro, Patent Holdup, supra note 188, at 2007.  See also Garai & 
Baluch, supra note 208, at 4 (“[E]ach additional license will decrease the manufacturer’s 
incentive to market the combined [biomedical] product. . . .”). 
216. Examples of major exclusive licensing deals in all three fields in the past two years 
include the following.  First, in synthetic biology, Condon Devices exclusively licensed 
synthetic biology technology for “its platform to design, construct and assemble large strings 
of oligonucleotides.”  Ken Howard Wilan, Commercializing Synthetic Biology, 
BIOENTREPRENEUR (2005) (reporting that Jay Keasling, UC-Berkeley Professor of 
Bioengineering and Chemical Engineering, formed two synthetic biology start-ups—not only 
Codon Devices, but also Amyris Biotechnologies—the latter receiving $12.5 million from 
OneWorldHealth, a non-profit pharmaceutical company in San Francisco).  Second, in RNAi, 
Merck became the exclusive licensee of Sirna’s broad RNAi patents through its purchase of 
Sirna. See Schmidt, supra note 61, at 273.  Third, in nanotechnology, Harvard exclusively 
licensed chemist George Whitesides’ patents to Nano-Terra.  Thayer, Harvard Licenses 
Nanotech Patents, supra note 85.  For an economic take on this trend, see SCOTCHMER, supra 
note 87, at 236. 
An exclusive license insulates the licensee from competition, and the resulting 
monopoly profit can be shared with the university through the fees.  Nonexclusive 
licenses are usually reserved for situations where the university perceives it has no 
other choice—for example, where [additional] industrial users threaten to challenge 
or design around the university’s patents. . . . [Seventy-four] percent of university 
licensing offices “almost always” grant sponsors the right to negotiate exclusive 
licenses. 
Yet Scotchmer also asserts in a footnote on the same page that this “distinction between 
exclusive and nonexclusive licensing is a bit artificial, since the profit advantage of exclusive 
licens[es] can often be achieved with nonexclusive licenses and high royalties.”  Id. at 236 n.7.    
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initial public offering or as an acquisition.217  NB/BN has experienced 
much growth, but continued rapid development is threatened by patent 
thickets that either already exist or are looming throughout 
nanotechnology, though particularly in NB/BN.  Combine the thicket 
problem with the high concentration of venture capital within 
nanotechnology,218 and one may expect a high rate of failure among 
NB/BN start-ups as well.  However, a high failure rate does not mean 
that those few that eventually exit successfully will not succeed very 
well.  Given the enormous potential in all three technologies, the most 
promising companies will be acquired for lucrative sums.  Being one of 
the successful few will still be extremely difficult.  A strong patent 
portfolio that indicates to venture capitalists that a company is relatively 
low risk for an unsuccessful exit within seven years may often be a 
necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for success.219 
The greatest financing challenge for NB/BN, synthetic biology, and 
RNAi may be in medical applications outside of a highly promising drug 
delivery patent, because of the caution shown by biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies, as well as much uncertainty in FDA 
regulatory approval and clinical utilization.220  Nonetheless, despite their 
cautious approach to acquisitions, established biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies increasingly engaged in them from 1998 to 
2006.221  These companies have pursued the safest route with these 
 
217. Thus, as critically important as venture capital is as a step towards a successful 
exit, it is only that; there is no guarantee that one will make the exit. Cf. GARY P. PISANO, 
SCIENCE BUSINESS:  THE PROMISE, THE REALITY AND THE FUTURE OF BIOTECH 162 
(2006) (drawing an analogy between raising capital in biotech and getting an official number 
for the Boston Marathon; it can be tough to qualify, but tougher still to do well in the race). 
218. Ann M. Thayer, Nanotech Investing, 83 CHEMICAL ENGINEERING NEWS, May 2, 
2005, at 1 (reporting that 10% of the more than 1,200 nanotechnology-related start-ups 
worldwide have received venture capital, “and just 10% of those have received more than 
one round of funding”; thus, if this report is accurate, just [twelve] of these start-ups have 
received two or more rounds of venture capital funding). 
219. Cf. ULDRICH, supra note 199, at 246. 
[M]ost investors have limited patience.  Many of the [nanotechnology] companies 
listed in this book are the recipients of venture capital.  Venture capitalists are 
typically willing to give a company anywhere between three and seven years to 
prove they can either be a viable acquisition target or succeed on the public market.  
If companies cannot demonstrate progress toward these established goals, funding is 
going to become increasingly difficult to obtain.  
220. Regarding the uncertain but possibly very large health (as well as environmental) 
risks of nanomaterials, see generally Lin, supra note 195. 
221. Cf. Nixon Peabody LLP, Nixon Peabody LLP Attorneys Speak at BIO 
International Convention, May 3, 2007, 
http://www.sixbey.com/publications_detail3.asp?ID=1817 [hereinafter AGE OF ACQUISITION] 
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highly promising, yet also highly uncertain, technologies.  Instead of 
doing the R&D themselves, they have entered into licensing 
agreements, relying on government and academic research, and waiting 
until the regulatory climate becomes clearer.222  Because many drug 
patents are set to expire soon,223 drug development—despite all of the 
potential R&D hurdles—is one of the relatively safer bets in all three 
technologies for government, university, and start-up investment.  An 
increasing percentage of total venture capital is given to life sciences 
companies.224  This trend most likely reflects not only the near-term 
expiration of many drug-related patents in these technologies which 
fuels drug development, but also the lack of direct investment from 
major pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies that prefer instead 
to rely on government-or-university-to-start-up de facto research 
pipelines. 
Nonetheless, probably the most commercially promising exclusive 
licensing deal of 2007—Harvard’s licensing of George Whitesides’ 
nanotechnology patents to Nano-Terra—will apparently require no 
venture capital.225  Nano-Terra and Harvard will co-own the technology, 
which is already licensed to several large established private companies, 
as well as the Department of Defense.226  This may be because 
Whitesides previously helped create three biotechnology companies 
with “a combined market value of nearly $20 billion”227 and is also a 
highly esteemed expert in nanotechnology.228  Without a combination of 
proven business acumen and scientific expertise, researchers in 
government agencies, universities, and start-ups should not count on 
being able to bypass venture capital like Harvard and Nano-Terra 
 
(reporting that firm attorney Philip Taub would be moderating a conference panel “The Age 
of Acquisition:  Business Strategies for Biotech Companies.”) (emphasis added).   
222. Cf. Morrow, Gauging Nanobiotech’s Promise, supra note 190. 
223. See Bawa et al., Protecting Nanomedicine, supra note 90, at 154. 
224. LUX NANOTECH INDEX, supra note 24 (reporting that venture capital investment 
in the life sciences increased from 13% to 28% of total venture capital investment). 
225. Having licensed more than fifty patents from Harvard, “Nano-Terra has not 
raised venture capital; instead, its founders and employees, along with advisors and Harvard 
University, own the company.”  Jeffrey Carbeck, Nano-Terra, Inc., Nano-Terra, A Scientist’s 
Approach to Commercializing Science, Presentation at the AIChE 2007 Annual Meeting 
(Nov. 7, 2007) (abstract available at 
http://aiche.confex.com/aiche/2007/preliminaryprogram/abstract_100463.htm). 
226. Thayer, Harvard Licenses Nanotech Patents, supra note 85. 
227. Id. 
228. Barnaby J. Feder, Harvard is Licensing More Than 50 Patents to a 
Nanotechnology Start-Up, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/04/technology/04nano.html?_r=1&oref=slogin. 
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apparently will be able to do.  Moreover, much uncertainty persists with 
even the most commercially promising start-ups such as Nano-Terra, as 
seen by the disappointments of some other seemingly very promising 
similar start-ups.229 
F. Through the Minds of Prospective Buyers: How Pharmaceutical and 
Biotechnology Companies Acquire NB/BN, Synthetic Biology, and 
RNAi Technology 
Merger and acquisition activity—especially acquisition activity—has 
increased sharply in the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries 
over the last few years, leading some industry analysts to refer to these 
times in the life science industry as an “age of acquisition.”230  Although 
making a patent portfolio an attractive acquisition target may appear to 
be elusive because of many firm-specific factors,231 the generalization 
that companies can be expected to be risk-averse, with calculated and 
cautious purchases built on solid patent portfolios, nonetheless holds.232  
A corollary to the risk-averse nature of these companies is that they 
would like to increase the acquisition risks that face their competitors, 
which they can do by dominating a nascent market, as long as the 
barriers to entry that such increased risks create do not run afoul of 
antitrust law.233  
 
229. See, e.g., Thayer, Harvard Licenses Nanotech Patents, supra note 85. 
230. See AGE OF ACQUISITION, supra note 221. 
231. See James Mittra, Life Science Innovation and the Restructuring of the 
Pharmaceutical Industry:  Merger, Acquisition and Strategic Alliance Behaviour of Large 
Firms, 19 TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 279, 279 (2007) (reporting that the present 
preferred balance in the pharmaceutical industry between in-house R&D and externally 
sourced knowledge is due to numerous very firm-specific factors). 
232. Regarding nanomedicine, compare Kostas Kostarelos, Editorial, Establishing 
Nanomedicine, 1 NANOMEDICINE 259, 260 (2006), reporting that although quite a few big 
pharmaceutical companies like the ideas and technologies in nanomedicine, because they 
consider most nanomedicine companies early stage and high risk, these pharmaceutical 
companies are fitting nanomedicinal technologies into their pre-established markets. 
233. Cf., Mark Hollmer, News In-Brief:  Merck Establishes a Foothold in RNAi, 25 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 9, 9 (2007).  Although Hollmer does not specifically address 
antitrust issues, he does discuss Merck’s exclusive licensing of a broad RNAi patent portfolio 
that may help the large pharmaceutical company dominate the nascent industry by excluding 
competitors from a large percentage of the new technological turf.  If the percentage of turf 
excluded gets too high, it is possible that Merck could obtain a monopoly.  Excessive anti-
competitive effects of broad patent portfolios could thus create antitrust problems. 
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IV. OVERCOMING NEAR-TERM OVER-OPTIMISM TO REALIZE LONG-
TERM REVOLUTIONARY GAINS: A SOBERING LOOK AT THE MODEST 
MEDICAL GAINS IN FIGHTING AMERICA’S TOP THREE KILLERS—
HEART DISEASE, CANCER, AND CEREBROVASCULAR DISEASE234 
Emphasis on the great medical potential of NB/BN, synthetic 
biology, and RNAi threads its way through NNI, NIH, and other U.S. 
government institute reports,235 academic projections of medical 
applications, and emerging growth company and venture capitalist hype.  
Although this potential is indeed great, it will not be realized anytime 
soon.  Do not expect radical reductions in the incidence, prevalence, and 
mortality rates for the three most common causes of death in the United 
States—heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular disease—anytime in 
the next twenty years.  NB/BN, synthetic biology, RNAi, and other new 
biotechnologies all promise great breakthroughs in our fights against 
these and other chronic diseases.  Realizing this promise, however, will 
most likely require major advances in not just the technologies, but also, 
inter alia, better comprehension of complicated multilayered cellular, 
molecular, extracellular, and system-wide (e.g., genome-level, 
proteome-level) human biology.  Thus, it is highly unlikely that any of 
the three technologies will realize this great promise in the next twenty 
years.  Moreover, there is no guarantee that anticipated and/or 
unforeseen barriers to safe and efficacious medical intervention will not 
contraindicate the use of all of these technologies even in the remote 
future.  We must proceed with equal parts vigorous enthusiasm and 
rigorous skeptical inquiry into what could go wrong.  Presently, 
optimism is not sufficiently tempered by skepticism and rigorous 
searches for obstacles to implementation and ways to overcome these 
obstacles.   
What have we seen in the last forty years?  In the 1960s, we heard 
that a “cure for cancer” was imminent, but, despite huge funding, there 
is still no cure, although ironically, unjustified hype appears to continue 
 
234. NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
AND HUMAN SERVICES, HEALTH, UNITED STATES 109 fig.20 (2007) (displaying tabular data 
that show heart disease, cancer, and stroke to be the first, second, and third most common 
causes of death, respectively, in the United States for every decade from 1950 through 1980, 
every five years from 1985 through 1995, and every year from 1996 through 2004).    
235. The FDA being a notable and predictable exception.  See, for example, the 
FDA’s guardedly optimistic language regarding the uses of nanotechnology.  See FDA 
Statement on Whether There are Regulated Nanotech Products, supra note 32.  Canada may 
be a bit different.  See ONTARIO MEDICAL NANOTECH HORIZON, supra note 37, at 12.   
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unabated.236  In the 1980s, the biotechnology hype also promised 
monumental changes in treatment for various genetic disorders.  In the 
1990s, gene cloning identified all sorts of targets for intervention with 
many deadly chronic diseases, but again the deadliest three—heart 
disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular disease—remained major lethal 
threats.  We did not fully anticipate the obstacles to interventions such 
as gene therapy.  Although there are reports that “[n]anotechnology has 
been increasingly utilized to enhance bone tissue engineering 
strategies,”237 tissue engineering, though very promising, has not yet 
been used extensively in medicine.  Unfortunately, when trying to 
develop and market complicated new technology—or when trying to 
 
236. See George L. Gabor Miklos & Phillip J. Baird, The Latest Surge in the War on 
Cancer; Tour de Force or Tour de Farce?, posted by Otis to You Bet Your Life, 
http://barnesworld.blogs.com/barnes_world/2007/03/george_l_gabor_.html (March 05, 2007, 
3:00 EST) (arguing that The Cancer Genome Alliance (TCGA) is making completely 
unwarranted promises of potential applications of the data to personalized medicine, with a 
representative of the National Cancer Institute even promising that all suffering and death 
from cancer will be eliminated by 2015).  Miklos and Baird argue that the data TCGA is 
collecting appears irrelevant to the individualized clinical genetics of cancer where the key 
outstanding question is “[h]ow do we sort the mutations of very different types which may 
produce a clinical outcome in the unique genetic and epigenetic background of that particular 
individual[?]”  Id.  The authors contend that the effectiveness of drug treatment for individual 
cancers is determined by a genomically heterogeneous cell population consisting of 
imbalanced genomes at both the genetic and epigenetic levels, necessitating better systems-
level understanding of the differences to predict therapeutically relevant outcomes.  Id.  This 
implies that the billions of dollars of public money that will be invested in single gene pair 
mutations, without genome-level multivariate systemic analysis, may be tragically wasted.  
They see TCGA as built on the false premise that the mutational signature of the bulk tumor 
is congruent to that of its metastatic derivatives and thus offers illusory hope of a 
personalized therapeutic application built on bulk tumor, rather than stem cell population, 
information.  The stem cell population information, the authors contend, would “still offer 
some hope.”  Id.  However, Miklos and Baird’s criticism appears excessively harsh and not 
entirely valid, given that other researchers believe that TCGA is providing us with 
remarkably valuable information.  See, e.g., W.C. Cho, Review, A Future of Cancer 
Prevention and Cures:  Highlights of the Centennial Meeting of the American Association for 
Cancer Research, 19 ANNALS OF ONCOLOGY 205, 205 (2008).  The complexity of 
carcinogenesis is reflected in ongoing debates regarding the roles that mutations might play in 
cancer and thus the potential of targeting mutations in oncotherapy.  Compare Lawrence A. 
Loeb et al., Point-Counterpoint Review, Cancers Exhibit a Mutator Phenotype:  Clinical 
Implications, 68 CANCER RES. 3551, 3551 (2008) (arguing that cancer cells have a mutation 
rate that exceeds that of normal cells and thus inhibiting mutator pathways could prevent 
cancer) with I. Walter Bodmer, Response, Cancers Exhibit a Mutator Phenotype:  Clinical 
Implications, 68 CANCER RES. 3551, 3557 (2008) (criticizing this mutator phenotype 
hypothesis because natural selection would confer no advantage to Loeb et al.’s “unexpanded 
random mutations,” and therefore, they will rarely occur in the tumor and are “irrelevant for 
the overall biology of the tumor”). 
237. Kyobum Kim & John P. Fisher, Nanoparticle Technology in Bone Tissue 
Engineering, 15 J. DRUG TARGETING 241, 241 (2007). 
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secure funding from Congress—there can be much pressure to look 
rigorously for how things could work to satisfy potentially wary funding 
sources, but there is often less pressure to examine rigorously all that 
could go wrong.   
Some of what will go wrong will only be discovered via 
experimentation, but some of it can be anticipated.  If we are truly more 
interested in long-term medical gains than short-term financial gains, we 
must be hyper-vigilant about investigating obstacles to major 
developments and how we could best overcome or circumvent them.  
Unfortunately, this is outside the tactical and strategic thinking that 
frames the work of most commercial researchers, executives, and 
investors.  As I will argue in Part V.B.2, this requires an idealistic public 
commitment to long-term sophisticated research. 
Also recall the many surprising findings pertinent to regulation of 
protein expression, reported by ENCODE and others, described in Part 
I.B.2, which implicate both mechanistic biology and systems biology.  
NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi will thus need to coordinate their 
technologies with forthcoming basic research that elucidates the 
implications of the surprising new findings to realize revolutionary 
clinical gains in heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular disease.238  
Intracellular mechanisms are sources of much of the planned targeted 
clinical intervention in all three technologies discussed in this Article.239  
Accurate higher-level systemic analysis is also essential for pertinent 
clinical developments in synthetic biology.240  Sorting out the many 
diverse and intertwined cellular and extracellular surprising new 
findings pertinent to normal and pathological human conditions will of 
course take much time. 
V. POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS: FURTHER WEED OUT THE PATENT 
THICKETS, INCREASE PATENT QUALITY, AND SHIFT THE MAIN FOCUS 
FROM MAXIMIZING NEAR-TERM COMMERCIALIZATION TO 
MAXIMIZING LONG-TERM MEDICAL PROGRESS 
Heraclitus made two pertinent prophetic points 2500 years ago: “[a] 
thing’s (the world’s) real constitution has a tendency to conceal itself” 
 
238. Regarding cancer, see, for example, Pagano et al., supra note 66, at 0181–82 
(finding down-regulation of 21A endogenous ncRNA in tumor cell lines and concluding that 
the role that this newly discovered transcript plays in tumor cell proliferation needs further 
investigation). 
239. See supra Part I.B.2. 
240. See supra Part I.B.2. 
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and “lovers of wisdom ought very much to be enquirers into many 
things.”241  ENCODE et al.’s new picture of mammalian regulation of 
protein expression is contrary to many decades-old assumptions.  This is 
a picture of nucleic acid and amino acid sequences involved in 
extraordinarily complex multilayered regulatory phenotypic controls 
from the level of the small sequence all the way up to the genome and 
proteome.242  Considering this complexity—and considering too that 
gene therapy has yet even to approximate the ground-breaking clinical 
success it was promised to be243—one must approach the great medical 
promises of these nascent technologies with a healthy dose of 
skepticism.   
This pithy 1808 rhyme from Walter Scott’s poem Marmion is also 
prophetic: “Oh! what a tangled web we weave [w]hen we first practi[c]e 
to deceive!”244  This prophecy applies doubly.  One tangled web is a 
huge, broad, and often-overlapping group of patent portfolios.245  This 
web ostensibly protects innovations derived from an even more tangled 
web of overlapping mammalian biophysics, bioengineering, 
biochemistry, and cell and molecular biology which apples to NB/BN, 
synthetic biology, and RNAi.246  The following is clear in these three 
nascent technologies: to varying degrees, all have thickets, invalid 
patents of indefinite claim scope (with related inadequacies in the 
written descriptions), and potentially infringing patents of broad claim 
scope.247  These thickets, invalid patents, and potentially infringing 
patents threaten to stymie commercial development via massive 
litigation.248 
If the patent portfolio is critical to the commercial development of 
 
241. HERACLITUS, FRAGMENTS:  A TEXT AND TRANSLATION, 29, 71 (T.M. Robinson 
trans., Univ. of Toronto Press 1987). 
242. See supra Part I.B. 
243. Not only has it not been a ground-breaking clinical success, gene therapy has had 
at least one very high-profile lethal failure.  See Couzin & Kaiser, infra note 289.    
244. WALTER SCOTT, MARMION 205 (William J. Rolfe ed., The Riverside Press 1913) 
(1808). 
245. See supra Part II.B. 
246. See supra Part I.B. 
247. See supra Part II.B. 
248. Cf. Giovanni Dosi et al., Knowledge, Competition and Innovation:  Is Strong IPR 
Protection Really Needed for More and Better Innovations?, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 471, 477 (2007) (contending that the literature on cumulative, sequential, and 
complementary technological progress indicates that if technological opportunities for firms 
are not mutually independent, patents can cause holdup phenomena, such as patent thickets 
and anticommons and, in the long-term, deter innovation). 
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NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi,249 an important policy question is 
whether it should have such critical importance.  Important related 
questions are whether patent portfolios, considered both within each 
technology and across two or more of the technologies, are likely to 
hinder or facilitate the best types of growth in the technologies.  In this 
part of the Article, I argue that the quality of patent portfolios can be 
improved—and the risk of patent thickets and low quality patents 
stymieing commercialization consequently reduced—via various 
reforms in patent law and patent examination procedure and review.  
However, I also argue that these reforms will not suffice to facilitate 
near-optimal medical progress for two main reasons.  First, upstream 
building blocks and other basic foundations, such as research tools, need 
to be broadly accessible via scientific and technological commons.  
Second, the most promising research is also very risky, expensive, and 
long-term, which makes it unsuitable for collaborative government 
agency or university-start-up-big pharma/biotech developmental 
pipelines and the securing of a reliable finance source.  This latter fact is 
largely due to the daunting interconnected complexity of cellular, 
extracellular, and metabolic mechanisms, higher-level biological 
systems, and clinical medical translational problems.  These problems 
include barriers to creating fairly precise links between basic laboratory 
science, animal experimentation, and clinical trials with humans.  
Nonetheless, such fairly precise translations will be needed for the most 
ambitious innovations that will make leaps, rather than incremental 
steps, toward revolutionary advances in medical diagnostics, prevention, 
and treatment. 
This is how we might further untangle the patent web and increase 
patent quality.  Although not in itself a panacea, the untangling will at 
least afford us more valid, secure, and non-infringing patent portfolios.  
Three related statements from Albert Einstein—”[o]ut of clutter, find 
simplicity”; “[f]rom discord, find harmony”; and “[i]n the middle of 
difficulty lies opportunity”250—apply as well.  Findings from ENCODE 
et al. strongly imply that intracellular and extracellular regulations of 
phenotype production are linked via extraordinarily intricate, variable, 
and multilayered connections.251  The technological boundaries between 
BN and NB, as well as between NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi 
 
249. See infra Part II.A. 
250. ALBERT EINSTEIN, THE EXPANDED QUOTABLE EINSTEIN 322 (Alice Calaprice 
ed., 2000). 
251. See supra Part I.B. 
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are also blurred because of complexities and uncertainties, in addition 
to categorical overlap.252  The patent portfolio in itself is not 
problematic, so much as the ease of getting patents and building a 
commercially valuable portfolio that may nonetheless contain invalid or 
infringing patents.  The low value of most individual patents vis-à-vis 
patent portfolios is a large part of the problem, and the market alone is 
unlikely to create the necessary incentives to fix it.253  Nonetheless, one 
must also be wary of the formation of commons for reasons that 
ostensibly promote the public good, but are in actuality a close cousin of 
“regulatory capture,” that is, a way for people who already possess 
patents to reduce the patenting potential of future competitors.254   
A much more finely tuned balance between private patent 
protection and public incentives for inventions could facilitate truly 
major medical progress in the next twenty years.  Private patent 
protection must be guided by additional changes in patent law.255  
Commons are necessary for upstream building blocks to secure the 
foundation of valid and reliable basic science and technology.256  
Governmentally and philanthropically funded prizes for cures or 
preventions for diseases would be salutary supplements to particular 
reforms in patent law and examination procedure and the proper 
creation and maintenance of parallel commons.257  There is no panacea 
 
252. See supra Part I.A. 
253. Compare Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70, at 60 (“Perhaps the most 
important prediction enabled by the portfolio theory is that the current patent intensity 
(patents obtained per research dollar) should not be expected to drop dramatically—at least 
absent the intervention of other major factors, such as substantive legal changes.”) with 
Lemley & Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, supra note 83, at 82 (reporting that voluntary 
arrangements can occur between established incumbents with a shared incentive to clear out 
a patent thicket by signing broad cross-licenses).  In nascent fields like the three discussed in 
this Article where new start-ups own much of the patents, however, there are no established 
incumbents. 
254. Cf. Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1747 (reporting, in the context of synthetic 
biology, “the attempt by individuals to use intellectual property rights to create a ‘commons,’ 
just as [the] developers of free and open-source software use the leverage of software 
copyrights to impose requirements of openness on future programmers—requirements 
greater than those attaching to a public domain work”). 
255. See infra Part V.A.1. 
256. See infra Part V.B.1. 
257. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Editorial, Scrooge and Intellectual Property Rights:  A 
Medical Prize Fund Could Improve the Financing of Drug Innovations, 333 BRITISH MED. J. 
1279, 1279–80 (2006) (recommending government-funded prizes for cures to diseases—such 
as malaria—that primarily affect third world countries because there are insufficient 
incentives for the commercial development of cures for these diseases).  See also 
SCOTCHMER, supra note 87, at 39, 41–42 (providing an economic analysis of two types of 
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for either the somewhat chaotic patent portfolio landscape or long-
funded but still refractory killers such as our country’s most common: 
heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular disease.  Nonetheless, there is 
much more that we can and should do. 
A. Further Weed Out the Patent Thickets and Increase Patent Quality: 
Why KSR and the Patent Reform Act Probably Will Not Suffice and 
How We Could Do More 
1. Additional Changes Recommended: Prosecution History Estoppel, 
Improved Injunctive Relief to Deter Holdups from Trolls,258 and 
Removal of the Prior Art Limit to Reexaminations 
The Supreme Court and Congress are both to be lauded for 
initiating reforms that should help weed out overbroad and potentially 
overlapping patents from thickets and thickets-in-the-making in all 
three technologies.  But considering the expense and the retardation of 
development that thickets effect, the federal courts and Congress should 
go farther.  IP scholars have recommended several promising ex ante 
and ex post legal changes that deserve greater consideration from judges 
and legislators.  Prosecution history estoppel, which could force patent 
applicants to produce sufficient information about their patented 
invention at an early stage, is a promising ex ante recommended 
change.259  Removing the prior art limit to reexaminations (the removal 
being somewhat like extending to reexaminations KSR’s prescription 
that obviousness inquiries be expansive and thus may need to consider 
more than just the prior art) and providing injunctive relief to reduce 
patent trolls260 are both very promising ex post recommended changes. 
 
prizes as alternatives to patents—”targeted prizes,” which are directed ex ante at well-known 
needs that originate with sponsors, and “blue sky prizes,” which are directed ex post at the 
value of the innovation—and arguing that “[t]he advantage of prizes over patents is that they 
can avoid the deadweight loss of proprietary pricing”).   
258. Although injunctive relief proposals have been very seriously considered, it now 
appears unlikely that injunctive relief will be a major component of the Patent Reform Act 
that eventually passes to become law.  See H.R. 1908; S. 1145; S. 3600. 
259. See Parchomovsky & Wagner, supra note 70, at 10, 69–71. 
260. See Mark A. Lemley, Patent Reform Legislation—Public Comments on Substitute 
HR 2795 and the Role of the Antitrust Modernization Commission, Testimony Before the 
Antitrust Modernization Commission 7–9 (Oct. 24, 2005), available at 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/commission_hearings/pdf/statement_Lemley.pdf.  But cf. 
id. at 1–2  (arguing that while abusive patent litigation is reported by innovators in 
semiconductor, computer, Internet, and telecommunications, it is not a problem for the 
medical device, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical industries because of differences in the 
two types of industries).  Lemley states, “pharmaceutical patents are more likely to cover a 
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2. Impractical Given the Extraordinary Cross-Industry Nature of the 
Technologies: Extensive Industry-Specific Patent System Reform 
Some scholars have noted that patent problems are often industry-
specific, with divergence most common between biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical patents and software patents, leading some to question 
whether the patent system should be tailored to such differences.261  
Category-specific patent rules may be both feasible and desirable for 
some types of patents, such as business methods patents and software 
patents.262  However, even if nanotechnology is limited as it has been 
here to NB/BN, because NB/BN often incorporates computer science 
and other fields, it would oversimplify this interdisciplinary technology 
to place it in a single natural science category.263  Similarly, synthetic 
biology involves code-driven information, which makes it, somewhat 
like bioinformatics, an awkward exclusive fit in biotechnology.264  Only 
RNAi could possibly be placed exclusively in a biotechnology category, 
but because of potential salutary synergies between RNAi and both 
 
whole drug, rather than one of 5,000 different components of a semiconductor chip.”  Id.  
This perception may indeed be common and thus explain why many in the computer industry 
have supported the most recent patent reform proposals, while many in the life sciences 
industry have not.  See also Robert E. Thomas, Vanquishing Copyright Pirates and Patent 
Trolls:  The Divergent Evolution of Copyright and Patent Laws, 43 AM. BUS. L. J. 689, 693 
(2006) (“Large biotechnology, medical, and pharmaceutical companies (biotech/pharma) do 
not face the same threat that their info-tech counterparts face.  This lack of cohesiveness has 
likely delayed or prevented the passage of some of the proposed patent reforms.”).  However, 
nascent multidisciplinary technologies such as the three discussed here—especially synthetic 
biology—straddle the computer/life sciences dichotomy.  Cf. Arti Rai & James Boyle, 
Synthetic Biology:  Caught Between Property Rights, the Public Domain, and the Commons, 5 
PLOS BIOLOGY 0389, 0389-90 (2007) (“Intellectual property law in the U[.]S[.] has already 
had difficulty incorporating the revolutionary technologies from which synthetic biology 
draws inspiration—biotechnology and computers.”).  Given the multitude and diversity of 
patents, as well as patent thickets, in these three nascent technologies, it is very possible that, 
by the time many of the innovations covered by patents in the technologies become 
commercially viable, injunctive threats from trolls could be problematic for these patents too.     
261. See, e.g., Menell, supra note 214, at 496–501 (noting many distinctions between 
these two broad categories of patents). 
262. See id. (arguing that software and business methods patents both pose particular 
problems that warrant specific reforms tailored to these categories).   
263. See Rai & Boyle, supra note 260.  See also supra text accompanying note 259.  
Regarding NB/BN, compare NCI Alliance for Nanotechnology in Cancer, Nat’l Cancer Inst., 
Where Science and Law Meet, MONTHLY FEATURE, Oct. 2006, at 2, available at 
http://nano.cancer.gov/news_center/monthly_feature_2006_oct.asp, and the statement “the 
filing of a nanotechnology patent often involves a team of scientists representing many 
scientific disciplines collaborating on a technology comprising multiple components, each of 
which might require multiple IP licenses.” 
264. Cf. Rai & Boyle, supra note 260, at 0391. 
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NB/BN and synthetic biology,265 even RNAi does not support the 
argument for category-specific reform.266  Category-specific reform could 
also add a burdensome bureaucratic layer to pertinent patent analysis. 
B. Parallel Science and Technology Commons 
1. Commons for Pertinent Upstream Basic Science and Technology: 
Which Commons Type for Valid and Reliable Building Block Standards 
in the Three Nascent Technologies? 
Broad foundational patents have been reported to slow growth in 
many industries.267  Research at ENCODE and elsewhere reveals the 
need for a more accurate and deeper understanding of human biology.  
This understanding is one of the most important foundational 
knowledge bases in all three nascent technologies.268  In synthetic 
biology, unlike in NB/BN, many of the building blocks have been kept 
in commons.269  However, although building parallel commons could 
provide an effective thicket prophylactic, the commons in synthetic 
biology in themselves have thus far not deterred thickets.270  The 
absence of successful patent pools in the life sciences is also cause for 
concern.271   
One promising solution is to obtain statements of non-assertion from 
other patentees in patent-based commons such as the Registry of 
Standardized Biological Parts at MIT, especially considering that many 
of the innovations in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi will be made 
in academia and government.272  Another good idea is for MIT to “open 
the Registry to any owner that promised to donate its parts to the public 
 
265. See supra note 29. 
266. Moreover, even where Menell seeks categorical reform—software and business 
patents—he states that the boundaries of these patents are inherently ambiguous.  Menell, 
supra note 214, at 506.  Although he implies that this ambiguity is primarily a reflection of 
claim indefiniteness created by inadequate prosecution, see id., there are also disciplinary 
boundary problems in software or business methods made to achieve biotechnology goals. 
267. See, e.g., Rai & Boyle, supra note 260, at 0390 (arguing that considerable evidence 
from virtually every important industry in the twentieth century reveals that broad patents on 
foundational research can retard industry growth).   
268. See supra Part I.B. 
269. See Rai & Boyle, supra note 260, at 0391. 
270. Cf. Kumar & Rai, supra note 28, at 1768 (“Even in its nascent state, the synthetic 
biology research space is filled with proprietary rights.”).    
271. See id. 
272. Cf. Rai & Boyle, supra note 260, at 0391 (stating that because many of the MIT 
registry patents are owned by academia and government, statements of non-assertion in the 
registry would be “a salutary development and a comfort to those working on the registry”). 
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domain after some fixed number of years.”273  The synthetic biology 
commons should be extended to interfaces between synthetic biology 
and other technologies, especially NB/BN and RNAi (as well as 
correlational research linking genotypes to phenotypes274).  Because of 
the cross-disciplinary nature of these technologies, many of the grants 
that fuel the research that feeds the commons should likewise be cross-
disciplinary.275  However, the highly contentious disputes over the 
degree to which foundational genomic information should be preserved 
in a scientific commons suggest that attempts to expand or add 
foundational commons pertinent to the three nascent technologies 
discussed here would meet stiff resistance. 276 
 
273. Joachim Henkel & Stephen M. Maurer, News and Views, The Economics of 
Synthetic Biology, 3:117 MOLECULAR SYS. BIOLOGY 1, 4 (2007) (acknowledging that this 
prescription assumes that the MIT Registry will remain “the world’s premier focal point for 
recording and sharing parts information”).  The authors nonetheless argue that this is a safe 
assumption for two reasons.  First, “scientific databases  . . .  almost always follow a winner-
take-all dynamic in which frontrunners become larger and more entrenched over time.”  
Second, the risk of would-be monopolists trying to build their own proprietary databases to 
challenge the Registry is manageable because “[f]or every company that wanted to 
monopolize parts data, there would be several others trying to block it.  The Registry would 
almost certainly receive their support.”  Id. 
274. Cf. Klein, Gene Patents, supra note 166 (stating that “it is in the public interest 
that our courts do not expand patent-eligible subject matter to include ownership of 
medically related genotype-phenotype correlations”). 
275. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 188–89.   
There is deep knowledge within specific disciplines (e.g., chemistry, genomics), but 
less knowledge that helps us understand connections across disciplines. . . . Part of 
the problem may . . . be due to the grants funding process, which tends to reward 
investigators for narrow, well-defined research projects. . . . The current peer review 
process for grants . . . can . . . create barriers to cross-disciplinary work. . . . Critics of 
the grants process point to the “war on cancer” as an example of how funding can 
divert researchers from the most important problems.  According to one account, 
while metastatic processes lead to about [ninety] percent of all cancer deaths, less 
than 0.5 percent of National Cancer Institute study proposals made between 1972 
and 2004 focused primarily on metastasis.  
Sara Boettiger & Alan B. Bennett, Bayh-Dole:  If We Knew Then What We Know Now, 24 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 320, 321 (2006) (arguing that because NIH’s promotion of its 
guidelines to license nonexclusively and make widely available upstream research tools 
primarily used for discovery rather than products in themselves has fostered access to 
upstream technologies, this promotion should serve as a model for other federal agencies to 
emulate). 
276. Different perceptions on the critical need to preserve the scientific commons in 
genomics for, inter alia, the creation of standard building blocks perhaps explains reports of 
“vigorous, sometimes even vicious, fight[s]” where public investment has been both high and 
high-profile (e.g., Human Genome Project).  Robert Cook-Deegan, The Science Commons in 
Health Research:  Structure, Function, and Value, 32 J. TECH. TRANSFER 133, 136 (2007), 
available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/782310p623282449/fulltext.pdf.  In 
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To counter this resistance, it is important to emphasize that the 
commons would not replace, but rather complement, commercial 
development via synergistic feeding of increasingly accurate basic 
science and technology.277  Moreover, universities may not need the 
patenting and licensing revenue that results from placing a 
disproportionate emphasis on such commercial development.  Even if 
university patenting and licensing suffer because some researchers move 
away from near-term commercializable research, universities will not 
 
examining the competition between public and private gene data provision, Cook-Deegan 
himself forcefully argues that the latter option has been highly problematic for basic research 
because of constraints on private gene sequences which effectively delayed access to the 
sequences until after patents issued or companies published the sequencing information.  
Cook-Deegan reports that these revelations via patenting or publication happened only if it 
was in the companies’ commercial interests.  Id. at 142.  See also Tanuja V. Garde, Supporting 
Innovation in Targeted Treatments:  Licenses of Right to NIH-Funded Research Tools, 11 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 249, 284 (2005) (arguing that while limited access to 
upstream molecular biology research tools could stifle innovation, weakening patent rights 
could also reduce the rate of innovation, thus implying a suboptimal innovation tradeoff, 
although she offers a way around the tradeoff for NIH-funded upstream tools:  licenses of 
right provisions in grant funding).  In nanotechnology, Ted Sabety contends that government-
funding agencies should position seminal upstream foundational patents.  See Sabety, supra 
note 101, at 279. 
277. See Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the 
Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical Research:  Is There a Role for Compulsory 
Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B. U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 120, 136–37 (2007) (stating that the 
power of innovation and market-stimulated research is widely viewed as stemming from a 
strong open basic science base).  Cf. Misha Angrist & Robert M. Cook- Deegan, Who Owns 
the Genome?, 11 THE NEW ATLANTIS 87, 96 (2006), available at 
http://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA11-AngristCook-Deegan.pdf. 
[I]t is also possible that the gathering enthusiasm for “open and collaborative” 
research, even in the private sector, signals an inflection point.  Perhaps we have 
moved beyond the impassioned rhetoric of public versus private; perhaps we no 
longer regard the human genome as either “the common heritage of all mankind” 
immune from IP rights or as a Wild West for speculative patents and endless court 
fights.   
The ultimate fate of genomic research—who (if anyone) owns, pays for, and 
innovates with genomic information—won’t be known for decades.  But we are 
increasingly moving beyond the two-dimensional modes of thinking that 
characterized the early days of biotechnology.  Legions of genome scientists (Craig 
Venter among them) now promote patenting and commercialization in some areas, 
such as protein-based drugs, while simultaneously promoting open science and 
expressing hostility to restrictive patents in others, such as software and raw data. 
Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 188 (arguing that basic R&D can reduce risk for downstream 
commercialization by generating knowledge that reduces uncertainty and, thus, “[a]ny 
strategies or policies at the university level (such as exclusive licensing) that discourage or 
inhibit the broad flow of basic scientific information are clearly problematic”).  Recall from 
Part IV.D, supra, that exclusive licensing appears to be a likely stop on the route to 
commercialization for many developments in the three nascent technologies. 
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suffer too much financially because they have many other ways to 
market their knowledge.278 
2. Which Commons Type for Very High Risk and Very Long-Term 
Technological Developments That Could Truly Revolutionize 
Medicine? 
Unclear or excessive patent claim scope is in part due to the ease of 
obtaining patents of dubious value such that many companies can tout 
huge and varied patent portfolios without attending to individual 
patents or claims except those of exceptional worth.279  Massive litigation 
effecting patent deadlock may well be prevented by the collective 
efforts of government agencies, universities, start-ups, venture 
capitalists, and established pharmaceutical and biotechnological firms, 
as well as the PTO, Congress, and the federal courts.  But even if this 
should occur, patent portfolio-enabled commercialization will not lead 
to huge medical advances, because none of the researchers, developers, 
and enablers of commercialization has sufficient incentive to produce 
the resources needed for long-term investments where the payoff is 
highly uncertain but potentially huge.280 
The infeasibility of creating a viable commercial development plan 
for the most promising long-term medical gains that could well be 
enabled by much more advanced forms of these technologies makes the 
near-term university-start-up-venture capital-acquisition commercial 
R&D pipeline appear inadequate.  There is talk of creating longer-term 
commercial partnerships, but with no probable revolutionary output for 
at least twenty years, incentives to sever such partnerships on truly 
revolutionary projects will be hard to counter.  Venture capitalist 
 
278. See Robert E. Litan et al., Commercializing University Innovations:  A Better Way 
8-9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 407, 2007), available at 
http://www.kauffman.org/pdf/NBER_0407.pdf (arguing that universities transfer information, 
materials, equipment, instruments, human capital, networks, and prototypes a variety of 
ways, patenting and licensing being just one and not necessarily the most economically 
valuable way).   
279. See supra Part II.B. 
280. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 190. 
[T]he [IP] monetization mind-set [in universities] . . . increasingly influences 
licensing and disclosure policies . . . that may inhibit the broad flow of critical 
scientific information.  These policies are aimed at maximizing university licensing 
revenues and equity returns rather than maximizing the contribution to the scientific 
commons.  A shift in mentality and policies is needed.  Over the long term, the 
continued scientific advance of biotechnology and improving the prospects for 
commercially successful R&D requires greater emphasis on the scientific commons.    
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demand for a commercial success within seven years will create path 
dependencies, and associated path dependency-created science and 
technology capacity limits will foster modest fixes to the large and 
diverse range of technological problems.281  There is also talk of strong 
companies—perhaps Nano-Terra being a good prototype, given its 
apparent lack of a need for venture capital and its co-ownership of IP 
with Harvard—making revolutionary breakthroughs via an 
accumulation of incremental advances, each building on previous 
successes.  But even the most well-financed and prestigious near-term 
commercial alliances, such as Harvard-Nano-Terra, will create 
restrictive path dependencies based on the research investments needed 
for successful commercialization.  Because the best medical gains from 
all the technologies will require basic and translational research on 
scientific and technological paths too ambitious to converge with near-
term commercial paths, publicly funded collaborative commons is 
recommended.282 
 
281. Cf. SCOTCHMER, supra note 87, at 58 (Arguing that even if a better idea was 
known to occur at some point in the future, in a competitive market “delay is costly[, and] if 
the delay is . . . too long, then the better idea is not worth waiting for”).  But venture 
capitalists would have you believe otherwise.  See PLATZER, supra note 150.  Platzer’s 
analysis, funded by the National Venture Capital Association, though it also contains 
valuable and valid insights, predictably overstates the risks venture capitalists will take in 
funding medical R&D:  “[M]any . . . venture backed discoveries are so revolutionary that they 
disrupt markets and industry segments.”  Id. at 9.  Truly revolutionary clinical medical 
breakthroughs from any of these technologies are too uncertain and too far down the road for 
a “capitalist venture.”  This is implied by a recent informed commentary about business 
prospects for RNAi.  See, e.g., Haussecker, supra note 62, at 459. 
A basic principle of economics is the inverse relationship of risk and return.  The 
fact that market caps of individual biotechs with little more to show than a single 
approved drug may easily exceed that of all the pure-play RNAi therapeutics 
companies combined, reflects the risk, but also the time involved in realizing the 
therapeutic promise of RNAi.   
Above all, it is the science that matters most.  The delivery challenge is often cited 
and despite a growing literature on delivery to the brain, bone, spleen, cancers, and 
other targets, it is still uncertain which technologies will be able to combine safety 
and efficacy. 
This is also implied by a cautionary analogy to prospects in nanomedicine.  See K. John 
Morrow et al., Recent Advances in Basic and Clinical Nanomedicine, 91 MED. CLINICS N. AM. 
805, 818 (2007) (citations omitted). 
[M]onoclonal antibodies, one of the most significant scientific developments of the 
latter twentieth century.  Discovered in 1975, antibodies were widely believed to 
hold great promise as cancer therapeutics, yet the early years of discovery were 
marked by many failures in clinical trials.  It was only after billions of dollars in 
research and many frustrations that successful antibody products appeared twenty 
years later.  
282. Cf. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO 
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Although promises of too much too soon over-hyped all of the 
technologies, the problem is not so much over-hype, because all of these 
technologies do indeed promise truly revolutionary clinical medical 
gains as soon as twenty years from now, as it is understating the known 
and unknown potential barriers to the R&D progress needed to realize 
the revolutionary gains.  Given the multitude and diversity of these 
unknowns—and track records in both medical biotechnology and 
chronic disease medicine of not fulfilling promises according to schedule 
(in some cases, decades-old deadlines have passed with promised 
medical gains still not made)283—it appears likely that the best route 
towards changing this state of affairs is a major, ambitious public 
commitment built on these three and related technologies.  We should 
promise major gains in prevention and treatment for our main killers—
especially the top three: heart disease, cancer, and cerebrovascular 
disease—in twenty years, up the funding for public research, and make 
an unprecedented, unqualified demand that researchers make 
demonstrable progress towards realizing the gains or else lose the public 
funding.284   
Because of all of the risks associated with commercial clinical 
medical development of ambitious innovations in these three 
technologies, it is not surprising that venture capitalists as well as 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies have shied away from 
such innovations.285  Despite the continual waves of seemingly 
 
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS, NEW DRUG DEVELOPMENT:  SCIENCE, BUSINESS, 
REGULATORY, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ISSUES CITED AS HAMPERING DRUG 
DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS (2006) (“According to experts, several factors have hampered drug 
development  . . .  [including] limitations on the scientific understanding of how to translate 
research discoveries into safe and effective drugs. . . .”). 
283. See supra Section I.B. 
284. Cf. Litan et al., supra note 278, at 17 (“More ambitiously, agencies of the federal 
government can condition their research grants on university demonstrations that they are 
experimenting with and using multiple pathways to provide competition or to advance 
innovations into the commercial market.”). 
285. Compare PISANO, supra note 217, at 149 (Discussing biotechnology generally, 
Pisano states, “[t]here are already some signs that existing mechanisms for risk management 
are breaking down for the truly high-risk projects.  In the post-genomics bubble period, there 
was a marked change in the strategies of start-ups and the preferences of venture 
capitalists.”) with Magnus Gittins, A New Model for Investors, 8 MATERIALS TODAY 54 
(2005) (discussing nanotechnology, Gittins states,  
[N]anotechnology is reaching a critical point in its life cycle—it must deliver on 
some [of its] promises or face a crisis of confidence. . . .  
. . . . 
Critical to ensuring that discoveries fulfill their potential is striking a balance where 
corporations and governments can work closely with universities to drive and 
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compelling promises that biotechnology start-up companies make, the 
vast majority of these companies have not survived to make a successful 
exit.  Partly as a direct consequence, established biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical companies have become gun-shy about acquiring such 
start-ups, and partly as an indirect consequence, start-ups appear to 
have lost some of their entrepreneurial edge.286  Proper integration of 
scientific and technological knowledge in technology development is 
also hampered by the diverse problem set in the pertinent science and 
technology which the recent research at ENCODE et al. highlights, as 
well as the unclear patent landscape.287  The need for commercial success 
in the near future, combined with the complex biology underlying 
conditions of health and pathology, will thus lead commercial research 
designs away from ambitious, risky, long-term projects.   
Extraordinarily intricate, still not well-understood, composite 
intracellular/extracellular pathological conditions are implicated in 
America’s three most common killers: heart disease, cancer, and 
 
finance product development in a low-cost, low-risk way.).   
286. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 184–85.  Pisano notes, 
the sector appears to be retreating from its position at the radical and risky end of 
the R&D spectrum.  It was supposed to be the entrepreneurial biotechnology firms, 
unshackled from tradition and bureaucracy, that would go where big pharmaceutical 
companies dared not.  Unfortunately, the economics have not worked out, and 
biotechnology firms [are] mov[ing] from the frontier to less risky ventures. . . . [T]his 
trend should give us [some] pause.  Entrepreneurial firms are expected to be at the 
cutting edge of research.  If young biotech firms are not pursuing the high-risk 
strategies—if they are moving away from cutting-edge science—then who will focus 
on the higher-risk, long-term, and less scientifically mature projects that offer 
potential medical breakthroughs?  Who will be on the vanguard of the 
biotechnology revolution in the future? 
If “the economics have not worked out,” perhaps the entrepreneurial market is too 
precarious to rely on primarily for medical breakthroughs.  Perhaps we as a public ought to 
demand from our federal government more prudent, well-thought-out investment in high 
risk, but potentially very high medical return, long-term R&D.  
287. Cf. id. at 150–52. 
IP monetization and the market for know-how[ ]works very well in industries like 
software and  semiconductors. . . .  
. . . . 
Biotechnology is quite different . . . The pieces of the drug discovery puzzle are 
often not modular at all but constitute a set of independent problems. . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [I]n biotechnology the IP regime is more complex and murky.  It is often not 
clear ex ante what is patentable and what is not. . . . Furthermore, the most valuable 
IP is often not the specific molecule, but the understanding, insight, and data about 
how that molecule behaves, what it can do, what its potential problems are, and how 
it might be developed.  This type of knowledge is often much more difficult to 
patent, and yet it needs to be shared before and during the collaboration.  
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cerebrovascular disease.  Although there have been many 
improvements in diagnosis, prevention, and treatment for all three 
diseases, we have yet to make any breakthroughs that could be causally 
linked to very large reductions in incidence and prevalence rates for 
these diseases.  This is not for a lack of funding: Over the last forty 
years, a massive amount of public money has been invested which can 
be tied directly or indirectly to the prevention and treatment of these 
three diseases. 
Publicly funded biomedical research has consistently failed to 
deliver on its greatest promises.  In the 1960s, cures for all types of 
cancer were promised; we are still waiting for a cure for just one type.  
The laboratory researchers announce breakthrough after breakthrough, 
but where is the real medical breakthrough?  We expect far too little for 
our health-related research money.  The government granting system 
has not produced a truly major breakthrough in heart disease, cancer, or 
cerebrovascular disease, in part because of a lack of sufficient incentives 
for the most ambitious research.  But this could and should change.  
Given the stakes—our lives—we need extremely prudent public 
financing of these endeavors, based on thorough analyses from a large 
and varied group of relatively disinterested experts.   
Perhaps no one can be relied on to be absolutely disinterested in the 
sense of not having career-based or other particular professional 
motives that could possibly lead to the advocacy or pursuit of research 
of suboptimal long-term value to the public.  The basic science and 
technology research culture may not have, even in the Bayh-Dole era, a 
comparably strong demand for near-term commercialization which is 
virtually ubiquitous in private R&D.  Nonetheless, the federal 
government agency as grant-provider is itself a seller in a market niche 
where political forces such as patient advocacy groups may have 
particular short-term interests that are not consistent with the general 
long-term public welfare.  These groups often include family members 
of victims of lethal diseases.  Many of these family members, desperate 
to hear of cures just around the corner, will be averse to skepticism.  
Sympathy for their plight should not lead to a waste of billions of tax 
dollars, especially when such waste will probably just perpetuate the 
prevalence of many diseases for future generations.   
George Miklos and Phillip Baird’s scathing criticism of apparently 
grossly misfocused and overhyped research at The Cancer Genome 
Atlas (TCGA), notwithstanding the probability that the criticism is only 
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partly justified,288 underscores the point that publicly funded and 
ambitious research is not all that we need.  The promise from a former 
National Cancer Institute Director of a cure from such research coming 
by 2015 leads to serious worries that the culture of the institute may be 
driven by desires to show swift progress to get coveted congressionally 
earmarked funding.  Part of the problem may be the careerist motives 
that lead to distorted reports; when this happens in a research setting, 
money can be wasted, but when it happens in an experimental clinical 
setting, lives can be lost.289 
The ultimate source of this problem is us—the public—for being too 
impatient, for perpetuating our ignorance as to the complexities of 
human pathologies such as cancer, for demanding swift change in the 
near-term rather than more certain change in the long-term.290  
Although this Article still maintains that the balance of public 
commons-to-private patent-protected research is skewed somewhat 
towards the latter,291 increasing the commons will only be beneficial if 
 
288. Miklos & Baird, supra note 236. 
289. Perhaps the most notorious example of distorted information reporting occurred, 
according to the Justice Department, prior to the death of eighteen-year-old Jesse Gelsinger.  
His death was the result of gene therapy that he received in 2000 as part of an experimental 
clinical trial at the University of Pennsylvania and Children’s National Medical Center.  The 
Justice Department, which investigated the incident and activities that preceded it, settled the 
case in 2005, reportedly alleging that human toxic reactions should have halted the trial, but 
lead investigators misrepresented clinical findings to both the NIH and the FDA which 
oversaw the trial.  One of the investigators accused of this deception also reportedly had “a 
financial interest in a company that stood to profit if the trial was successful.”  Jennifer 
Couzin & Jocelyn Kaiser, As Gelsinger Case Ends, Gene Therapy Suffers Another Blow, 307 
SCIENCE 1028 (2005).  Of course, it is easy to make too much of this high-profile tragedy, but 
one must nonetheless wonder about critical conflicts of interest.  Certainly, having a principal 
investigator with an outside financial interest in a successful trial is something an 
experimental trial for a new complicated procedure with many obstacles, both anticipated 
and unanticipated, does not need.  There may inevitably be incentives to downplay, if not 
conceal, problems to successful implementation if one’s reputation as a scientist may be 
affected by whether the trial proceeds at all and if one has cognitive biases oneself that tend 
to skew risk negatively.  Possible commercial conflicts of interest could easily provide 
additional incentives.    
290. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 8–9.  Pisano argues,  
In the context of biotechnology, the challenges of high risk and primary uncertainty 
are further amplified by the long time horizons over which these risks and 
uncertainties are resolved. . . . In science . . . the uncertainty and risks may linger for 
years, sometimes decades.  Cancer continues to prove a devilishly difficult disease to 
understand and treat despite several decades of massive investment in basic 
research.  And even when one finds a “solution,” it does not necessarily have clear 
implications for commercial R&D; rather, it may instead trigger a new round of 
basic research. 
291. Cf. Bruce H. Littman et al., What’s Next in Translational Medicine?, CLINICAL 
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that commons is broadly conceived and maintained.  We must always 
think of the health of future generations.  Their health will benefit most 
from prudent investment in both rigorously defensive research—i.e., the 
thorough study of all potential scientific and technological barriers to 
revolutionary medical advances—and rigorously offensive research that 
aims to make these advances.  Patient advocacy groups may not want to 
hear the sobering news that rigorously defensive research has already 
provided and will continue to provide about formidable obstacles that 
need to be overcome before success can be achieved, but not to pursue 
such research is to perpetuate the obstacles.  If, for instance, we want 
more than just extensions of chemotherapy, radiation, and surgery for 
cancer treatment in the long-term, we had better face up to the near-
term obstacles.292 
This is not to say that patent portfolio-enabled commercial R&D 
should not be pursued for accumulated incremental gains, just that it 
must be better complemented by prudently planned R&D into 
associated basic science and technology.  There is simply far too much 
unknown about short-term and long-term efficacy and safety effects of 
pertinent inventions considered individually and as a totality.  More 
importantly, there is even less known about whether the more ambitious 
medical promises associated with NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi 
will ever be efficacious and safe.  Countless research articles have 
identified obstacles for NB/BN and RNAi-enabled targeted drug 
delivery and ways to surmount the obstacles, while also emphasizing 
that there are probably additional, yet-to-be-identified obstacles.293 
A point rarely made in the literature comparing innovation in 
semiconductors and the rapid growth of information technology with 
the comparative slow growth of medical biotechnology is that the 
intracellular and extracellular dynamics of human pathological 
processes such as those associated with different types of cancer are 
many times more complex than the complicated circuitry involved in 
electrical engineering.  Much research on the comparative lack of 
progress in biotechnology has rightly focused on economic factors that 
foster suboptimal incentives for innovation.  However, it is very possible 
that ignorance in basic science and technology—masked by hype—is an 
 
SCI., 217, 219 (2007) (noting that, in 2003, over 60% of total R&D spending on biomedical 
research was private).  
292. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217. 
293. See supra Part I.B. 
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even greater barrier.294 
Despite high levels of scientific and technological knowledge and 
skill in NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi, we need to push ourselves 
to much higher levels to reap the major rewards in medical 
breakthroughs that very carefully constructed interventions in these 
technologies could provide twenty years hence.295  Evolution appears to 
have created extraordinarily intricate, metabolically interdependent, 
and seemingly ultimately phenotype-controlled, cellular, intercellular, 
and molecular dynamics.  This complexity, combined with the emergent 
nature of the technologies, will demand much greater knowledge and 
skill in all three technologies296 for us to realize the promises of high-
tech, highly personalized medicine.   
CONCLUSION 
NB/BN, synthetic biology, and RNAi all hold great medical 
promises but, despite hype suggesting the contrary, the greatest medical 
promises will not be fulfilled in the near future.  In the near-term, the 
patent landscapes must be effectively uncluttered and patent 
prosecutors must work with patent examiners to produce thorough and 
precise patents that would increase confidence in patent quality.  Patent 
 
294. Cf. PISANO, supra note 217, at 8.   
In science-based business, R&D confronts fundamental questions about technical 
feasibility.  Is it possible to express a protein in a bacterial cell?  Is it possible to 
culture mammalian cells in vitro?  What genes are involved in depression?  Which 
biochemical pathways are involved in inflammation?  What role do kinases play in 
certain diseases?  Why are some people more likely than others to be stricken with 
Alzheimer’s Disease?  These are the types of questions with which science-based 
businesses in biotechnology have had to grapple. 
Not only are such questions difficult to answer, but the attempt to answer them leads, in 
all likelihood, to more questions—or to unexpected results. 
295. Regarding NB/BN, compare Chih-Ming Ho, Dean Ho, and Dan Garcia, Bio-
Nano-Information Fusion, 209, 220, in LYNN FOSTER, NANOTECHNOLOGY:  SCIENCE, 
INNOVATION, AND OPPORTUNITY (2006). 
Although the nanotechnology industry is in a nascent stage, rapid advancements and 
a streamlined road map of progress ensure that the future is quite promising. . . .  
However, to reach this point in the roadmap, we must address in depth several key 
areas. . . . Through the use of emerging technologies and methodologies for 
discovery . . . we will achieve an unprecedented, more complex level of control of 
biological molecules.  This, in turn, will give us a deeper understanding of how . . . 
biomolecules and their respective activities contribute to global functionality (such 
as the systemic performance of the human body) to create an emergent behavior in 
nature.  In this way, nanotechnology will then be poised to reproduce this behavior 
to combat disease. . . . 
296. As well as in other related “anticipated” (that is, likely to emerge) technologies. 
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portfolio construction and management must also be an integral part of 
multidimensional modifiable roadmaps to commercialization.  The 
roadmaps should include initial patent portfolio-guided R&D path 
construction and maintenance to generate and improve prospects for 
exclusive licensing, financing, and acquisition. 
Patent portfolio-enabled short-term commercialization nonetheless 
needs to be complemented by scientific and technological commons.  
Commons are needed to create valid and reliable building block 
standards and to facilitate very high risk, but potentially revolutionary, 
long-term biomedical R&D in these technologies.  More prudent 
government funding of long-term research would allow for both a 
greatly increased understanding of the basic science and technology and 
the capacity twenty years hence to translate that understanding into 
revolutionary advances in clinical medicine. 
 
